Global Concepts, Local Contexts

A case study of international criminal justice policy transfer in violence reduction

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of Glasgow Caledonian University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my wife Christine. I could not have achieved all that I have without her love and support over the past 35 years.
Abstract

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Glasgow has long experienced the issue of gang-related violence, especially in the east end of the city, an area of high social deprivation and related problems. Faced with apparent failure to deal with the problems of violence, in 2008, the police in Glasgow, in partnership with other statutory agencies, engaged in a process of policy transfer of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (US CIRV). They formed a multi-agency strategy, the Community Initiative to Reduce Violence (Glasgow CIRV), in order to tackle violence by targeting gangs and gang members both collectively and individually, in an attempt to encourage them to change their lifestyle. Glasgow CIRV operated for a period of three years (June 2008-July 2011), with some success in reducing violence and weapon carrying offences, however, in contrast to US CIRV, which is still in operation, it failed to achieve long-term sustainability.

This research is an in-depth case study of the policy transfer between US CIRV and Glasgow CIRV and was initially guided by the question; ‘to what extent could the apparent long-term failure of Glasgow CIRV be explained by the policy transfer process?’ The model of policy transfer developed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) was used to provide the theoretical and empirical framework to analyse the processes, mechanisms,
and outcomes of the transfer of CIRV from Cincinnati to Glasgow. The transfer process was found to be a direct copy of the US CIRV project by Glasgow CIRV at the outset, however; it quickly became apparent that this process changed to one of emulation, due to differences, including the local context and legal constraints.

The model of policy transfer proved to be a useful analytical tool with which to frame the empirical approach used in this case study. However, the model was found to have some limitations in terms of understanding the outcome of the policy transfer process. These limitations, which include its descriptive, linear, and finite framework, do not allow for the conceptualisation of one of the main findings of this research, an instance of 'back-flow of policy transfer', which requires a more cyclical approach; nor for the critical theorisation of what happens after a policy has been transferred, where the model stops, but the process may continue.

This thesis therefore, extends existing knowledge in the field of criminal justice policy transfer by proposing an extension to the model beyond its linear and finite scope, by showing that transfer can be cyclical in nature and not be restricted to ‘one-way traffic’, identifying what it does not encapsulate, and reinforcing the significance of the local contexts, which cannot fail to have an impact on such transfer processes.
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I am sure that she will breathe a sigh of relief when it is all over. This thesis is for you Christine.
Declaration

This thesis has been composed by myself, from results of my own work, except where stated otherwise.

It has not been submitted in any previous application for a degree.

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

This thesis critically analyses a case study of international criminal justice policy transfer, the Glasgow Community Initiative to Reduce Violence (Glasgow CIRV), which was a multi-agency strategy designed to address the issue of gang-related violence that has long been prevalent in Glasgow. It was first implemented in Glasgow in 2008 and drew heavily on the experiences of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (US CIRV), which was implemented in the US in 2007 as a means of addressing gang-related violent crime in that city. The Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (US CIRV) found its origins in the 1995 Boston Gun Project (Kennedy, 1997; Braga et al., 1999 and 2001), that had been developed by a team of academics and members of the Boston Police Department to deal with the growing homicide problem and illegal firearms market in the city, associated with the gangs primarily involved in drugs and acquisitive crime. The approach developed was termed a ‘focused deterrence strategy’ (Kennedy, 1997; Braga et al., 1999 and 2001) and the police used a problem-oriented policing (POP) approach to tackle the problems faced, as examined in Chapter 5 in this thesis.

This focused deterrence strategy has been and is still being used in various cities in the US, for example, Oakland and Los Angeles (California), Cleveland and Dayton (Ohio), Detroit (Michigan) and Minneapolis (Minnesota), to name a few (National Network for Safer Communities, 2014). However, this was the first time that an attempt had been made to transfer the approach out of the US (to Glasgow). It has since also been implemented in Enfield, London (Graham, 2016) to deal with gangs and violence, and also in Adelaide, Australia (Engel, 2013), targeting ‘smash and grab’ raids.
Glasgow CIRV was led by Strathclyde Police, and comprised staff drawn from different partner agencies in the city, through the auspices of the National Violence Reduction Unit (VRU). The VRU was created in 2005 by Strathclyde Police (later given a national remit in 2006) and was designed to address all forms of violence, especially knife crime and the possession of weapons by young males in the Glasgow area (Williams and Carnochan, 2016, as discussed in Croall, Mooney and Munro, 2016).

The concept of CIRV and the focused deterrence strategy, on which it was based, were designed to target a particular issue, for example, gang-member related homicides in Cincinnati or gang violence in Glasgow. The Glasgow CIRV model allowed for the central coordinating team to approach gang members, involved in violence, to engage with them and using the services of the various agencies involved in the city, offer them alternative lifestyles away from violence. Focusing on the issue of violence, the Glasgow CIRV objective was to reduce the frequency of street violence in the east end of the city and to continually reduce this frequency over time. Glasgow CIRV acted as a central coordination team for law enforcement, service providers, and community members to ensure that those who continued to participate in violent gangs received due consequences in law, while those who chose to transition to a non-violent lifestyle, received the appropriate services in the most effective, efficient, and respectful manner possible (Glasgow CIRV 6 Month Report, 2009).

Glasgow CIRV launched in June 2008 and ran for a period of three years, with some degree of success before it ceased to operate in July 2011, therefore failing to achieve long-term sustainability. This is in contrast to US CIRV in Cincinnati, which is still in operation today (July 2016). This research aimed to investigate these different outcomes by carrying out an in-depth analysis of the policy transfer between US CIRV and Glasgow CIRV and was
initially guided by the question; ‘to what extent could the apparent long-term failure of Glasgow CIRV be explained by the policy transfer process?’ In order to answer this question, the model of policy transfer developed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) was used to provide the theoretical and empirical framework to analyse the mechanisms, processes and outcomes of the transfer of the CIRV programme from Cincinnati to Glasgow. It was also envisaged that by answering this question, the effectiveness of the model as an analytical tool, including its limitations in assessing policy transfer, could be critically discussed.

The rest of this chapter will first give an overview of Glasgow and its gangs over the years and also provide a similar picture of Cincinnati and Boston, the site of the original focused deterrence strategy, to provide some context. This will be followed by setting out the aims and objectives, the theoretical framework and an outline of the thesis.

**Glasgow and its Gangs**

Glasgow is Scotland’s largest city, situated on the River Clyde in the west of the country, and was first established as a religious centre in the 6th Century. Following the Industrial Revolution of the 18th and 19th Centuries, the population and economy of Glasgow grew exponentially and it became ‘the Second City of the Empire’, one of the world’s most important centres of heavy industry, especially in shipbuilding and engineering (Craig, 2010). In 1939, the population of Glasgow peaked at 1,128,473, which led to significant urban renewal projects to reduce the inner city population. The next few years saw a large-scale relocation of people to the peripheral suburbs of Pollok and Castlemilk in the south of the city, Drumchapel in the west, and Easterhouse in the northeast of the city and also to new towns being built outside the city. This had the effect of massively reducing
the population to its current level of 598,830, with the Greater Glasgow conurbation having a population of approximately 2,500,000 people (National Records of Scotland, 2011).

The east end of Glasgow, the area where Glasgow CIRV first operated, contains the suburb of Easterhouse and includes some of the most socially and economically deprived areas in the UK (SIMD, 2012). Easterhouse, especially, has suffered from a long history of social problems, which have arisen due to the failure to provide basic civic amenities when the housing scheme (or housing estate) was first built. In areas to the north of Glasgow, for example, Springburn and Maryhill, unemployment levels and drug abuse are among the highest in Scotland (Deuchar, 2009). Housing regeneration has made a difference, with old tenement buildings demolished or refurbished, however, social and economic deprivation still exits at high levels, which, in parallel with American cities like Cincinnati, has led to social problems and high levels of crime and delinquency (Deuchar, 2009).

Various researchers (see Chapter 2) have discussed the fact that Glasgow has suffered for generations from a ‘gang problem’ along with the associated violence and territorialism issues (see Patrick, 1973; Davies, 2007 and 2013; Deuchar, 2009 and 2010; Deuchar and Holligan, 2008 and 2010 and Kintrea et al., 2010). The gangs in Glasgow, especially those in the east end where Glasgow CIRV was implemented, comprised young males typically in their teens, aged 12 years of age and up to their mid-20s. The issue of territoriality, or as Suttles (1972) describes it, ‘defended territory’, can lead to regular large-scale fights and instances of violence, including serious assaults and murders (homicides) (Kintrea et al., 2010). These issues associated with the gangs in Glasgow are examined in Chapter 2 while also providing a comparison with the situation in Cincinnati.
**Cincinnati and its Gangs**

In order to provide context for this research it is important to give a brief overview of the city of Cincinnati, Ohio, the site of US CIRV that Glasgow CIRV sought to copy, examining its growth and socio-economic factors over the years, that gave rise to its gang situation and the civil unrest that led to the development of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (US CIRV).

Settlers founded Cincinnati in 1788 after the British occupation of America had been ended by the American Revolution, as the British had previously proclaimed that settlers could not move westwards over the Appalachian Mountains. The city was founded on the north bank of the Ohio River at the state borders of Ohio, Kentucky and Indiana. The site was attractive due to its river access and steep wooded hillsides and the settlers quickly came into contact with native tribes who used the area for seasonal hunting, leading to conflict and the eventual intervention of the army who constructed a new fort, Fort Washington, to protect the settlers. By 1840, the city's growth escalated rapidly and reflected its status as one of America’s central commercial cities due to its river location and the opening of the Miami Canal (Stradling, 2003).

By the late 1840s the city was attracting even more immigrants, especially from Germany, and by 1850 more than 40% of all Cincinnatians were either German or had been born of German parents. They settled in an affluent area north of the Miami Canal just north of the city centre, called Over-the-Rhine due to its Germanic population. Staley, (2001) and Stradling (2003) state that by the end of the 20th Century, this same area, had become a ‘crime-ridden neighbourhood’ and was ‘notoriously impoverished’ due to the movement of the original occupants out to the more affluent suburbs and the in-migration of other
ethnic groups, notably black African-Americans, in a similar trend experienced in other American cities (Park, 1925).

Cincinnati’s population grew over the years to a peak of over 500,000 in 1950, due to its increasing industrialisation, and the city became a great commercial port and meatpacking (mainly pork) centre. This industrialisation process gradually increased the gap between the rich and poor residents, and from the 1960s suburban growth led to a racial polarisation, as white families migrated outwards from inner city neighbourhoods to the more exclusive and homogeneous suburbs of the city. The population subsequently decreased to 296,943 in 2010, with the greater Cincinnati area containing approximately 2,000,000 people (US Census, 2010). Deindustrialisation followed and left the black African American population in declining neighbourhoods. Businesses closed, employment fell and crime began to rise as young black males found themselves disadvantaged and unemployed (Stradling, 2003). The inner-city areas experienced the greatest decline in population; with over 50% moving away and these same areas that experienced the highest population loss are also in the worst poverty brackets.

The high levels of unemployment, social and economic deprivation, coupled with the move to the suburbs by the mainly white population, left the largely African American unemployed in the inner-city areas, like Over-The-Rhine, East Price Hill, East Walnut Hill and Avondale. Gangs proliferated in these areas and crime levels increased over the years. The chart in Appendix 1 gives an indication of the gangs and their extensive networks that have become established over the years in Cincinnati.
**Boston**

The situation in Cincinnati mirrored somewhat that experienced in the late seventies and early eighties in Boston, the site of the implementation of the Boston Gun Project (or Operation Ceasefire as it was also known), the origin of the focused deterrence strategy that evolved into US CIRV. In Boston, changes in structural and socio-economic factors produced conditions in inner-city minority communities that created the conditions for a rise in crime. The socio-economic fabric of communities collapsed under various pressures, for example, high unemployment, business closures and families breaking up with children growing up in increasingly stressful and adverse conditions, resulting in youths joining gangs in search of security and affiliation with others. Braga (2003) states that the gangs produced a fear of crime for society in general and caused other gangs to form and become rivals. There followed an epidemic of crack cocaine usage leading to some gangs becoming involved in the street-level drug markets and arming themselves both for protection and to resolve disputes, which led to a proliferation of guns and violence and a worsening of the situation (Braga, 2003).

Cincinnati experienced a similar growth in drug crime as Boston did, though on a slightly later timeline. Crack cocaine first came to the fore in the mid-eighties, though it did not replace powder cocaine until the early nineties. Cincinnati also suffered from a growth in gang violence and a surge in the use of illegal firearms as a result of the drug problem (Cincinnati Police Commander Interview), leading to the eventual establishment of US CIRV.

The following sections outline the aims and objectives of this research, the theoretical framework and the structure of this thesis.
**Research Aims and Objectives**

The purpose of this research was to investigate the mechanisms, processes and outcomes of this case of international criminal justice policy transfer, of which the key objectives were:

- To examine the legal, socio-economic and cultural environs in which the initiative was developed in Glasgow in comparison with Cincinnati.
- To develop an understanding of the factors, both endogenous and exogenous, which affected the implementation of the initiative and its outcomes, including sustainability.
- To establish whether the policy transfer achieved its intended outcomes and whether it was a complete transfer of the initiative policy or otherwise.
- To reflect on the transferability of this type of criminal justice policy.

**Theoretical Framework**

In order to analyse the transfer of the violence programme, US CIRV, to Glasgow, this research used the model of policy transfer developed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) to provide a theoretical framework. Policy transfer has existed for millennia, as noted by Evans (2009b) in his discussion of Aristotle advising citizens in Ancient Greece of the rationality of taking part in lesson-drawing from positive and negative experiences in developing their city-states. Rose (1991), in his discussion of ‘lesson-drawing’, argues that policy transfer has always existed but has grown since the end of World War II due to the expansion in worldwide communications.
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) developed their theory of policy transfer by ‘pulling together’ the assorted concepts of ‘policy diffusion’ (Walker, 1969), ‘policy convergence’ (Bennett, 1991a) and ‘lesson-drawing’ (Rose, 1993). Their aim was to present a model that examined the actions of actors at a strategic level and by adopting a broader approach from that discussed by Bennett (1991a) on ‘policy convergence’. They examined transfers within states, cross-border transfers and the importance of external actors to discuss governmental, international and trans-national organisational coercion of others to adopt policies.

As discussed further in Chapter 3, in contrast to Rose (1993), Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) discuss policy transfer and lesson-drawing separately, as they believe that lesson-drawing is performed when people from one country, voluntarily, draw lessons from another and then apply them to their own, while they also use the term ‘policy transfer’, to cover both voluntary and coercive transfers.

Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 344) defined ‘policy transfer’ as:

Policy transfer, emulation and lesson-drawing all refer to a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions etc. in another time and/or place.

