A review of Likelihood Ratios in Forensic Science based on a critique of Stiffelman “No longer the Gold standard: probabilistic genotyping is changing the nature of DNA evidence in criminal trials”

John Buckleton; Bernard Robertson; James Curran; Charles Berger; Duncan Taylor; Jo-Anne Bright; Tacha Hicks; Simone Gittelson; Ian Evett; Simone Pugh; Graham Jackson; Hannah Kelly; Tim Kalafut; Frederick R. Bieber

doi:10.1016/j.forsciint.2020.110251

A review of Likelihood Ratios in Forensic Science based on a critique of Stiffelman “No longer the Gold standard: probabilistic genotyping is changing the nature of DNA evidence in criminal trials”

John Buckleton, Bernard Robertson, James Curran, Charles Berger, Duncan Taylor, Jo-Anne Bright^*, Tacha Hicks, Simone Gittelson, Ian Evett, Simone Pugh, Graham Jackson, Hannah Kelly, Tim Kalafut, Frederick R. Bieber

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

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Abstract

Stiffelman [1] gives a broad critique of the application of likelihood ratios (LRs) in forensic science, in particular their use in probabilistic genotyping (PG) software. These are discussed in this review.

LRs do not infringe on the ultimate issue. The Bayesian paradigm clearly separates the role of the scientist from that of the decision makers and distances the scientist from comment on the ultimate and subsidiary issues.

LRs do not affect the reasonable doubt standard. Fact finders must still make decisions based on all the evidence and they must do this considering that all evidence, not just that given probabilistically.

LRs do not infringe on the presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence does not equate with a prior probability of zero but simply that the POI is no more likely than anyone else to be the donor.

Propositions need to be exhaustive within the context of the case. That is, propositions deemed relevant by either defense or prosecution which are not fanciful must not be omitted from consideration.

Original language	English
Article number	110251
Number of pages	6
Journal	Forensic Science International
Volume	310
Early online date	13 Mar 2020
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forsciint.2020.110251
Publication status	Published - 1 May 2020
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Likelihood ratio
Reasonable doubt
Presumption of innocence
Exhaustiveness

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10.1016/j.forsciint.2020.110251

Jackson_AReviewOfLikelihoodRatiosInForensicScienceBased_Accepted_2020Accepted author manuscript, 388 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

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Buckleton, J., Robertson, B., Curran, J., Berger, C., Taylor, D., Bright, J-A., Hicks, T., Gittelson, S., Evett, I., Pugh, S., Jackson, G., Kelly, H., Kalafut, T., & Bieber, F. R. (2020). A review of Likelihood Ratios in Forensic Science based on a critique of Stiffelman “No longer the Gold standard: probabilistic genotyping is changing the nature of DNA evidence in criminal trials”. Forensic Science International, 310, [110251]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forsciint.2020.110251

Buckleton, John ; Robertson, Bernard ; Curran, James ; Berger, Charles ; Taylor, Duncan ; Bright, Jo-Anne ; Hicks, Tacha ; Gittelson, Simone ; Evett, Ian ; Pugh, Simone ; Jackson, Graham ; Kelly, Hannah ; Kalafut, Tim ; Bieber, Frederick R. / A review of Likelihood Ratios in Forensic Science based on a critique of Stiffelman “No longer the Gold standard : probabilistic genotyping is changing the nature of DNA evidence in criminal trials”. In: Forensic Science International. 2020 ; Vol. 310.

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title = "A review of Likelihood Ratios in Forensic Science based on a critique of Stiffelman “No longer the Gold standard: probabilistic genotyping is changing the nature of DNA evidence in criminal trials”",

abstract = "Stiffelman [1] gives a broad critique of the application of likelihood ratios (LRs) in forensic science, in particular their use in probabilistic genotyping (PG) software. These are discussed in this review.LRs do not infringe on the ultimate issue. The Bayesian paradigm clearly separates the role of the scientist from that of the decision makers and distances the scientist from comment on the ultimate and subsidiary issues.LRs do not affect the reasonable doubt standard. Fact finders must still make decisions based on all the evidence and they must do this considering that all evidence, not just that given probabilistically.LRs do not infringe on the presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence does not equate with a prior probability of zero but simply that the POI is no more likely than anyone else to be the donor.Propositions need to be exhaustive within the context of the case. That is, propositions deemed relevant by either defense or prosecution which are not fanciful must not be omitted from consideration.",

author = "John Buckleton and Bernard Robertson and James Curran and Charles Berger and Duncan Taylor and Jo-Anne Bright and Tacha Hicks and Simone Gittelson and Ian Evett and Simone Pugh and Graham Jackson and Hannah Kelly and Tim Kalafut and Bieber, {Frederick R.}",

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Buckleton, J, Robertson, B, Curran, J, Berger, C, Taylor, D, Bright, J-A, Hicks, T, Gittelson, S, Evett, I, Pugh, S, Jackson, G, Kelly, H, Kalafut, T & Bieber, FR 2020, 'A review of Likelihood Ratios in Forensic Science based on a critique of Stiffelman “No longer the Gold standard: probabilistic genotyping is changing the nature of DNA evidence in criminal trials”', Forensic Science International, vol. 310, 110251. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forsciint.2020.110251

A review of Likelihood Ratios in Forensic Science based on a critique of Stiffelman “No longer the Gold standard : probabilistic genotyping is changing the nature of DNA evidence in criminal trials”. / Buckleton, John; Robertson, Bernard; Curran, James; Berger, Charles; Taylor, Duncan; Bright, Jo-Anne; Hicks, Tacha; Gittelson, Simone; Evett, Ian; Pugh, Simone; Jackson, Graham; Kelly, Hannah; Kalafut, Tim; Bieber, Frederick R.

In: Forensic Science International, Vol. 310, 110251, 01.05.2020.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

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AU - Gittelson, Simone

AU - Evett, Ian

AU - Pugh, Simone

AU - Jackson, Graham

AU - Kelly, Hannah

AU - Kalafut, Tim

AU - Bieber, Frederick R.

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Buckleton J, Robertson B, Curran J, Berger C, Taylor D, Bright J-A et al. A review of Likelihood Ratios in Forensic Science based on a critique of Stiffelman “No longer the Gold standard: probabilistic genotyping is changing the nature of DNA evidence in criminal trials”. Forensic Science International. 2020 May 1;310. 110251. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forsciint.2020.110251

A review of Likelihood Ratios in Forensic Science based on a critique of Stiffelman “No longer the Gold standard: probabilistic genotyping is changing the nature of DNA evidence in criminal trials”

Abstract

Keywords

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