People tend to mirror the syntax used by their interlocutors in dialogue. Given that people treat computers as “social actors” in many ways, we might expect them to mirror computers’ syntax as well. We report an experiment in which naïve participants played a dialogue game in which they believed that they were interacting with either a person or a computer. In fact, in both cases their “interlocutor” was a computer program that produced pre-scripted utterances. Participants demonstrated a very strong tendency to repeat the syntactic form of their “interlocutor’s” immediately preceding utterance in both conditions. It does not appear that beliefs about the mental states of one’s interlocutor mediate between perception and production.
|Title of host publication||Proceedings of the 25th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, July 31 - August 2 2003, Boston, Massachusetts|
|Editors||Richard Alterman, David Kirsh|
|Place of Publication||Mahwah, NJ|
|Publisher||Lawrence Erlbaum Associates|
|Number of pages||6|
|Publication status||Published - 2003|
|Event||25th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society - Park Plaza Hotel, Boston, United States|
Duration: 30 Jul 2003 → 1 Aug 2003
Conference number: 25
|Conference||25th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society|
|Abbreviated title||CogSci 2003|
|Period||30/07/03 → 1/08/03|
Branigan, H. P., Pickering, M. J., Pearson, J., McLean, J. F., & Nass, C. I. (2003). Syntactic alignment between computers and people: the role of belief about mental states. In R. Alterman, & D. Kirsh (Eds.), Proceedings of the 25th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, July 31 - August 2 2003, Boston, Massachusetts (pp. 186-191). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.