This model of ‘policy transfer’ has been important in the study of politics, especially in the field of political science over the years, but as discussed by Newburn (2002) and Jones and Newburn (2007), has also been used to analyse instances of criminal justice policy transfer, for example: Zero Tolerance Policing, curfews, the position of a Drugs Czar, private penal policies and private prisons, electronic monitoring and the concept of
‘Three Strikes’. They also point out that further empirical research is necessary in this field, a gap, which this thesis aims to address by carrying out a case study of a recent instance of international criminal justice policy transfer.

**Thesis Structure**

In order to offer a contextual framework for this research, Chapter 2 provides a preliminary review of the key literature on gangs, both theoretical (definitions, culture) and substantive (explanations), pertaining to the US and the UK and in particular, Glasgow.

Chapter 3 provides a review of the literature on policy transfer and examines in detail the model of policy transfer developed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) that underpins and provides the theoretical framework for this thesis. In doing so, it discusses the questions that were posed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) and furthermore, this chapter also acknowledges the various critiques of the Dolowitz and Marsh model, including a discussion on the emerging criticisms laid against orthodox policy transfer models, i.e. diffusion, convergence, lesson-drawing and policy transfer, by critical human geographers, such as Peck and Theodore (2010), Peck (2011) and McCann and ward (2012) who argue that the terms, ‘mobilities’, ‘mutations’ and ‘assemblages’ are more apt.

The methodology developed for this thesis is discussed in Chapter 4. A qualitative approach was used, which involved the use of a case study framework, with semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis taking place in both Glasgow and Cincinnati. The questions posed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) were adapted to develop an interview schedule for key participants and actors to ascertain the reasons for the perceived need of a new approach to tackle violence in Glasgow. This allowed for
the identification and analysis of the processes involved in the implementation of the policy transfer and provided scope for a discussion of the outcomes and results. My role as a former police officer and as the deputy manager of the Glasgow CIRV project is also reflected upon in this chapter.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 all follow a similar structure and provide a ‘rich description’ (Bazeley, 2013), and examination of the constraints, similarities and differences of both Glasgow and Cincinnati in their approaches and methods of development and implementation of the violence reduction initiatives in each city.

Chapter 5 discusses the origins of the policy transfer as it pertained to Glasgow CIRV and ascertains why the various key actors decided to engage in a voluntary transfer process. This chapter provides an insight into the perennial problems of initiatives that had tried to deal with the issue over the years and the failings of partners to work together and provide sustainable solutions to tackle violence, including an acknowledgement that policing was only part of the solution. The chapter also discusses early fact-finding trips, partnership building and the development of Glasgow CIRV as a central coordinating hub to address violent crime associated with gangs, including the funding process and structure that was finally approved by the Scottish Government to allow the policy transfer to take place. This is a significant endogenous issue as it impacts on the sustainability of Glasgow CIRV and its eventual demise. The original funding application that was approved by the Scottish Government carried with it an undertaking that the city council, in the guise of the Glasgow Community Planning Partnership (CPP), would agree to carry on with the programme at the end of the initial funding period and ‘roll it out’ across the rest of the city. This did not happen due to various factors that will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8.
Chapter 6 discusses the development of the Glasgow CIRV and examines how the fact-finding visits to Cincinnati by key staff from Glasgow shaped the initial ideas of how the Glasgow CIRV should look. It was clear that Glasgow intended to copy US CIRV at the outset of the transfer, however, from an early stage in the transfer process, it became apparent that this would not be possible, due to various constraints placed upon Glasgow CIRV by the Scottish legal system in relation to the engagement of young people, which led to a process of *emulation* of the US CIRV by Glasgow CIRV. This chapter also critically discusses the implementation of the project and introduces the new concept that has emerged from this research of a *‘back-flow of policy transfer’* following a site visit to Cincinnati in April 2009 by Glasgow CIRV staff: this ‘back-flow’ and its relevance to expanding the Dolowitz and Marsh policy transfer model is a key finding of my research.

Chapter 7 continues the analysis of the implementation of Glasgow CIRV and examines the communication methods employed by Glasgow CIRV, in particular, the ‘Self-Referral Session’, which was the main communication method used by Glasgow CIRV and how these sessions evolved during the *emulation* process. The chapter also discusses the aftermath of the initial sessions held in October 2008, when Glasgow CIRV was officially launched, and analyses the structures that were developed to engage with the young people identified, including the case management process and the various options available to Glasgow CIRV, in comparison with US CIRV, to help with the issues faced by those engaged. The enforcement tactics employed by the police and law enforcement agencies in both cities are also identified and discussed, in relation to their effectiveness. I found that the law enforcement tactics used in Glasgow differed significantly from those in Cincinnati and argue that the ‘heavy-handed’ approach that was threatened by the police and Glasgow CIRV appeared to be an empty threat and was never actually used.
The final chapter, Chapter 8, provides a discussion of this research and reaches some conclusions regarding the outcome of the policy transfer process. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) discuss three categories of policy transfer failure, *uninformed transfer, incomplete transfer and inappropriate transfer*. The chapter examines this case of policy transfer in light of these categories and concludes that the transfer may be classed as a success as it could not be classified in any of the categories of failure. However, I argue the policy transfer of US CIRV of Glasgow ultimately did not succeed in its aim of long-term sustainability, as Glasgow CIRV ceased to operate in 2011 due to failings by both statutory agencies and individuals. A key finding of this research, therefore, is that the Dolowitz and Marsh model of policy transfer is limited in terms of understanding the different longer-term outcomes of success or failure. This research proposes that the model could be extended to offer a critical theorisation of what happens after a policy has been transferred, where the model stops, but the process may continue to take into account longer-term sustainability issues, as in this case of policy transfer.

Furthermore, the Dolowitz and Marsh model of policy transfer is also somewhat limited in terms of its descriptive and linear framework, and does not allow for the conceptualisation of one of the main findings of my research, an instance of "back-flow of policy transfer". This phenomenon requires more of a cyclical approach in order to fully understand its impact and will be fully discussed in Chapter 7 and 8.
Chapter 2 – Gangs Research and Their Definitions

Introduction

Glasgow has long had a violent image and reputation, with Leyland (2006) stating that the homicide rate in Glasgow was approximately three times higher than the rest of Scotland. The official picture of the violence in Glasgow has also been a common theme in the media with reports that homicides (murders) are commonplace. It was these comparatively high levels of violence that led to the creation of the Violence Reduction Unit (VRU) in 2004, at first in the Strathclyde Police area and then, to cover the whole of Scotland, in an effort to tackle the perceived violence problems in the country, including gang violence, especially in the Glasgow area.

The aim of this chapter is to set in context the issues surrounding gangs and the problems of violence associated with them in the cities that will be discussed in this research, especially Glasgow and to a lesser extent, Cincinnati, to provide an understanding of key issues and how they came to influence decision-makers in both cities that led to the instance of policy transfer. However, it is important to first discuss the definitional problems surrounding gangs in both America and the UK, outlining the different definitions used over the years. The chapter also identifies the typical gang that was prevalent in Glasgow and was the subject of the intervention programme, Glasgow CIRV. This is followed by an overview of gang research, which provides an historical perspective of gangs in America and also discusses the research carried out by the sociologists of the Chicago School. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the research carried out in the UK and examines the different issues surrounding local communities affected by the gangs in Glasgow. This research will later argue that
territorialism and violence associated with gangs, as discussed by Deuchar and Holligan (2008 and 2010), Deuchar (2009 and 2010) and Kintrea et al. (2010), were major factors considered by the city agencies in Glasgow leading to the origins of the policy transfer of the CIRV model from Cincinnati.

**Defining ‘gangs’**

There are many different definitions of a ‘gang’, which raises issues for academics, police and policy makers on what actually constitutes a gang. The term ‘gang’ and who is a member of a ‘gang’ is a highly contestable and debatable subject with no recognised consensus and has produced much debate over the years (see Curry and Spergel, 1990; Ball and Curry, 1995; Esbenson et al., 2001; Bennett and Holloway, 2004; Spergel et. al., 2004; Bradshaw, 2005; Bradshaw and Smith, 2005; Deuchar, 2009).

Defining the term ‘gang’ is an essential task if one is to implement crime reduction programmes and initiatives to allow agencies to target the right group of people (Schneider and Tilley, 2004; Wood and Aleyne, 2008). Winfree et al. (1992: 29) claimed that the development of gang research has been on an ‘almost schizophrenic path’, while Curry and Decker (1998) claimed that the situation was so confused by the lack of a clear workable definition that the United States Justice Department tried to alleviate this by holding a series of meetings between police officers, academics and policy makers involved in dealing with gangs, which ultimately failed to deliver a working definition.

The term ‘gang’ can have many varied meanings and definitions. For example, Geis (quoted in Klein, 1995: 22) noted that early English usage of the term ‘gang’ was, ‘a going, a walking, or a journey’. One of the first definitions of a gang was postulated by Thrasher
Thrasher's definition involved a group of people meeting and moving around their area as a co-ordinated group and being involved in conflict with other rival groups. This led to the group becoming bonded together in common purpose. He also discovered that the members of gangs tended to be concentrated in the area labelled as the ‘zone of transition’, which was characterised by poor socio-economic conditions, for example, poor housing, high immigration rates, poverty and disease as described by Burgess (1925). Asbury's (1928) study of gangs in the Five Points district of New York also revealed that gangs and their members tended to originate from and gather in the areas of socio-economic deprivation, that were populated by recent Irish immigrants. This situation is mirrored today in Glasgow and Cincinnati, with gangs populating the economically deprived areas of both cities.

Sheldon et al. (2004) state that many researchers appear to use the classifications that are utilised and determined by the relevant police force and confuse the term ‘group’ with ‘gang’ and have expanded the definition to include every group of youths who are gathered together who commit crimes, regardless of whether they are recognised as a gang or not.

Klein and Maxson (1989: 205) defined the gang as:

Any denotable...group [of adolescents and young adults] who (a) are generally perceived as a distinct aggregation by others in their neighbourhood, (b) recognise themselves as a denotable group (almost invariably with a group name), and (c) have been involved in a sufficient number of [illegal] incidents to call forth a consistent negative response from neighbourhood residents and/or enforcement agencies.
This definition states that gangs have been involved in illegal acts and this is the dominant law-enforcement perspective that has been adopted both in the US and UK (Sheldon et al., 2004). For example, Spergel (1990: 19) quotes the California Penal Code, as a criminal gang ‘is any that is or has been engaged in a pattern of criminal activity’. This meaning is more in line with the traditional image of organised crime gangs (OCGs) in Glasgow, that are concerned with acquisitive crime on a large scale, including drug dealing, human trafficking and prostitution, as opposed to the ‘street gangs’ that were identified by Glasgow CIRV to target. These street gangs were more involved in anti-social behaviour and casual violence, rather than organised and acquisitive crime as characterised by the gangs in Cincinnati.

In the UK, since the 1920s, all definitions of ‘gangs’ have the term ‘violence’ as a key indicator of a gang within it and it is the use of this violence that differentiates the gang from organised crime gangs, who use violence as a means to protect their acquisitive crime activities, for example, drugs trafficking, and are more adult in nature. (OCGs) (Huff, 1993: MPS, 2007).

Curry and Spergel (1990) have differentiated the terms ‘gang’, ‘street gang’, ‘traditional youth gang’ and ‘posse’ or ‘crew’. Their definition of a ‘gang’ is:

A group or collectivity of persons with a common identity who interact in cliques or sometimes as a whole group on a fairly regular basis and whose activities the community may view in varying degrees as legitimate, illegitimate, criminal, or some combination thereof. (Curry and Spergel, 1990: 388)

Furthermore, they also define the ‘street gang’ as ‘a group or collectivity of persons engaged in significant illegitimate or criminal activities, mainly threatening and violent’
(Curry and Spergel, 1990: 388), while their definition of the ‘traditional youth gang’ is more ‘concerned primarily with issues of status, prestige, and turf protection [and] may have a name and a location, be relatively well organised, and persist over time’ (Curry and Spergel, 1990: 389).

Curry and Spergel’s definition of a ‘traditional youth gang’ has parallels with the gangs in Glasgow, where gangs have existed for generations in certain parts of the city, especially in the east end, where the Glasgow CIRV project was established. These gangs also are concerned with issues of status, respect and territorialism or ‘turf protection’ (not to be confused with racketeering), leading to outbreaks of violence with rival gangs.

Curry and Spergel’s final category of a ‘gang’ is that of a ‘posse’ or ‘crew’, which can often be used in conjunction with ‘street’ or ‘youth gang’ and is generally more commonly associated with ‘a commitment to criminal activity for economic gain, particularly drug trafficking’ (1990: 389) and is more associated with the gang structures in Cincinnati. In contrast to Glasgow, the Cincinnati gangs have been, and are, engaged in ‘turf wars’ over illegal drugs trafficking and the resultant violence with guns inevitably leads to shootings and homicides (Engel, 2013, as quoted in Deuchar, 2013).

The Eurogang Programme of Research was initiated by Klein in 1997 to ‘pull together’ academics from across Europe in an attempt to conceptualise research on gangs in Europe. It adopted a single, workable definition of street gangs and worked towards the common operations in order to determine which groups were street gangs. This definition of a street gang is: ‘any durable, street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activity is part of its group identity’ (Van Gemert and Fleisher, in Decker and Weerman, 2005; Klein et al., 2006; Weerman, 2009).
The Eurogang definition does have its critics and has met with some resistance in Europe, including Pitts (2008: 14) who argues that the definition is an ‘insipid mishmash’ and that the definition tends to ‘criminalise’ large numbers of young people who simply ‘hang out’ together. It does include similar terms as other definitions, such as ‘criminality’, ‘durability’, ‘territoriality’ and ‘structure’ and it avoids the term ‘gang’ for fear of creating a moral panic and stigmatising young people (Pitts, 2008).

The question of ‘who is a gang member’ has been debated since the early 20th Century and the strategy was to let young people decide themselves, that is, to let them claim membership of a gang. This was Thrasher’s strategy and was later adopted by Klein in 1971, who also argued persuasively for self-nomination (Curry and Decker, 1998; Esbensen et al., 2001). The issue regarding self-nomination of gang members has parallels with the strategy adopted by Glasgow CIRV, who made it conditional on gang members to declare that they were part of a gang, in order to engage with Glasgow CIRV, as well as the use of police intelligence regarding gang membership. This issue will be fully discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. This was found not to be the case in Cincinnati, where the police and the probation and parole authorities determined the gang members’ identity.

