The credit crisis and corporate governance: excessive bonuses of TARP banks

Marco G.D. Guidi, Reza Kouhy

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    Maximising TARP banks' value to society would require the integration of all stakeholders rights and 'moral debt' (obligations) claims providing justice in protecting and distributing alienable and inalienable rights as well as their associated benefits and costs. For instance, the TARP banks that maximise their value only for an elite group through excessive bonus payments to executives incur 'moral debt' claims from other stakeholders, which will make the firm less valuable to society. This study shows that the unjust redistribution of rights through compulsory layoffs, whilst making excessive executive bonus payments reduces the value of TARP banks to society.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)366–381
    Number of pages16
    JournalInternational Journal of Corporate Governance
    Volume1
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2009

    Keywords

    • Trouble asset relief programme
    • Banking
    • Excessive bonuses
    • Compulsory lay-offs
    • Rights redistribution
    • Moral debt
    • Corporate governance
    • Credit crisis
    • Bonus payments
    • Executive bonuses
    • TARP banks
    • Value to society

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