Maxson (1998) further argues that gangs experience a fluid nature of membership with some terms utilised to reflect this, for example, ‘wannabe’, ‘core’, ‘fringe’, ‘associate’ and ‘hard-core’. Other researchers also adopted this approach, for example, Battin et al., 1998 (discussed in Esbensen et al., 2001) by asking respondents if they belonged to a gang. This was also the position adopted by the Edinburgh Study of Youth Transitions in looking at the offending patterns of 4,300 young people in the city (Bradshaw, 2005, in Decker and Weerman, 2005).
There are other ways to ascertain if a person is a gang member or not, including police records and intelligence, which can be a valuable resource regarding identities. However, as Curry and Decker (1998) point out, this can have some shortcomings. Information can be out of date, based on misinformation, or fail to take into account the fact that the individual had 'moved on' out of the gang. Other means can also be adopted including: asking youth workers, teachers and neighbourhood residents to identify gang members. Furthermore, some gang members wear distinctive clothing, badges and tattoos, which can also be an indicator of gang membership (Curry and Decker, 1998).

The Glasgow CIRV project was designed to look at the more traditional street gangs, defined by Curry and Spergel (1990) and not organised crime gangs (OCGs), as described by Huff (1993), as these were deemed to be out with the ‘reach’ of the project aims, while Cincinnati adopted a broader approach and did not preclude dealing with the ‘posse’ or ‘crews’ of the city that were involved in major crime.

Bannister et al. (2010) explain that, in Scotland, the term ‘gang’ is ingrained in the public and political consciousness, though researchers have made little attempt to create a workable definition for comparison purposes. The few studies that have examined gang behaviour have adopted a more local, rather than national, perspective, for example Patrick (1973) in his observations of a local gang in the north of Glasgow.

Bannister et al. (2010) comment that the Violence Reduction Unit in Scotland attempted to raise the profile of ‘gangs’ and define the problems posed by them and develop coping strategies, but each police force in Scotland (eight at the time, though these forces merged to form one single police force, Police Scotland, on 1 April 2013) defined and conceptualised the ‘gang’ in different ways, which reflected the differing intelligence gathering and local societal issues across the country. It remains to be seen what the
situation will be with the advent of a single national police force in Scotland and the effect this will have on ‘gang’ definitions across the country.

**Historical Perspectives on Gangs Research**

In order to place into context, the issues relating to gangs and the issue of violence that can be attributed to them, especially in the two cities discussed in this research, Cincinnati and Glasgow, it is expedient to outline early research in this area and the definitional problems that have emerged from it both in America and the UK.

The concept of gangs and violence, as discussed in this research, is not a new phenomenon, as they have existed in society for centuries both in the Western and Eastern hemispheres. For example, Pearson (1983) states that from:

> The early 1600s the streets of London and other cities have been terrorised by a succession of organised gangs-calling themselves the Muns, Hectors, Bugles, Dead Boys…..(*among others*)-who found amusement in breaking windows, demolishing taverns, assaulting the Watch (*as the police were called in those days*), attacking wayfarers and slitting the noses of their victims with swords, rolling old ladies in barrels and other violent frolicks.

*(Pearson, 1983: 188)*

In an interesting parallel with gangs in New York in the early 1800s, Pearson (1983: 188) comments that London gang members, in the 1600s, wore distinctive coloured ribbons to identify themselves during pitched battles fought with other gangs. Similarly, in New York, Spergel (1995) states that the gangs established, in the Five Points district of Manhattan by immigrants from Ireland around 1820, and later from other European
countries, also had distinctive names and dress and tended to fight in their undershirts. Haskins, (1974: 31, quoted in Spergel, 1995) states that the:

Roach Guards wore a blue stripe on their pantaloons, the Dead Rabbits a red stripe....the True Blue Americans wore....stovepipe hats and ankle length frock coats, all using a variety of weapons, for example, pistols, muskets, knives, brickbats, bludgeons, brass knuckles, ice picks and pikes.

The gang situation in America developed over the years and gangs existed in most American cities before the 19th Century. Spergel (1995) noted that gangs generally consisted of young males from second and even later generations of migrants who were clustered in low-income areas of expanding or declining industrial or post-industrial cities. The gangs had a multi-ethnic make-up and reflected the immigrant groups in the areas, for example, Haskins (1974: 7) comments that ‘nearly every nationality is represented in American gang history’.

The poor economic and poverty conditions that existed in American cities allowed gangs to flourish, for example, the poorer areas of New York saw gangs emerge and grow over the years. As mentioned above, the Five Points district of Manhattan was a relatively poor area and the Irish immigrants who settled there created gangs such as the Roach Guards and Dead Rabbits. They expanded into the neighbouring community of the Bowery and there developed the most famous and largest gang of the period, the Bowery Boys (Spergel, 1995). Other cities, such as Philadelphia and Chicago, also saw the emergence of gangs of young men, with Philadelphia having 52 identifiable local gangs in the period from 1836 to 1878. They existed there because of the concentration of poor adolescents in areas of socio-economic depression (Spergel, 1995).
As the 19th century passed into the 20th Century, gangs, with members from eastern and southern Europe, developed in the large north-eastern cities of America. These gangs provided young men the opportunity to engage in various criminal activities, for example, protection of their local area or ‘turf’, fighting with other gangs, stealing and to provide street-wise skills to allow them to survive in the tough environments. They also became increasingly involved in politics, aligning themselves with local politicians and union leaders by offering their services to protect the interests of local leaders (Thrasher, 1936; Haskins, 1974; Spergel, 1995).

Research of the gang ‘phenomenon’ was of long-standing interest for the social scientists of the Chicago School at Chicago University. In a similar way to Glasgow in the UK, Chicago was, at that time, the second largest city in America and was undergoing rapid expansion and industrialisation with large numbers of African-Americans from the southern American states and European immigrants arriving in the city (Giddens, 2006; McLaughlin and Muncie, 2013).

The Chicago School sociologists used participant observation to produce detailed accounts of people’s everyday lives, including patterns of social and geographical distribution of crime and delinquency (Shaw and McKay, 1942). The first pattern discussed by Park and Burgess in 1925, was that certain districts tended to be consistent in being high, medium or low crime areas. They also discovered a second pattern that incidents of crime and delinquency tended to be lower in high socio-economic status areas and higher in areas of low socio-economic status or in a state of deprivation including high unemployment, multiple family houses, single-parent families, low education rates and welfare cases. This social ecology of crime led them to conclude that the factors that helped explain socio-economic differences could also help to explain
social and geographical differences in crime and delinquency and that high rates of crime and associated social problems exist in the same areas over long time periods regardless of who lives in the area (Sheldon et al., 2004).

Later research by Shaw and McKay (1942) concentrated on the concept of ‘cultural transmission’ that existed in the areas of social deprivation and that these values are transmitted from generation to generation and it is through this process that areas become delinquent. They concluded that parents, schools and churches etc., supervise children from more affluent areas more closely and that social disorganisation is a significant breeding ground and cause of delinquency and crime. Delinquent behaviour and traditions are therefore seen to be transmitted down through successive generations, in much the same way that language and other social forms are transmitted (Shaw and McKay, 1942: 166).

This concept of ‘cultural transmission’, as discussed by Shaw and McKay (1942), can be seen in the east end of Glasgow, where the Glasgow CIRV project was implemented. The areas in question also suffer from high levels of social deprivation and generational delinquent behaviour with poor levels of health, low educational attainment, high levels of unemployment, crime rates and gang related violence. These issues will be discussed later in Chapter 5.

Sutherland (1939) also developed a related theory of ‘differential association’, which, together with the work of Shaw and McKay (1942), became an important thread in later criminological theories that attempted to account for crime by reference to deviant subcultures (McLaughlin and Muncie, 2013). However, Tannenbaum (1938) argued that the community at large was at fault for the socialisation failure of delinquent males, by failing to provide adequate housing, thus creating slum areas, failing to provide social
amenities and poor education and making the gang situation worse by providing a fertile breeding ground for them. Whyte (1943) also supported this position and believed that the juvenile gang was a purposeful and constructive force and was able to provide support for gang members in times of socio-economic hardship.

Thrasher also saw such groups or gangs as being characterised by having a quest for excitement among other features. Thrasher’s view of gangs as a product of socially disorganised environments has been important and influential in the study of delinquency as well as gangs (Thrasher, 1927), which was also examined by Cohen (1955) who viewed gang delinquency as a means of coping with the strains and stresses of the failures of the education system. According to Cohen (1955) the delinquent boy will join forces with other socially deprived boys as a means of challenging the feelings of ‘shame’, ‘status frustration’ and adjustment problems, thus forming a delinquent sub-culture that challenges the socially accepted values and status of the middle-classes.

Cloward and Ohlin (1960) sought to expand and test Cohen’s theory to explain the existence of delinquency in gangs. They were influenced in this task by Merton’s ‘strain theory’ (1938) and also by Sutherland’s theory of ‘differential association’ (1939). They argued that young males in socially-deprived communities experienced intense status frustration and suffered strains and tensions when there ‘was a disparity of what was actually available to them’ and this led to problems of adjustment for young delinquent males (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960: 86).
**Research in the UK**

Research into gangs in the UK developed at a different pace from that in America with Downes’ (1966) study of subcultural theory in two London boroughs, Stepney and Poplar, being the first of note. Downes reached different conclusions from that of Cohen (1955) and Cloward and Ohlin (1961), as he found little evidence to support American ideas regarding gang delinquency. Downes (1966) employed an informal approach to observing young people on the streets, rather than a ‘participant observationist’ approach, by hanging around street corners and thus forming the impression that the groups of young adolescents were:

- responsible for the bulk of delinquency were simply small cliques whose members committed illegal acts sometimes collectively, sometimes in pairs, sometimes individually, in some cases regularly, in other only rarely.
- Whilst these street-corner groups persisted over time, and invariably possessed a dominant personality, all the other features commonly attributed to the delinquent ‘gang’ were absent: i.e. leadership, role allocation, and hierarchical structure, consensus on membership, uniform and name. (Downes, 1966: 199)

Downes (1966) maintained that the delinquent groups were not like gangs at all but were more like ‘fluid, street-corner cliques’ and this premise was echoed by other English academics, (for example, Fletcher, 1964; Wilmott, 1966) as not being a central factor in juvenile delinquency.

Downes’ role, as an informal observer of the youths on street corners, and not being a participant observer, is worthy of some discussion to clarify his role. It is difficult to
assess the effect a passive participant observer may have on the subjects under observation, in this case groups of youths on street corners. The observer may inadvertently become an active observer, should they become involved in the actions of the youths, thus potentially changing the nature of their actions (Van Mannen, 1978, as quoted in Bryman, 2014).

Bryman (2014) illustrates the various field roles and their participation in ethnographic studies and labels them as on a continuum:

- **Covert Full Member** – full group member but status of researcher is unknown
- **Overt Full Member** – full member and status of researcher is known
- **Participating Observer** – participates in group activities but not as member
- **Partially Participating Observer** – Same as previous but observation is not necessarily the main data source
- **Minimally Participating Observer** – Observes but participates minimally in group activities
- **Non-Participating Observer** – Observes (sometimes minimally) but does not participate in group activities. In this case there is some limited interaction with the groups, usually through interviews. (Bryman, 2014: 441-444).

In the research carried out by Downes, he observed youths on street corners from a distance and did not become involved in their activities. Therefore, Downes does not fall into the above categories of the participant observer, as opposed to Patrick (1973), who actively became engaged in the actions of a Glasgow gang in a Covert Full Member role.

Cohen’s (1967) research and analysis of the Mods and Rockers disturbances at English seaside resorts on the south-east coast in the period of 1963-1966, found that the popular media image of riots and gangs was exaggerated. Cohen found that the widespread
damage and chaos, including serious violence, reported in the media was minimal, but the reactions of the media and Magistrates created an 'amplification-spiral', and that the gang stereotype was used as justification for the tough measures employed by the police and courts. This does not seem to be the case in Glasgow, as the gang situation has been commented on by the media extensively for decades and offending was recognised as a problem for the local communities, especially in the east end of Glasgow, as will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Patrick's (1973) study of a Glasgow gang found that gang delinquency in Glasgow was similar to that found by Yablonsky (1967) in his study, 'The Violent Gang' in New York, and was at odds with the work of Downes (1966: 122), who declared that 'it can be safely asserted that the structured gang is unknown in this country'. Further analysis of Downes' remarks by Patrick (1973), reveals the apparent reasons why Downes believes that the gang situation was non-existent in England as opposed to Glasgow. Downes claims that Glasgow had 'teeming slums', whereas England only had 'slums', highlighting the perceived and real socio-economic disadvantage that Glasgow experienced in relation to the rest of the UK. Downes (1966) later claimed that Glasgow had two further reasons that were the cause of the Glasgow gang situation, juvenile unemployment and the presence of second-generation immigrants (mainly Irish and to a lesser extent, Pakistani). This research would agree that the socio-economic factors, Glasgow's industrial and economic past and the territorial issues, were significant in the makeup of gangs in the city in recent times. However, this research did not uncover any evidence to suggest that gangs in Glasgow were established and maintained on a sectarian basis or by racial membership, as argued by Downes (1966) and Davies (2007), and will be returned to in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
**Territoriality**

Over the years there have been relatively few studies of youth gangs in the UK, with the exceptions noted above, for example, Downes (1966), Patrick (1973), Smith and Bradshaw, (2005) and Bullock and Tilley, (2008). There has been a tendency in the UK, by crime and criminal justice agencies, to believe that the same scale of the gang problem in America does not exist in this country. This research argues that the gangs targeted by Glasgow CIRV were not of the same ilk as those being targeted by the agencies in America, especially Cincinnati, where the gangs were more concerned with high-level acquisitive crime, for example, drug dealing. The gangs in Glasgow were more likely to be engaged in anti-social behaviour and casual violence, resulting from territorial issues, as has been highlighted by various researchers over the years, including Bannister and Fraser (2008) in their research on gangs and territoriality on the south side of the city and Patrick (1973), who also argued that gang violence in the city was often driven by territorial disputes between rival gangs.

Research carried out in the east end of Glasgow (Deuchar and Holligan, 2008 and 2010; Deuchar, 2009 and 2010) concluded that recent gang formation is not necessarily based around sectarian issues, but more about what area you come from and that ‘territorial issues were at the forefront of the young participants’ minds’ (Deuchar and Holligan, 2010: 25). Kintrea *et al.* (2010) also concluded that territoriality is part of everyday life for young people in their study of six UK cities, including Glasgow. They found that it is culturally expected, generational in nature, often passed down through grandfathers, fathers, uncles and brothers and leads to conflict and violence between different areas and streets. This finding illustrates the gender issue of the gang composition in the Glasgow CIRV target area, the east end of the city. Police intelligence and data gathered by Glasgow CIRV indicated that all gang members in that area were young males, with no
female members whatsoever. It was also discovered in the north of the city, that although three young females were attached to gangs, they were only on the periphery of the gangs (WG Personal Recollection).

Territoriality gives rise to many restrictive issues for young people, for example preventing people from leaving their own area, sometimes as small as a street, to find employment or friendship beyond their own 'sphere of influence'; it is endemic in parts of Glasgow, which along with alcohol and drugs, contributes to the violence in society. Kintrea et al. (2010) state that it is a social system, through which control is claimed over a defined space and is thereafter defended against outsiders. They also state that it can be damaging as it is characterised by strong ties with immediate societal networks, which can also be exclusive, inward looking and cuts down on contacts with others outside of the territory.

The defending of one's territory or 'defended neighbourhood' (Suttles, 1972), can lead to conflict with others outside of the area. This is the situation described by Kintrea et al. (2010) in the six cities they examined and especially in Glasgow, however, others claim that territoriality can have positive effects on people to answer fundamental needs and psycho-social benefits (Robinson, 2000; Wallace and Coburn, 2002). This follows on from Maslow's 'Hierarchy of Needs' theory, in that territoriality may provide security, belonging, esteem and self-actualisation (Maslow, 1943 as discussed by Ardrey, 1967).

It has also been suggested that the recent focus on gang research in the UK and also across Europe, is being influenced by sensationalist reports in the media, by populist politicians as well as by academic researchers who have been convinced the gangs in Europe and the UK have been ignored for too long in comparison to America, as discussed by Hallsworth and Young (2008), who conclude that this anxiety has:
Coalesced in a perception that the gang is a serious and growing problem, that the rise in lethal violence, as seen recently in inner cities such as London, Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool, is connected to the proliferation of the gang, and that the solution to the problem of urban gang violence lies in its suppression. (Hallsworth and Young, 2008: 175)

In 2007, the VRU carried out an intelligence gathering exercise by asking police intelligence analysts in the territorial divisions to identify any gangs in their area. This exercise identified 170 gangs known to the police in the Strathclyde Police area (the west of Scotland) and 55 gangs in the east end of Glasgow alone. The information came from various sources used by the police, for example, from the community police officers in each division, official intelligence logs, police records and using local contacts and youth groups. These gangs were typically based around territories ranging from a few streets, to local areas and consisted of mainly young males with an age range from 12 to their early 20s. The numbers in the gangs again varied with some ranging from a small number of members (for example, the Cumbie, Bal Toi and the Gyto) to others with many members (for example, the Parkhead Rebels, Calton Tongs, Gallowgate Mad Squad and the Denniston Young Team) (VRU CIRV, 2009). The map in Appendix 2 illustrates the different gang territories in the east end of Glasgow (VRU CIRV, 2009). This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 in relation to the origins of the policy transfer.

Evidence suggests that problems associated with gangs include high rates of violence linked with territorial issues, alcohol and drug abuse, and domestic violence. Leyland and Dundas (2010) report that men under the age of 65, who are living in the most deprived areas of Scotland (in the east end of Glasgow), have a death rate due to assault, which is 31.9 times higher than that of those living in the least deprived areas. However, it is young
males between the ages of 16-24 who are at most risk of being a victim of violence compared with all other combined age/gender groups, particularly those people living in the most deprived areas of the country (Fraser et al., 2010; Scottish Government, 2010).

Conclusions

Violence associated with gangs and gang members in Glasgow and Cincinnati has been a major problem over the years. Both cities have been major industrial centres in their respective countries over the decades and have suffered similar fates with regards to the economic climate in their respective countries and the world in general. Socio-economic factors, social and housing problems have led to areas of social deprivation, high unemployment, low education and poor health being created in both cities. This has led to a proliferation of gangs and related problems, such as territoriality, illegal drug markets, drug and alcohol misuse, and casual and serious violence. Over the years, both cities have tried various measures to tackle the problems with varying measures of success. The reasons why the authorities in both cities took certain steps in an attempt to reduce the violence in gangs will be examined in Chapter 5.

This chapter has set out to give an overview of the gang research projects and literature that has been developed over the years in both America and the UK. It is not exhaustive but seeks to set in context the issues that will be discussed as part of this thesis by giving an overview and providing an understanding of the gang related problems, especially territorialism, that pertain to both cities examined in this research, Cincinnati and Glasgow.
As noted, the matter of defining the gang is difficult and there are many definitions that can pose some issues for academics, police and policy makers alike. Early definitions range from Thrasher's (1927) definition involving a group of people meeting and moving through their areas and coming into conflict with other groups, while Asbury (1928) notes that gang members tend to originate and gather in areas of social deprivation. Sheldon et al. (2004) state that many researchers tend to use classifications that are used by police forces and confuse the terms ‘group’ and ‘gang’. Klein and Maxson's (1989) definition of the gang appears to be the dominant law-enforcement perspective that has been adopted in both the US and UK and states that members have been involved in illegal acts.

In the UK, Hallsworth and Young’s (2006) definition of the gang contains the term ‘violence’ that has been prevalent in the UK since the 1920s. This issue differentiates the gang involved in street-level violence from those gangs predominantly involved with acquisitive crime that are termed as organised crime gangs (OCGs) as defined by Huff (1993).

The issue of gang membership, specifically self-nomination of membership (see Thrasher, 1927; Klein, 1971; Curry and Decker, 1998; Esbenson et al., 2001) has been discussed in this chapter. It was noted that there were parallels with the strategy adopted by Glasgow CIRV, who compelled gang members to state that they were members of gangs to be eligible to engage with the project, as well as using police intelligence to identify them. This was not the case in Cincinnati where US CIRV used information gathered from the police and probation and parole services.

The historical perspectives of gangs in America has been discussed and gave an overview of their origins, while research into gangs in the UK developed later than the US, with
Downes’ (1966) study of subcultural theory in two London boroughs, Stepney and Poplar, reaching different conclusions from that of Cohen (1955) and Cloward and Ohlin (1961), as he found little evidence to support the idea of gang delinquency from America.

The issue of territoriability, as discussed by various researchers, was examined and it was noted that the issue was endemic in Glasgow, especially the east end of the city where Glasgow CIRV was implemented. This issue was a major factor in why Glasgow sought to adopt a new strategy to tackle violent crime, and led to the policy transfer as discussed in Chapter 5.

The definition of Curry and Spergel's (1990) ‘traditional youth gang’ is most closely related to the issues surrounding the gangs in Glasgow, where gangs have existed for generations in certain parts of the city, especially in the east end, where the Glasgow CIRV project was established. It is this definition of the gang that Glasgow CIRV used to differentiate between those gang members they wished to target and influence and those that they did not, for example members of organised crime gangs (OCGs).

This chapter has sought to put into context the discussion about the case of policy transfer of the gang initiative from Cincinnati to Glasgow that will be discussed later in this thesis. It has highlighted the differences between the gangs targeted in the US and UK and the different definitions and research paths followed in both countries. The following chapter provides an overview of the literature pertaining to policy transfer as defined by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) and examines the various component parts of the process that allows a full analysis of Glasgow CIRV to be carried out.
Chapter 3 - Policy Transfer: A Review of the Literature

Introduction

The study of the ‘transfer’ of policies etc., has long been in the sphere of political science and early studies to use the phrase ‘transfer’ were, for example, Westney (1987), who studied the external influences on Japanese public sector reform; and Wolman (1992) who examined the affect the US had on British social policy. However, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) are recognised as the first theorists to develop a comprehensive theory of policy transfer, by producing a general framework of assorted concepts, i.e. policy diffusion, (see McVoy, 1940; Crain, 1966; Walker, 1969 and Gray, 1973); policy convergence, (see Bennett, 1991); and policy learning and lesson-drawing (see Rose, 1991).

Early ‘Orthodox’ Policy Transfer Literature - Policy Diffusion, Convergence and Lesson-Drawing

Research into the diffusion of innovations emerged in the 1920s and 1940s with the work of Chapin (1928) and McVoy (1940), who discussed the acceptance of innovation and mapped American cities that had adopted the ‘commission’ form of government (Chapin) and the ‘city manager’ form of government. Walker (1969: 881) further developed the diffusion research and defined an innovation as ‘a programme or policy, which is new to the states adopting it, no matter how old the programme may be or how many other states may have adopted it’.
Over the years, as studies of policy diffusion progressed, weaknesses began to emerge, with Clark (1985) stating that ‘the major problem of this research tradition is that it reveals nothing about the content of new policies. Its fascination is with process not substance’ (Clark, 1985: 63). It was a consequence of this perceived requirement to answer questions that were ignored by studies of diffusion that led to discussions about lesson drawing and policy transfer that will be discussed later.

There is a broad agreement on the definition of policy convergence as ‘the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structure, processes and performances’ (Kerr 1983: 3), while Knill defines convergence as ‘the development of similar or even identical policies across countries over time’ (2005: 764), while lesson-drawing emerged from a critique of the diffusion of policy innovations, which criticised the approach for ignoring the associated multiple transfer processes (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). It was also later criticised by Bulmer et al. (2007) for its implicit assumptions that the process was rational and voluntary as its main focus was on the voluntary act of transfer by actors, acting in a rational manner and working in explicit political contests (Rose, 1991).

It was these early concepts that Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) brought together as ‘dimensions of policy transfer’, which is a particularly useful framework as it provides others with the opportunity to develop it further (Evans, 2009a). It can be posited as a map of the processes of policy transfer, which as Evans (2009a: 254) describes, as a representation of a ‘reality, which needs to be proved or disproved through empirical investigation’. The framework allows researchers to classify possible occurrences of policy transfer as either being voluntary, coercive, temporal or spatial and is regarded as being more inclusive than previous studies, as it is broad enough to encompass both
voluntary and coercive processes and transferences within and between countries. Furthermore, it can also be used as a dependent or independent variable, as they look to explain what causes and impacts on policy transfer processes, in addition to examining how these processes can lead to particular policy outcomes (Evans, 2009a).

More recently however, the study of policy transfer has been the subject of criticism from human geographers and critical policy adherents, who label policy transfer and its related concepts as ‘orthodox’ policy transfer (see Peck and Theodore, 2010 and Peck, 2011), and prefer to use the terms ‘policy mobility’ and ‘policy mutation’. This criticism will be returned to later in this chapter.

Policy transfer and its application is not new, as illustrated by the following from 315BC, in Ancient Greece where Aristotle is quoted in *Nicomachean Ethics* as saying:

> First, if any individual points have been well made by previous writers, let us try to follow them up; then from the collection of constitutions we must examine what sort of thing preserves and what sort of thing destroys cities and particular constitutions, and for what reasons some are well administered and others are not. (Evans, 2009b: 237)

Aristotle was advising citizens of the rationality of taking part in drawing lessons from positive and negative experiences in developing the city-states of Ancient Greece (Evans, 2009b), thus demonstrating that lessons can be learned from the experiences of other cities in Greece.

Rose (1991) argues that policy transfer, or ‘lesson-drawing’, has always existed but has grown significantly since the end of World War II due to the expansion of communications. While Bernstein and Cashore (2000) state that external agents,
institutions, and social and economic forces are playing an ever increasing role in shaping domestic public policies and politics due to the globalisation of the world economy and the growing influence of multi-national and supra-national organisations, and these factors have led to an increase of interest from students of comparative politics and public policy.

When Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) carried out a review of the research literature into ‘lesson-drawing’ and enhancing the development of ‘policy transfer’, they discovered that the literature falls into two types: (i) studies that do not use the concept but enlighten policy transfer; and (ii) material now devoted to policy transfer.

Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) state that while Bennett (1991a) discussed the concept of the general pattern of ‘convergence’ between policies that are adapted by different nation states, their aim was to be more focused on the transfer of specific policies as a result of decisions taken at a strategic level by internal and external governmental ‘actors’. However, they also adopt a broader approach by examining transfers within states, as well as across borders and looking at the importance of external ‘actors’, to discuss the ways in which governments, international and trans-national organisations can force or coerce others into policy transfer. The rest of this chapter will examine in detail the various factors involved in Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) model of policy transfer and will also discuss the criticisms that have been levelled at it by various researchers, including in particular the criticisms of ‘orthodox’ policy transfer by Peck and Theodore (2010) and Peck (2011).
What is Policy Transfer?

The most recognised definition of ‘orthodox’ policy transfer, was offered by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), and though it offers a central focal point for researchers, is not without criticism. It is defined as follows:

Policy transfer, emulation and lesson-drawing all refer to a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions etc. in another time and/or place. (1996: 344)

Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) discuss policy transfer and lesson-drawing separately in contrast to Rose (1993), who uses the terms interchangeably and refers to the overall process of transference as ‘lesson-drawing’. They believe that lesson-drawing is performed when people from one country draw lessons from another and then apply them to their own. This is a voluntary concept in contrast to the forcing or ‘pushing’ of a process from one country to another, a form of coercive transfer, which Rose (1993) does not distinguish from ‘voluntary transfer’. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) use the term ‘policy transfer’ to cover both voluntary and coercive transfers. They also state that, in many cases, negative lessons can be learned from the experiences of others, thus leading to the conclusion by the decision makers not to implement a particular course of action.

Policy transfer studies emerged as a sub-set of comparative politics literature, as prior to the 1940s, most studies focused on governmental institutions, known as state-centred research and tended to be descriptive in nature. These studies had a much narrower focus than later studies of policy transfer and also primarily focused on voluntary transfer,
viewing the process as one which was examined by rational actors and tended to ignore coercive transfers (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).

The study of policy transfer now encompasses a variety of policy spheres, including welfare policy (Peck and Theodore, 2011), the study of environmental regulation (Jordan et al., 2003), education (Bache and Taylor, 2003), the regulation of utilities (Padgett, 2003) and transport (Marsden and Stead, 2011). These studies have addressed some of the key questions posed by Dolowitz and Marsh, as noted below (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 9).

Criminologists have long been interested in examining how various crime control policies, mentalities and processes can travel across nations and jurisdictions (Cohen, 1998). However, as noted by Tonry (2015) and Jones and Newburn (2004), there has been a dearth of empirical research in the area of policy transfer of criminological issues, with Muncie (2001) carrying out one of the early studies examining the influence of restorative justice ideas coming from Australasia and Scotland on youth justice practice in England and Wales. Further studies in this field include Jones and Newburn's (2007) research on trans-Atlantic criminal justice processes, Robertson (2005) on the analysis of police reform in the Russia and the Ukraine, and Blaustein et al. (2015) on policy ethnography and police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Research also includes Canton's (2006) study of the policy transfer of penal policies from the UK to Ukraine; McFarlane and Canton's (2014) edited book on criminal justice policy transfer in the Turkish Probation Service; Wemmer's (2005) study of victimology in policy transfer; Durnescu and Haines (2012) study of probation in Romania; and Brown et al. (2015) research into justice reinvestment in penal policy. It is in this area of criminal justice policy transfer that this empirical research aims to contribute to by adopting an insider
approach to the research, similar to the work of Durnescu and Haines (2012), McFarlane and Canton (2014) and Blaustein (2015). This is in contrast to research carried out in this sphere using an outsider perspective by Jones and Newburn (2007) and Ogg (2015) in his study of preventative justice.

Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) and Dolowitz (1998) present their model of policy transfer, and later expanded upon by Dolowitz et al. (2000), by asking a series of nine questions, which are listed below before being discussed in greater detail. They provided the framework that has been used in formulating, interpreting and analysing this case study research:

I. Why and when do actors engage in policy transfer?
II. Who transfers policy?
III. What is transferred?
IV. From where are lessons drawn?
V. Are there different degrees of transfer?
VI. When do actors engage in policy transfer and how does this affect the policy-making and policy transfer process?
VII. What restricts policy transfer?
VIII. How can researchers begin demonstrating the occurrence of policy transfer?
IX. How can policy transfer help our understanding of policy failure?

I. Why and when do actors engage in policy transfer?

Learning lessons and the transference of policies is not a new phenomenon. Policies, programmes and practices in one place are affected, either directly or indirectly, by what
happens elsewhere. Over the years, it has been recognised that globalisation and the massive increase in worldwide communication networks have led to a developing interest in the field of comparative politics and the study of policy transfer (see Bernstein and Cashore, 2000; Newburn and Sparks, 2004).

There are many reasons and ways that lessons can be used. Political parties, or individuals, can use lessons in a selective manner to gain an advantage over others who are opposed to them. Opponents in the political sphere can contest the value, practicality and whether a policy is able to be transferred, in order to make the outcome more favourable to them. For example, Robertson (1991) states that ‘policy lessons from abroad often are put forward as politically neutral truths. Beneath this superficial impartiality, political adversaries just as often are using such lessons as political weapons’ (Robertson, 1991: 55).

Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) attempt to explain why policy transfer occurs and expands on the distinction between voluntary transfer, as in studies of policy diffusion, (see Walker, 1969; Gray, 1974; and Eyestone, 1977); policy convergence, (Bennett, 1991); and lesson-drawing, (Rose, 1993) and, coercive or forced transfer. They also make a further distinction between direct coercive transfer and cases where push factors leading to policy transfer are deemed to be more indirect.

In the case of voluntary transfer, it is apparent that the main driver is some dissatisfaction or problem with the status quo. When a policy, programme or institution is no longer effective, or is perceived to be ineffective, then there is a need for something new. Proponents of this model also state that if governmental policies are seen to be effective then there is no need for change and to seek out new policies or programmes as everything can progress as normal. It is only when there is a breakdown in established
policies etc., that one must search elsewhere for alternatives (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Rose, 1993). This would appear to be the case in Glasgow as the key actors in various city agencies realised that what had been tried in the past had not worked in relation to addressing gang violence. There was a gradual realisation that a new approach was required. This point will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

In the case of direct coercive transfer, one government forces another to adopt a policy. Majone (1991) provides an example of how American regulators coerced European countries to adopt American anti-cartel legislation. Majone (1991: 85-6) states that it was well known that ‘the anti-cartel clauses’ of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) treaty, which Jean Monnet considered to be:

The first European anti-trust laws- were significantly influenced by the American model represented by the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. Washington [represented by their own experts] .... insisted more than once on a particular wording of individual articles (Berghahn, 1986: 144, as quoted in Majone 1991).

More direct cases of governments forcing other states to adopt a policy are rare. However, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) discuss the role of supra-national organisations that can play a major part in such transfer. For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have played a significant part in the proliferation of Western monetary policies on the Third World by giving cheap loans, but imposing certain economic policies as conditions of the loan grant. Transnational corporations (TNCs) also play a part in policy transfer and can threaten governments that they will take their business elsewhere if they do not get favourable policies.
An example of *indirect coercive transfer* is highlighted by the case of Canada being influenced by externalities or functional interdependencies. Hoberg (1991) concluded that in response to the indirect effect US pollutants and regulations had on Canada, they had to look to the US for lessons that could be utilised in drafting their own legislation in relation to environmental regulation. Further areas of indirect coercive transfer that force governments to act include technological advancements and the speed of change and world economic constraints. The fear of being left behind one’s neighbouring country or competitors can also lead to policy change (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).

Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 13) discuss a continuum of policy transfer that flows from lesson-drawing to the direct imposition of a programme, policy or arrangement on a system by another system elsewhere. (See Figure 1 below)

**Figure 1: Continuum of Policy Transfer**

*Source: Graham (2016) adapted from Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 13)*
The continuum depicted above is a heuristic model that allows the policy transfer processes to be considered in a systematic manner. It has two main features that allow researchers to identify categories of transfer and it notes that in many cases there are both voluntary and coercive features involved. The second feature at the coercive end of the continuum is an example of policies being imposed or forced on others (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: Bulmer et al., 2007). The policy transfer analysed in this research is an instance of voluntary transfer, as shown above, and Glasgow CIRV sits at a central position on the continuum.

II. Who transfers policy?

Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) originally identified six main categories of actors who engage in policy transfer, though in some cases there may be more than one category of actor involved. However, they updated this list of actors in 2000, to nine main categories:

I. Elected officials
II. Bureaucrats and civil servants
III. Political parties
IV. Pressure groups
V. Policy entrepreneurs/experts
VI. Supra-national institutions and non-governmental institutions

(The following three categories, were added by Dolowitz and Marsh, in 2000)

VII. Transnational corporations
VIII. Think tanks
IX. Consultants
My research determined which of the above categories were involved in the policy transfer process relating to Glasgow CIRV, as discussed further in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

The principal group involved in policy transfer are elected officials, and Rose (1993) states the reason for this is that ‘their values give direction to public policy and their endorsement is needed to legitimate the adoption of programs’ (1993: 52). Elected officials also determine the guidelines and boundaries of acceptable policies during their term in office. It is clear that if elected officials are not in favour of a policy or programme, then it is highly unlikely that any such policy would be implemented, even though it may have merit or other countries are operating it. Furthermore, even if other non-elected officials want to adopt a policy, it is not likely to succeed if politicians are opposed to it or they do not see the benefits (Dolowitz et al., 2000).

It became apparent during the course of this research that elected officials played a small, though crucial part, in the policy transfer process in relation to Glasgow CIRV. The research revealed that national and local elected representatives did not apply pressure to the police and other agencies to seek alternative approaches to tackle violence in the city, especially around gangs. The Scottish Government Ministers did, however, play a part in the transfer process by allocating significant funds of £1.5 million to the city for the establishment of Glasgow CIRV, in the guise of the Community Planning Partnership (CPP), and thereafter lending their visual, by attending events and meetings, and vocal support to the approach. This issue is fully discussed in Chapter 5.

Dolowitz et al. (2000) argue that bureaucrats, civil servants and administrators are highly influential in the policy adoption process and may even be more important than politicians, especially at the development and implementation stages. Their role is to carry detailed information to policy makers within their own area of responsibility or
elsewhere. It is clear that one of the key actors in this case of policy transfer was a high-ranking government official, who was instrumental in recommending the allocation of the funds, required by Glasgow to implement the policy transfer process, to elected officials. This role is discussed in full in Chapter 5.

*Political parties* may also have a role to play in the policy transfer process, as they need new ideas and ideologies to increase their chances of successful election to office. Interestingly, this research has determined that political parties were not involved in this policy transfer, as there was no political pressure, either at governmental or local level, on the police and other agencies to discover a new way to tackle the gang violence problem. The key actors driving the change were experts, in the guise of senior police officers and other city agency officials, and will be discussed in Chapter 5.

*Pressure groups* at local, national and international levels can and do influence policy transfer, with their role being to influence policy makers to adopt policies favourable to them and their clients. They maintain links with pressure groups in other states and exchange ideas and learn lessons from each other. They then utilise their contacts within government and by using public pressure (Dolowitz *et al.*, 2000). However, this research determined that political parties and pressure groups did not have a role to play in this transfer process.

Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) state that it is clear that *policy entrepreneurs and experts* in particular fields are important to lesson-drawing and policy transfer because of their ability to encourage others to learn lessons and assist in the spread of ideas and policies between different political systems. *Academic entrepreneurs* are also becoming increasingly active in the spread of ideas. They are advising local and national governments and are also becoming more involved in the work of international
organisations and think tanks. The ideas and policy proposals that they take with them, as they move between institutions and governments, are often given legitimacy due to their status and reputation as academics (Dolowitz et al., 2000). Academic entrepreneurs were found to play a crucial role in the CIRV policy transfer and will be discussed in Chapter 8.

The role experts play is also important in the policy transfer process. Experts, who operate both inside and outside of government, help to spread ideas and form epistemic communities, which Haas (1992) defines as:

A network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area. Haas (1992: 3)

Haas (1992) formulated the framework as a method for investigating the influence of knowledge-based experts in international policy transfer. Control over the production of knowledge and information allows them to articulate cause and effect relationships and frame issues for collective debate and, therefore, transfer their policy projects onto the global stage (Haas, 1989 and 1992; Dunlop, 2009). The role that the police play, as being part of a large epistemic community network that shares best practice, ideas, thoughts and values across both countries, will be discussed in Chapter 5.

The Dolowitz and Marsh model of policy transfer also discusses the roles that supranational and non-governmental organisations, national and international corporations (transnational corporations-TNCs), think tanks and consultants play in the policy transfer process and notes that they encourage and exchange ideas between countries and increasingly playing a major part in the transfer of policies across time and space (Rose,
1993; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Dolowitz et al., 2000). However, this research has determined that these categories of actors did not have any involvement in this policy transfer process. The roles of the various key actors who were active in this transfer will be discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

**III. What is transferred?**

Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) expanded Bennett’s view of policy convergence to propose seven objects of transfer. However, in their review of policy transfer in 2000, they stated that almost anything can be transferred and list eight different categories; policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, policy programmes, institutions, ideologies, ideas and attitudes and finally, negative lessons (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Jones and Newburn, 2007).

Dolowitz et al. (2000) further state that although most of these categories are self-explanatory, there are a few distinctions. It is often the case in most instances of policy-making and transfer that programmes and policies are merged into one category. Dolowitz et al. (2000) believe this to be misguided, as there are clear differences between the two categories. Policies are seen to be broad statements of intent and programmes are the means to achieve them. Therefore, it is clear that a single policy can have multiple programmes while a programme is a complete course of action in itself. Therefore, in the policy transfer process; it is likely that policy-makers will transfer a programme rather than a policy. Furthermore, while policy-makers might not be in a position to transfer a whole policy or programme, they may still transfer goals, instruments and policy content of particular policies and programmes from one political system to another (Dolowitz et al., 2000).
Jones and Newburn (2007) reiterate the point that, even though modern communication methods are advanced, there is no doubt that policy transfer is not a simple process and the literature on policy transfer and lesson-drawing contain many examples of failure. For example, Dolowitz et al. (2000) discuss in detail the difficulties the Thatcher government faced when trying to import the Child Support Agency into the UK from the US, and specifically, the three areas of policy failure, uninformed, incomplete and inappropriate transfer. This research will examine these factors of failure later in this chapter, and more specifically as they relate to the transfer of Glasgow CIRV, later in the thesis.

Furthermore, Jones and Newburn (2007) argue that it is easier to transfer symbols and terminology, for example, the concept of Zero-Tolerance policing, than it is to transfer more substantial programmes. They further argue that it is difficult to find instances of such transfer and that a particular criticism of the policy transfer literature tends to ignore the difficulties that can be faced in transfers and that is relatively straightforward to do so. However, there are some examples of successful transfers of institutions, such as the establishment of environmental ministries in European states, to protect the Mediterranean, which involved the transfer of ideas and structures (Haas, 1989; Dolowitz et al., 2000).

Lessons can be negative as well as positive, for example, Hoberg (1991) discusses the American influence on Canadian environmental regulation mentioned earlier. The Canadian government examined the American auto-emission standards and decided not to emulate these standards, as they believed them to be restrictive and not to meet Canada's needs given their environmental situation.
In the case of this research, exactly what was transferred and, why the transfer took the eventual shape that it did, is discussed in detail in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

IV. From where are lessons drawn?

Policy-makers can also look to three levels of governance: local, national and international levels. Lessons can be drawn from anywhere, however, a starting point for policy-makers can be their own country's history, from where they can learn what has worked in the past and what has not. Such a search can save time and effort if a suitable lesson can be found (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Dolowitz et al., 2000).

Policy transfer agents can look within their own political system, organisation or other units in their own country for lessons. This is potentially enhanced, should the country have a system of multiple political units, for example, the federal state system in America. Governments can also draw lessons from lower levels of government in their own country as well as lower levels drawing from above (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).

It is worth noting that geographical propinquity is not a requisite for policy transfer to occur. It is more important that ideological and resource similarities exist for successful policy transfer and neighbouring countries do not necessarily have these conditions. For example, such preconditions have existed between the UK and the US but not between the UK and its closest neighbours, i.e. France, Holland etc. (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).

The perceived growing trend of the UK importing policies from America has been discussed in relation to the ‘convergence’ of UK and US crime control policy. Newburn (2002) and Jones and Newburn (2007) discuss the various strategies and ideas that have been transferred from America to the UK, for example, Zero Tolerance Policing, curfews, the position of a Drugs Czar, private penal policies and private prisons, electronic
monitoring and the concept of ‘Three Strikes’. They state that there has been a predisposition, on the part of UK governments and police, to import criminal justice policies and ideas from America. Newburn (2002) discusses six ways and reasons for which aspects of crime control have crossed the Atlantic: Ideological proximity, electoral success, the language of politics and governments, symbolic politics, penal industrial complex and finally, neoliberal penal industrial complex, as further examined below.

Firstly, Newburn (2002) argues that without a degree of ideological proximity, it is unlikely that policy transfer will occur between political parties. The close ties that came from the rise of the ‘New Right’ in US and UK politics, led to closer working between the UK Conservative Thatcher government and the US government under President Reagan, and led to the foundation of policy transfer between the countries, firstly illustrated by the decision to transfer the Child Support Agency from the US to the UK (Dolowitz et al., 2000).

Secondly, this ideological proximity has been important for the processes of policy transfer in the crime control arena over the last fifteen years, according to Newburn (2002) because:

I. It leads governments to examine sympathetically policies of others with whom they share ideological beliefs.

II. It tends to increase the chances that governments define their ‘problems’ in similar ways.

III. It offers shared language or terminology to define problems and consider policy responses.
IV. It also may provide an ideological rhetoric with which policies can be explained and justified (Newburn, 2002: 172-3).

For example, the Labour Party in the UK closely examined the electoral success of the US Democrats, under President Clinton. As a result, the renamed New Labour Party copied almost word for word the Clinton message on crime control in their successful election campaign in 1997 (Dolowitz et al., 2000; Newburn, 2002; Newburn and Sparks, 2004; Jones and Newburn, 2007).

Thirdly, the language of politics and governments is also vital in the policy transfer process. Fairclough (2000) demonstrated how New Labour and the New Democrats used similar language in their policies on crime control. Newburn (2002) also argues that some of the key policies that have been transferred have in actual fact been elements of terminology, ideas and policies only; for example, Zero Tolerance Policing, ‘Three Strikes’ and ‘Prison Works’, while the policies themselves have not been transferred.

The fourth point, symbolic politics, would appear to be the clearest area of crime control policy transfer, and Newburn (2002) argues that decisions are taken by politicians who implement policies because of how they will be perceived by a particular section of the electorate. For example, politicians feel that they need to appear ‘tough’ about criminal justice and this has had a dramatic effect on the politics of crime in both the US and the UK (Tonry, 1994).

In relation to the penal-industrial complex, Lilly and Knepper (1992) discuss the point that there has been a rise in the number of private prisons in the UK, an idea imported from the US. They argue that this is not so much about policy transfer, but about joint ownership of corporations that make profits from the corrections products and services.
The last category discussed by Newburn (2002) is termed the neoliberal penal-industrial complex and has been characterised by a recognition that it has not just been major industrial penal corporations that have assisted in the spread of policies and ideologies from the US, but the role of ‘policy networks’ have also been important. Actors from a variety of public and private institutions at all levels of government, share beliefs and look to influence governments to achieve their goals over time.

The key reasons that appear to have influenced the policy transfer of CIRV will be discussed in Chapter 5.

V. Degrees of Transfer

Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) argue that a range of options are available to actors and policy makers to incorporate lessons into their own political system or organisation. Whereas Rose (1993) identifies five categories of policy transfer options; copying, emulation, hybridisation, synthesis and inspiration, Dolowitz and Marsh argue that these categories are better seen as four, merging the concepts of hybridisation and synthesis.

The first category is termed as copying and takes place when a state adopts a policy, programme or institution without any changes to the originating policy etc. It is copied in its entirety without any amendment or adaptation by the borrower. The second category of policy transfer, emulation occurs when a policy, programme or institution is not copied in detail, but provides best practice to adopting actors, as changes and adaptations have to be made to take into account the different factors in the borrowing environment.

The third category is hybridisation/synthesis and Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) combine the two separate categories discussed by Rose (1993) in lesson-drawing and
state that it involves combining elements found in two or more countries to develop best practice that will suit the adopter. The final category is termed *inspiration* and is the study of familiar problems in unfamiliar settings that can inspire or expand ideas and fresh thinking about what is possible (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 2000: Evans, 2009a).

The category of policy transfer that took place in this instance, emulation, is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

**VI. When do actors engage in policy transfer and how does this affect the policy-making process?**

Dolowitz et al. (2000) state that policy transfer can clearly aid our understanding of the policy-making process and recognise the different stages and purposes when policy-makers engage. For example, some of the key reasons for engaging in a transfer process include; to set the systemic and/or institutional agendas; solve problems; appear to be acting upon a problem (or to make a symbolic gesture that they are doing so); alter the course of policies, programmes or ‘rules of the game’; harmonise one system with another nation or the international system; penetrate another system; or simply to learn what is going on outside the indigenous situation or system.

This understanding is important especially when a ‘foreign’ model is under investigation in the transfer process and is clearly illustrated in cases of ‘failed’ transfer. In the case of such a ‘failure’, analysts often fail to recognise that where the policy is from can influence the chances of success or failure. For example, if the programme or policy is used in a ‘borrowing system’ in a way that was not intended, then this can lead to problems emerging and ultimately to failure. Conversely, the success of a programme or policy in
the originating system may depend on cultural or institutional factors, which were either ignored or misunderstood by those borrowing it (Dolowitz et al., 2000).

Dolowitz et al. (2000) also state that policy transfer can assist the understanding of several stages in the policy-making process as determined by Hogwood and Gunn (1984: 7), which are: agenda setting (deciding to decide); issue filtration (deciding how to decide); issue definition; forecasting; setting objectives; option analysis; policy implementation; monitoring and control; evaluation; and the final stage of policy maintenance, succession and termination.

Once it has been recognised that a problem exists then the agenda setting stage requires that the ‘actors’ need to take action. In this instance, policy-makers have to decide whether the problem or issue ‘should be left to normal political and administrative process or should be selected for more fundamental and objective analysis’ (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984: 8).

Furthermore, Dolowitz et al. (2000) claim that policy transfer can illuminate the ‘issue filtration’ and ‘issue definition’ stages of the policy process. For example, policy-makers will embark on a search for new ideas when such a solution is not readily available at ‘home’ and that before searching for new ideas, the issue must have been defined in such a way as to make the ‘found’ policy or programme acceptable, as is the case in this instance of policy transfer, discussed in detail in Chapters 5-7.

Policy transfer can also assist understanding of the option analysis stage in the process as outlined by Hogwood and Gunn (1984). It is assumed that once a policy or programme has been identified as being suitable for transfer, then contact must be made to assess what changes if any should be made to make the transfer successful. It is at this stage that
policy-makers should decide whether to copy, emulate, or mix policies to deal with their own problem. It is also important that policy-makers fully analyse the problem and the ‘borrowed’ policy to ensure that all the complexities are understood in order to achieve a successful transfer (Dolowitz et al., 2000). This research will argue that the actors in this policy transfer, initially set out to copy US CIRV and then realised at an early stage in the process, that emulation was more appropriate, as will be discussed later in Chapter 6.

Finally, policy transfer can also assist in the process of evaluation and reformation. It is important that policy-makers look at the impact the ‘borrowed’ policy or programme had on its own system. It is probable that policy-makers will adapt the policy or programme during its implementation, in light of information on its impact in the original system (Dolowitz et al., 2000).

**VII. What restricts policy transfer?**

Complex programmes constrain policy transferability; the more complex a policy or programme is, the more difficult it is to transfer successfully. Rose (1993: 133) suggests six hypotheses (see Table 1 below):
Table 1: Differences between Simple and Complex Programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Differences between Simple and Complex programmes</th>
<th>Simple</th>
<th>Complex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal</strong></td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Causes</strong></td>
<td>One, direct</td>
<td>Many, often indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Empirical focus</strong></td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>Vague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perception of side effects</strong></td>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td>Internalised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Familiarity</strong></td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Novel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Predictability</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Rose (1993: 133)*

A simple programme will have a single *goal* or objective, while a complex programme will more likely have multiple goals or objectives. The fewer and more direct the *causes* of a desired result, the greater the likelihood that a programme or policy is easier to transfer because there are less component parts. When an *empirical focus* characterises simple programmes or policies, their objectives can be more easily identified and verified. This focus allows one to know what a programme is meant to do and to make an evaluation that it has been transferred effectively. The *perception of side effects* increases the complexity of a programme or policy and hence, makes it more difficult to transfer. The fewer the side effects there are, the more likely the transfer. The more *familiar* actors are with a programme or policy and how it operates makes it easier to transfer. Finally, the more easily outcomes can be *predicted*, the simpler the transfer will be (Rose, 1993: 132-4).

In relation to the above factors, this thesis determines the aims and objectives that Glasgow CIRV was set up to achieve. It also examines the many complex *causes* of the
violence and identifies the *empirical focus* of the key actors. This research also sought to determine whether the key actors anticipated any *side effects* of the policy transfer, for example possible additional benefits of reduced anti-social behaviour. It also examines the category of *predictability* of Glasgow CIRV and determines its predicted outcomes, the effect of having or not having a robust evaluation model implemented at an early stage in the process of transfer. These issues are discussed in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.

According to Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) past policies can also constrain and restrict policy makers as to what can be transferred and what to look for when one is engaging in policy transfer. For example, the institutional and structural constraints faced by agents of policy transfer, are crucial, as they can act as a barrier to transfer. Wolman (1992) identifies two important institutional and structural constraints faced by transfer agents transferring policies from one setting to another; differences in the institutional environment in which governments function, for example, the structure and operations of local fiscal systems or personnel systems; and, differences in the relationship of different levels of government to each other. Wolman (1992) demonstrates how the United States’ federal structure acted as a constraint on the transfer of policies from the unitary British system, while Britain’s unitary system facilitated the UK Government’s ability to transfer American policies into the UK. This research examines if this was the case in the transfer of the CIRV programme from Cincinnati to Glasgow, and reflects on the ability of the Scottish Government, through the auspices of the police in Glasgow and the city agencies, to transfer the US CIRV to Glasgow, and the constraints placed on the transfer by the local context in Glasgow.

Policy transfer is also dependent on the transferring political system possessing the political, bureaucratic and economic resources to implement the policy or programme
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Robertson (1991) suggests that policy transfer success is more likely if the policy is consistent with dominant political ideology in the ‘host’ country and states that ideological similarities are vital when looking for lessons elsewhere. Therefore, ideological similarities are crucial when a state is looking for lessons elsewhere, which is similar to the concept of ideological proximity as discussed earlier in this chapter by Newburn (2002).

Rose (1993) states that the bureaucratic size and efficiency of the state may influence policy transfer. A state has to be able to cope with a policy or programme and have the necessary resources and administrative capabilities. If a nation is not capable of coping with a programme or policy, then it is unlikely that transfer will occur. However, even if a state does possess the necessary resources then it is not assured that the policy will be transferred, as discussed earlier by Hoberg (1991) in the case of the Canadian government adopting American environmental protection policies. Economic resources are therefore a crucial constraint for actors in policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).

**VIII. How can researchers begin demonstrating the occurrence of policy transfer?**

Any research seeking to demonstrate/evaluate policy transfers requires an in-depth analysis as it is highly unlikely that there will be a single piece of empirical evidence to prove that transfer has occurred (Dolowitz *et al.*, 2000). There are various readily available sources of information to search for lessons worldwide and to ascertain if policy transfer has occurred. The media is the most common, with newspapers and magazines being the most popular (Dolowitz *et al.*, 2000; Evans, 2009c).
For example, Nellis (2000) demonstrates that the main newspapers in the UK were aware of the electronic monitoring programmes in the US. They were influential in persuading the government to delay implementation in favour of developing a British system of ‘tagging’, due to what the Observer newspaper (17 November 1996) called the UK’s ‘cultural cringe’ towards the US, because of what they saw as a persistent ‘swamping’ of the UK, by American culture and gadgetry.

Television also plays a part in providing information on foreign policies and programmes, for example, British television highlighting US welfare-to-work programmes and thus, bringing it to the attention of government officials and ministers. Radio similarly plays a part in highlighting potential policy transfer initiatives and the Internet is also becoming highly influential as a source of information. It gives direct access to all of the world’s governments, pressure groups, and media outlets. It also provides access to government documentation that is useful for researchers and officials on the lookout for suitable policies or programmes for transfer (Dolowitz et al., 2000).

Empirical research, and the use of appropriate methodological questions, can be used to show that policies and programmes have been successfully transferred, or indeed have been a failure. Official government statements in written records and interviews provide the most direct method to show that transfer has taken place. It should also be noted that agents of transfer must be aware of information of a policy elsewhere because showing that a policy looks similar to another is not evidence of transfer. The transfer must be a ‘conscious process’ (Dolowitz et al., 2000).
IX. *How can policy transfer help our understanding of policy failure?*

Not all policy transfers are successful. It is, therefore, important to understand and examine why policy transfer can be unsuccessful; one should identify which factors are related to successful or unsuccessful transfers. Dolowitz *et al.* (2000) discuss the point that it is difficult to actually ascertain if a transfer was a success or not. Two possible definitions of success could be that the transfer achieved the stated aims of the policy-makers, laid down at the beginning of the transfer, and whether the policy, programme or institution was seen to be a success by the key actors involved in the transfer.

Three factors may have a significant impact on policy transfer failure. First, the term, *uninformed transfer* relates to the borrowing country not having sufficient information regarding the policy or institution from which the policy is being transferred, and how it actually operates there. *Incomplete transfer* relates to when the transfer has occurred, but some crucial elements have not been transferred. Finally, *inappropriate transfer* relates to when insufficient attention to detail has been paid to the differences between economic, social, political and ideological contexts in the transferring and borrowing countries (Dolowitz *et al.*, 2000; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Jones and Newburn, 2007). These issues are discussed in relation to this case study in Chapter 8.

*Criticisms of Policy Transfer and Way Forward*

Evans and Davies (1999) argue that the study of policy transfer has a multi-disciplinary character, which could be seen as a strength, but also as a weakness. A consequence of the diffuse nature of the study of policy transfer is that researchers do not have a unified
theoretical or methodological discourse, from which they can learn lessons and develop hypotheses.

The policy transfer literature has displayed a number of important limitations. Stone (1999) demonstrates how the literature requires to be informed by the perspectives of other bodies of work, in particular, policy networks. One reason for this is that Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) posited that the earlier policy transfer literature concentrated on political state institutions and the actions of politicians and government officials.

A further concern is a number of claims that policy transfer is unsupported by rigorous empirical evidence. Bennett (1997: 214) argues that ‘there is a paucity of systematic research that can convincingly make the case that cross-national policy learning has had a determining influence on policy choice’. Jones and Newburn (2007) state that this lack of detailed empirical research is most evident in the fields of criminal justice and penal policy, underpinning the need for the type of research conducted in this thesis.

Dolowitz et al. (1999) define policy transfer in a broad sense to include non-voluntary aspects when discussing the transfer of US electoral strategies and social policies. This does not take into account the possibility that policy-makers had decided on a course of action independently of influence from the US, even though they had visited the US.

Evans (2009b) offers a critique of policy transfer and discusses four main areas. The first is that it cannot be distinguished from normal forms of policy-making (Evans and Davies, 1999) and rational approaches to policy-making, in particular, as discussed by James and Lodge (2003) and it also has no distinct form of enquiry. The second area is discussed by James and Lodge (2003) who claim that policy transfer analysts fail to advance an explanatory theory of policy development while the third area is that policy transfer
analysts are also accused of failing to provide rigorous empirical tools for evaluating whether policy transfer has occurred or not. The final point offered by Evans (2006) maintains that policy transfer analysts fail to make research relevant to the real world of practice. This research aims to address this by conducting a case study of the Glasgow CIRV initiative from Cincinnati, determining the scale of the policy transfer that occurred, using a robust empirical approach.

Benson and Jordan (2011) discuss the original policy transfer study by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) and their updated research in 2000, to review what has been learned, by whom, and for what purpose. They state that the literature has evolved from its narrow state-centered roots to cover more actors and places. It is now debated in the wider topics of globalisation, ‘Europeanisation’ and policy innovation. They also assess the concept’s position in the overall ‘toolkit’ of policy analysis and conclude that it is now an important component. They conclude by stating over the years there was a process of evolution, during which it expanded to encompass other theoretical and empirical perspectives and foci. They also argue that a parallel process of assimilation has occurred, as policy transfer has been absorbed into debates in other literature. In the future, research into the topic may continue to evolve or assimilate or even go into a period of decay, though they believe that this is unlikely.

Marsh and Sharman (2009) argue that the literature on policy diffusion and policy transfer are complimentary but feel there is a requirement to focus more clearly on various issues. For example, each concept would benefit from a focus on the changing interactions between the different mechanisms involved in diffusion and transfer; diffusion literature focuses on pattern finding, while the transfer literature looks at process tracing but any full explanation of transfer/diffusion needs to do both; both kinds
of literature suffer from distorted case selection with too little attention on developing countries; and finally neither concept considers any criteria that could be used to define policy success or failure. This last point has been an issue of concern for this research. It has proven difficult to define if the policy transfer has been a success or not due to a lack of definitive criteria of success or failure. However, this point is discussed in Chapter 8 and reaches a conclusion on the success or failure of the policy transfer. In doing so, it also discusses the limitations of the Dolowitz and Marsh model, discussing the failure of the long-term sustainability of policy that was transferred and proposing an extension of the Dolowitz and Marsh model beyond its linear and finite scope, by showing that transfer can be cyclical in nature and not be restricted to flowing one way, to account for the ‘backflow of policy transfer’ occurrence that this research identifies. It also identifies what it does not encapsulate, and reinforces the significance of the local contexts, which cannot fail to have an impact on such transfer processes.

**Policy Mobilities and Mutations**

As mentioned at the start of this chapter, models and approaches of orthodox policy transfer have recently sustained some levels of criticism from critical human geographers and policy scholars, most notably Peck and Theodore (2010), Peck (2011) and McCann and Ward (2012). Peck and Theodore (2010) and Peck (2011) have especially been most vocal in their criticisms and explores the distinction between the ‘rational-formalist tradition of work on policy transfer, rooted in orthodox political science, and the social-constructionist approaches to policy mobility and mutation’ (Peck, 2011: 774).

One of the main criticisms of the orthodox models was posited by McCann and Ward (2012) and Clarke et al. (2015), who adopt this interpretivist framework, claiming that
this framework was more flexible and was not overly reliant on a preoccupation with transfers between and by nation states, a notion that is contrary to that discussed by Marsh and Evans (2013) and Benson and Jordan (2012), who argue that orthodox policy transfer has not been overly preoccupied by the nation state.

Early proponents of this interpretivist framework were Lendvai and Stubbs (2009) who identified what they termed ‘assemblages’, which emerged as a concept from the work of Deleuze and Guattari (2004, discussed in Lendvai and Stubbs, 2009). It seeks to adhere to both the structural and fluid aspects of social phenomena taking into account time and temporal space in the emergence and mutation of phenomena. They also preferred to use the term ‘translation’, as it appeared to emphasise the fluid and dynamic nature of the social world.

Human ethnographers, such as Peck (201), argue that the concept of ‘policy mobilities’ is better suited to explain the wandering and mobile nature of public policies across the world due to the increased globalisation of communications etc. Peck and Theodore (2010: 169-170), contend that the ‘mobilities’ approach has five key features. The first contends that policy formation and transformation are socially constructed processes and are best seen as a ‘field of adaptive connections, deeply structured by enduring power relations and shifting ideological alignments’. Furthermore, policy transfer processes are rarely just about transferring policy knowledge and technology from one place to another, as there are intrinsic politics in play. The second key feature suggests that policy actors are not ‘lone actors’ but are heavily involved in epistemic communities (see Haas, 1992) involving consultants, advocates, evaluators, gurus and critics.
Indeed, the main actors involved in the transfer of the US CIRV model to Glasgow, were members of such an epistemic community of police experts, which facilitated the exchange of ideas between the US and UK. This will be fully discussed in later chapters.

The third key feature discussed by Peck and Theodore (2010: 170) relates to the argument that mobile policies rarely travel as ‘complete’ packages, but are instead transferred in a piecemeal fashion and are often transformed in the process. They arrive at their destination, not as copies, but as ‘policies already-in-transformation’. I would contend that the Glasgow CIRV model was not transferred in such a piecemeal fashion, but was complete at the outset. It was only after the transfer had taken place that it became apparent that changes would have to be made and the transformation, or emulation, occurred. The fourth feature argues that policy transfer is not a linear process of replication, or simple emulation, but a complex process of non-linear reproduction and that ‘policies will mutate and morph during their journeys’ (Peck and Theodore, 2011: 170). This point will be discussed in relation to the transfer of the CIRV model in Chapter 8.

The final feature emphasises the ‘spatiality’ of policy making, meaning that policies should not be seen as travelling across an inert landscape, but rather in terms of a ‘three-dimensional mosaic of increasingly reflexive forms of governance, shaped by multi-directional forms of cross-scalar and interlocal policy mobility’ (Peck and Theodore, 2011: 170). Policies do not transfer intact across boundaries, but evolve through mobility, transforming the landscape and remaking the relational connections between policy-making sites. There is a parallel in this instance with the connections that were forged between US CIRV and Glasgow CIRV staff as information flowed between the sites,
especially in relation to the ‘backflow of policy transfer’, that will be discussed later in this thesis.

However, while human geographers (see Peck and Theodore, 2010: Peck, 2011: and McCann and Ward, 2013) do concede that orthodox policy transfer literature can illuminate policy actors, institutions and practices involved in international policy transfer, they also contend that the literature is limited somewhat in three ways. It does not look at concept of ‘agency’, as it is focused on a limited set of actors; the conceptualisation of policy process is overly rationalistic as ‘there is a tendency for good policies can drive out bad, in a process of optimising diffusion (Peck and Theodore, 2010: 169); and finally, there is a tendency to make assumptions that models are fully formed and ready for transfer, which does not take into account the social, spatial, economic issues and in the case of Glasgow CIRV, legal and political climate, that affected the transfer. These issues will be examined in relation to the policy transfer in later chapters.

It would appear that the criticisms laid at the door of orthodox policy transfer models by critical human geographers may have some merit. However, not all agree that such policy transfers are invalid. Marsh and Evans (2013) offer four key points to refute the arguments. They disagree that policy transfer researchers ignore agency by focusing all of their attention on actors; they also argue that there is a plethora of research not just focused on nation states; they acknowledge that policy transfer does not ignore transformational issues and argue that research in this field is focussed on processes and not just on outcomes. This point is key to this research that is an examination of the policy transfer processes of the CIRV project from Cincinnati to Glasgow. Finally, they contend that all policy transfers are complex.
It is clear, however, that the social constructionist view of orthodox policy transfer does make some valid points and has some merit. The term ‘policy’ does infer a ‘flatness’ and is linear in its approach. I would argue that this research has revealed that the Dolowitz and Marsh model of policy transfer is somewhat limited in its efficacy to fully describe the instance of transfer in this case as it does not fully explain the concept of ‘backflow’. This will be fully discussed in Chapter 8.

The terms ‘policy mobilities and mutations’, as discussed by Peck (2011) do offer interesting insights into the transfer process involved in this research. I would agree that ‘policies are not … merely being transferred over space; their form and their effects are transformed by these journeys’ (Peck, 2011: 793) and that the focus is not just on nation states, but on multiple sites. This which will be discussed later in this thesis in relation to the changes to the model as they ‘mutated’ to take into account the local environmental context of the borrowing site, Glasgow CIRV.

**Final Thoughts**

This chapter has provided a review of the literature on policy transfer. As discussed, policy transfer emerged from comparative policy analysis in the US, from the studies of policy diffusion, convergence and lesson-drawing. Policy transfer literature is mainly concerned with the field of political science though it has been discussed in terms of criminal justice. For example, Newburn (2002) and Jones and Newburn (2007) discuss the various strategies and ideas that have been transferred from America to the UK, including, Zero Tolerance Policing, curfews, the position of a Drugs Czar, private penal policies and private prisons, electronic monitoring and the concept of ‘Three Strikes’.
Furthermore, Newburn and Sparks (2004) and Jones and Newburn (2007) have stated that there is a dearth of empirical research in the criminal justice field. It is this area that this research aims to contribute to by drawing on the policy transfer model developed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000).

The orthodox models of policy transfer have been subject to some criticisms, especially by critical human geographers (see Peck and Theodore, 2010; Peck, 2011; McCann and Ward, 2012), who maintain that the term policy transfer is limited in its efficacy to take into account the various factors involved in such transfers, and that the terms ‘policy mobilities and mutations’ are better suited to fully understand and describe the complexities of transfers now taking place in the global environment.

The following chapters analyse the policy transfer between Cincinnati and Glasgow, by using the various questions posed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000), and conducting an in-depth analysis of the policy transfer case.
Chapter 4 - Methodology

Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodology that underpinned this research; an in-depth critical case study of the Glasgow Community Initiative to Reduce Violence (Glasgow CIRV), which was established in June 2008 and, was initially designed to copy (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996) the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence project in America (US CIRV). It later transpired that merely copying US CIRV would not suffice due to various issues and constraints, as will be discussed in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. Therefore, I will argue that Glasgow CIRV instead emulated US CIRV, taking into account the significance of local contexts that shape the transfer process as contingent on various local issues and different legal, policing and socio-economic contexts in Glasgow. Glasgow CIRV ceased to operate in July 2011 while US CIRV is still in operation; one aim of this research was to explore whether the policy transfer processes could explain their different outcomes.

Aims and Objectives of Research - Research Questions

The main purpose of this research was to investigate the processes, mechanisms and outcomes of a case of international criminal justice policy transfer. This research had several key objectives:

➢ To examine the socio-political and cultural environments in which the initiative was first developed in Cincinnati and how it was implemented in Glasgow
➢ To develop an understanding of the factors, both endogenous and exogenous, which affected the degree of implementation of the initiative and its outcomes

➢ To establish whether the policy transfer had the intended outcomes and whether it was a complete transfer of the initial policy

➢ To reflect on the general transferability of this type of criminal justice policy

These aims and objectives will be addressed and answered throughout this thesis in the following chapters.

In order to examine the policy transfer process, those involved in the conception, development and implementation of the programme had a key role to play as participants. The research relied on the collection and analysis of qualitative data, which was central to providing the rich description type of evidence required for a detailed understanding of the distinct aspects of this case of criminal justice policy transfer (see Patton, 2002; Bryman, 2004; King and Wincup, 2008; Davies et al., 2011 and Bazeley, 2013).

The examination of the policy transfer began with an investigation of where the initiative came from, who was involved and what each party hoped to get out of it. This entailed both the analysis of available documentation in the form of policy briefings, 'best practice' notes and reports, and academic papers, as well as interviews with key participants in the transfer process to contextualise this material. The aim was to unravel the thinking and context that informed the development and implementation of the initiative in Scotland, but reference was also made to the involvement of American counterparts in the development and implementation where relevant. This analysis also involved
examining the similarities and differences between US CIRV and Glasgow CIRV and an analysis of any apparent constraints that were placed on Glasgow CIRV.

It is important to state at the outset that I was a police officer (holding the rank of Inspector), and the Deputy Project Manager of Glasgow CIRV from June 2008, until my retirement from the police in September 2010, during which time I had day-to-day operational responsibility for the staff and the project in general. It should also be noted that I was not involved in the planning and pre-implementation phase in early 2008 of Glasgow CIRV, as others, who have been interviewed for this research, carried this out. I had an in-depth knowledge of the project, from its inception in June 2008, and had built relations with key participants in the transfer process both in Glasgow and Cincinnati. It was my role in the Glasgow CIRV project that led to my interest in the topic for this doctoral research.

This chapter includes a discussion of the research design, theoretical framework and the methods used during my research. It also discusses my personal reflections on my previous role in the police and how I took this into consideration by acknowledging that it may have had an impact on my research, due to my previous close working relations with some key actors, and my involvement in the process of transfer and implementation of Glasgow CIRV. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the ethical considerations relevant to the research.

**Research Design**

Bryman (2004: 27) defines a research design as providing a framework for the collection and analysis of data, while King and Wincup (2008) state that it is important to note that
the research design and research methods are different and that the research methodology can only be agreed on when the research design is clear. The researcher needs to ascertain what kind of data to collect and from what sources. If one can get the design right, the rest will follow.

Research designs can either be tightly focused, or planned, with great attention to detail and pre-specification in the collection of data and analysis; or, be flexible in that only the research problem and approach are outlined at the commencement of the data collection. Each type of such approach can be problematic as a planned approach can lead to the researcher missing critical new evidence while a flexible approach might lead to ineffective strategies and analysis that does not lead to a conclusion (Bazeley, 2013).

Therefore, the choice of an appropriate research design was crucial to the success of the research and set out a ‘roadmap’ to follow. I adopted a flexible research design that, while allowing me to remain focused on the practicalities of achieving my objective, was flexible enough to adjust to specific questions as required, dependent on experiences during the field research. Furthermore, this allowed me to make changes to the interview schedule dependent on the role and the availability, or lack of access to, key actors.

This research used a case study design to analyse the transfer process, which is defined by Berg (2004) as ‘a method involving systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, event, or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how the subject operates or functions’ (Berg, 2004 quoted in Seale, 2012: 119).

This type of approach involved collecting, organising and subsequently analysing the primary and secondary data gathered. Patton (2002), Robson (2002) and Bryman (2004) discuss the purpose of this type of approach as gathering comprehensive and in-depth
information in a systematic manner, in this case of the two initiatives in Glasgow and Cincinnati, which allowed the analysis of the policy transfer of the Cincinnati initiative to Glasgow, including the processes, mechanisms and the subsequent outcomes.

Yin (2012) states that a multiple case study design is beneficial to the researcher as the evidence that can be gathered could be more compelling; however, time and resources can have an impact on such an undertaking. Yin (2012) further describes five categories of case studies that may be used in single-case studies: the critical case, used when the researcher has a theory they may wish to challenge or confirm, which was used in this case; a unique case, when the subject being studied is rare; a representative case, which has features that are common in other instances; a revelatory case, where the researcher is given access to a previously private or inaccessible institution or body; and the longitudinal case, when the case is studied over a period of time.

An advantage of a case study design is that the research can be more detailed and provide a rich understanding of a particular person, setting or event, in this case, Glasgow CIRV, than if one was looking at a large sample or multiple cases (Gilbert, 2008; Seale, 2012; Bazeley, 2013). However, there are disadvantages of case studies, for example, the findings may not be generalisable; they cannot establish cause and effect connections; and they can be very time-consuming and produce large amounts of data that can be difficult to handle (Seale, 2012).

The case study used in this research incorporated the following components: Purpose (aims and objectives) of what the study trying is to achieve; theory (model of policy transfer) – identifying the theoretical framework guiding the research; research questions (semi-structured interview schedule) – developing the questions for the interviews; methods – identifying the specific methods chosen to collect data.; and the
sampling strategy, including who will be interviewed (Robson, 2002; King and Wincup, 2008; Seale, 2012).

**Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework that I chose for this research was the model of policy transfer developed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000), who developed a series of questions that informed the policy transfer process and I used these questions as a framework to examine the transfer of the US CIRV model to Glasgow CIRV. The key questions developed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) were as follows:

I. Why and when do actors engage in policy transfer?

II. When do actors engage in policy transfer and how does this affect the policymaking and policy transfer process?

III. From where are lessons drawn?

IV. Who transfers policy?

V. What is transferred?

VI. Are there different degrees of transfer?

VII. What restricts policy transfer?

VIII. How can policy transfer help our understanding of policy failure?

IX. How can researchers begin demonstrating the occurrence of policy transfer?

After reviewing the available literature on policy transfer, I deemed this model to be the most appropriate framework for my research, as it provided the relevant tools to carry out an in-depth analysis of the transfer process. As previously discussed in Chapter 3, the
Dolowitz and Marsh model of policy transfer was an amalgam of the various concepts developed in the political science field, namely; policy diffusion, policy convergence, policy learning and lesson-drawing and it provided a comprehensive model, allowing the examination of the various processes, mechanisms and outcomes of the policy transfer between Cincinnati and Glasgow.

**Methods Used - Qualitative Approach**

I used a qualitative approach for this research, as I perceived that such an approach would provide me with the tools to develop a rich description of the policy transfer for critical analysis (Flick, 2015). Qualitative researchers can explore the behaviour, perspectives and the experiences of the people who are the subject of the research (Bryman, 2004; Holloway, 2004) by focusing on observing, describing and interpreting and analysing the way that people experience their social space and how they act on, or think about themselves (Bazeley, 2013). I did consider using elements of quantitative research, for example, a survey questionnaire, but discounted this at an early stage of the research as being inappropriate for my purposes.

Bryman (2012) and Gray (2014) state, that some researchers and commentators believe that qualitative research is regarded as less valid and reliable than quantitative research, though as Kirk and Miller (1986, as discussed in Flick, 2015) state that the classical criteria of empirical social research, i.e. reliability, validity and objectivity, can also be applied to qualitative research, as well as quantitative research, a position agreed with by Mason (1996). LeCompte and Goetz (1982) discuss the relevance of whether or not reliability and validity can be used appropriately in relation to qualitative research, and adopt a different stance by discussing the concepts of external reliability. For instance,
the degree to which a study can be replicated, is a difficult concept to achieve in qualitative research; internal reliability - meaning when there is multiple observers that all agree with what they see and hear; internal validity - a good match between observer's observations and the theoretical ideas they develop; and finally, external validity - refers to the degree to which findings can be generalised across different social settings, taking into account the fact that qualitative researchers do tend to use case studies and small samples. These points lead to the conclusion that qualitative research can in fact be reliable and valid in similar ways to quantitative research.

Flick (2015) also discusses how the issue of reliability can be reformed to have a more procedural emphasis, with the requirement that statements made by participants and the researcher's interpretation should be clearly distinguishable. Flick (2015) also determines that the question of validity also requires to be reformulated, with researchers scrutinising interviews for any indication that the interviewee was, or was not reluctant to answer certain questions. However, it is clear that qualitative research is a powerful analytical tool and is highly contextual and gathers data in a real life setting, which can involve long time periods. It is not a 'snap-shot' or cross-section of events and can provide a deeper explanation of how and why events happen (Gray, 2014). Furthermore, it can also take into account people's own emotions, motivations, prejudices, and incidents of interpersonal co-operation and conflict (Charmaz, 1995).

Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2013) argue that qualitative research has several characteristics including, that it is carried out in the 'field' and that the researcher's role is to achieve a 'holistic', integrated view of the subject being studied and that this should include the perceptions of the relevant participants, including trying to understand the ways they acted and how they accounted for their own actions.
In seeking to investigate the various reasons why it was felt that Glasgow needed a new approach to tackle gang violence, the advantages that qualitative research could provide were taken into account. It was felt that, by adopting such a qualitative approach, it could provide a rich picture of the policy transfer and ascertain the perceptions and motivations of the key actors involved in the process.

I employed an approach, which involved using different methods to investigate the same phenomenon, the Glasgow CIRV initiative, from the perspectives from various actors who had a range of differing views on the initiative. This involved carrying out semi-structured interviews with key participants in the transfer process and a review of relevant documentary evidence, for example, published documentation from Glasgow CIRV and the VRU, academic books and journals (Patton, 2002; Robson, 2002; Bryman, 2004; Gilbert, 2008; Davies et al., 2011; Seale, 2012).

**Interview Process**

**Interview Sampling and Identifying Key Participants**

As discussed in Chapter 3, the Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) model of policy transfer identified nine main categories of actors who can be involved in the policy transfer decision-making process. These are elected officials, bureaucrats and civil servants, political parties, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs and experts, supranational and non-governmental institutions, transnational corporations, think tanks and finally, consultants.

I identified a range of key participants from several categories of actors involved in the processes of the policy transfer, however, as the categories of political parties, pressure
groups, transnational corporations, think tanks and consultants played little or no part in the policy transfer process, they were not included in this research.

Given my role in the police and Glasgow CIRV, I was able to identify various key actors involved in the policy transfer process, who I also knew in a professional capacity due to my working with them over a period of 3 years. Their roles ranged from the heads of the Scottish Violence Reduction Unit, department leaders in Housing, Education, Social Work and Community Safety Services in Glasgow and various senior police officers, including the Chief Constable, who had responsibility for the areas covered by the initiative. This research determined that elected representatives did not play a significant role in the policy transfer process, except to authorise the funding, which will be discussed in full in Chapter 5, so I did not deem it necessary to carry out interviews with them. However, I did interview a senior Scottish Government civil servant, who provided me with an insight into the decision-making and funding process for Glasgow CIRV at the highest level. Other key participants identified and interviewed included voluntary sector workers and representatives of non-governmental institutions.

Given my previous personal experiences with the key actors, I tried to remain objective throughout the interview process and not let my personal relationships with them interfere with, or prejudice, the data collection and subsequent analysis; for example, I was conscious that I had inside knowledge of the issues under discussion and could be tempted to ‘fill in the gaps’ by suggesting words or comments or prompting during the interviews. The interviewees were encouraged to reply freely and as comprehensively as possible and only if the answers were not rich enough, did I ask probing questions to gain a better insight to the topic under discussion (Flick, 2015).
Noaks and Wincup (2004) discuss the subject of anonymity during the research process and I also considered this to be important. However, I also recognised from the outset that this is a very tight-knit field of work, and those interviewed may possibly be easily recognised through their positions in organisations and knowledge base. Given this situation, the key participants interviewed were fully informed of this position when I was seeking their permission and all agreed to be interviewed.

I employed a strategy of purposive sampling on the basis of looking to interview those people who were key to understanding the policy transfer process and outcomes. Given my knowledge of Glasgow CIRV, I was confident that I was able to identify and approach various key individuals who were involved in the transfer process from the start to finish, i.e. the project’s inception, planning, implementation and evaluation, without missing out on any key actors that may have been important. I thereafter carried out a total of 18 interviews in Glasgow (see Appendix 5).

As a result of a site visit to Cincinnati in April 2009, I had developed a working relationship with key staff in US CIRV and given this, I was also able to access the key participants in Cincinnati who were involved with the implementation and running of US CIRV and I conducted a total of 10 interviews (see Appendix 6) with those who represented similar organisations to those from Glasgow, during a week-long site visit to Cincinnati in November 2012.

Due to my personal involvement in Glasgow CIRV, as previously mentioned, I had an idea of how many key actors were involved in both projects, but I also did not have a predetermined number of interviews to carry out, rather, when I reached a position when I felt that I had interviewed enough of the relevant actors to achieve a full and ‘rich’ picture (Bazeley, 2013) of the project, I concluded the interview process. For example, I
did not anticipate that I needed to, or would be able to, interview all of the police officers involved in the project in Glasgow, and felt that it was sufficient to interview some key senior officers, who were instrumental in the decision-making process, to provide a clear picture of the police involvement. These officers included the Divisional Commander and Area Commanders of the police division involved in Glasgow CIRV but did not include junior officers, as they were not involved in the transfer process.

Access to Key Participants

I was able to access a wide range of key participants during my research, including the then Acting Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police, who had been involved in the initial visits to America that led to Violence Reduction Unit (VRU) staff searching there for new ideas, and the then Director of the VRU. I was also able to gain access to other senior police officers, along with the key personnel from the partner agencies involved in Glasgow CIRV. The interviews in Glasgow enabled me to construct a comprehensive picture of Glasgow CIRV, including the reasons why it was felt that a new approach was necessary to tackle violent crime in gangs and how this new approach was subsequently conceptualised and implemented. I did note from my research, that the former Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police, Sir William Rae, who retired from the police in 2007, had played a significant part in the transfer process at the outset, by authorising the implementation of Glasgow CIRV. However, I was not able to interview Sir William as his whereabouts was unknown and it was thought that he was living abroad. Given the actors that I did manage to interview, I do not think that this omission had a negative impact on the research.
I also secured access to a range of senior figures in Cincinnati involved in US CIRV, including the City Councilman who had been instrumental in bringing the academic who had developed the focused deterrence strategy in the 1990s in Boston, Professor David Kennedy to Cincinnati.

I believe that, given my previous role in the police and Glasgow CIRV in particular, I was able to gain access to a range of former colleagues and agency partners that another researcher may have had more difficulty accessing, as discussed by Brown (1996) and Reiner and Newburn (2008). However, not all of the key actors made themselves available for interview. One notable key participant did not refuse to be interviewed but did make it extremely difficult to be interviewed, by what appeared to be a process of passive resistance by failing to answer letters and e-mails. Several telephone calls to their secretary were met with a reluctance to set an interview date attributed to how busy they were. I formed the opinion that this person did not wish to be interviewed on this subject, but they did not actually say so. Ultimately, I was not able to interview this actor in the policy transfer process, but I believe, given the other interviews successfully conducted, this omission did not hamper the research in any way as I was able to gather relevant information from other actors.

**Semi-Structured Interviews**

I developed a series of questions that allowed me to gather qualitative data in order to analyse, inform and guide my research to ascertain the level/type of policy transfer that may or may not have been achieved. The questions were derived from the models of policy transfer developed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) and Evans and Davies (1999), identified in Chapter 3, though I concentrated on the Dolowitz and Marsh model...
as I felt that it provided me with the necessary tools to develop an effective interview strategy. I first set out the nine key questions from the Dolowitz and Marsh model of transfer (see above) and then distilled them into a series of questions that would inform each of the nine main questions. This process provided me with a template to critically analyse this case of policy transfer (see Appendix 3).

I recognised that the main set of questions developed for Glasgow CIRV was not relevant for all practitioners and others not directly involved in the decision-making process in Glasgow, therefore I adapted the main interview schedule for each category of interviewee. For example, there were some questions that were only relevant for the main actors directly involved in the initial transfer of Glasgow CIRV, which were not put to others in Glasgow who became involved in the process at a later stage. I carried out a similar exercise for the interviews in Cincinnati, and the actors there were interviewed to present a ‘picture’ of the Cincinnati model with a view to examining the transfer process as a whole (see Appendix 4).

**Documentary Evidence**

The collation and review of documentation provided a rich descriptive source of evidence that produced a fuller picture of both CIRV projects by providing academic, legal and organisational information. Documentary evidence was collated from a variety of sources, including policy documents, best practice guides relating to the initiatives, documentation and official press releases and media sources. I also carried out a literature review of academic journals, primarily relating to US CIRV and the focused deterrence strategies employed in the US. In addition, I also gained access to other
documentation, for example, personal papers not released into the public domain, from 'gate-keepers', such as strategy documents relating to Glasgow CIRV.

There are a number of advantages and disadvantages associated with using such sources. One advantage is that readily available documents can provide a rich source of information, while a disadvantage can be that the material is very hard to organise and analyse as well as possibly being out of date (see Patton, 2002; Robson, 2002; Bryman, 2004; Noaks and Wincup, 2004; Davies et al., 2011; Seale, 2012). A further disadvantage that I faced in this research was in relation to official documents produced by Glasgow CIRV, in that they were produced for a particular purpose and may have contained selective information. Therefore, I had to be aware of possible bias of any statistics produced and assertions made in relation to Glasgow CIRV's effectiveness. For example, the statistics and figures contained in the quarterly reports may not be entirely accurate as there was a lack of a robust collation framework available to Glasgow CIRV, as will be discussed in Chapter 6.

**Coding of Data**

In total, I conducted 28 interviews in Glasgow and Cincinnati and once the interviews were completed, I transcribed them personally, allowing me to identify themes that emerged from the data. Nvivo 10 was used to facilitate the coding of the interview data collected into nine thematic interest areas that mirrored the nine key questions developed in the Dolowitz and Marsh model (1996 and 2000), which assisted the analysis process, and also allowed further reflection on the emerging data (see Patton, 2002; Bryman, 2004; Noaks and Wincup, 2004; Gilbert, 2008; Seale, 2012).
Firstly, I set out the nine main areas of analysis, based around the key questions developed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000). Examination of the transcribed interviews allowed me to identify key concepts and issues that emerged from the data, allowing me to structure the information and evidence gathered from the key individuals, facilitating the analysis of the case in question. Case studies generate huge amounts of data, and this case study was no exception. However, using this method allowed me to be able to handle a large amount of data in a logical and consistent way. I thereafter carried out a process of analysis of the main areas and identified subsets that emerged from the data, amounting to a total of 144 key themes (see Appendix 7), pertaining to all areas of the policy transfer process in both Glasgow and Cincinnati.

**Personal Reflections on my Previous Role**

Brown (1996) and Reiner and Newburn (2008) discuss four possible permutations of categories of researchers: i.e. inside/insiders, inside/outsiders, outside/outsiders and outside/insiders, each of which has implications in relation to access levels to police data and material. Given my previous roles, it is clear that I am an example of an outside/insider, a police officer who has left the police and who engages in research into the police service.

Former police officers’ knowledge and experience offer them both unique advantages and disadvantages when researching the police. However, it should be noted that the degree of opportunities and problems of access depends on the researcher’s relationships with others in the police. If an officer has been out of the police for some time, they may find difficulties accessing serving officers (Holdaway, 1983: 8). Furthermore, the longer a
person has been out of the police might be an advantage, given that they might be less biased in their opinions and become less affected by police culture.

My status as a former police officer, closely involved in the running of Glasgow CIRV, gave me a unique insight into the project and access to key participants of the projects in Cincinnati and Glasgow. However, I recognised that this position could also lead to me having biased opinions due to my inside knowledge of practices and, as such, I have tried to take care not to assume information and knowledge in my analysis and dealings with key participants and remain objective in my analysis. However, it is also important to recognise that my unique position in the transfer process and the subsequent project that emerged, Glasgow CIRV, could also have a positive impact by adding value to the rich description of this research.

The interviews conducted during this research were used to ascertain the participant’s views and perspectives on the transfer process, including, why they thought such a new approach to tackle violence in gangs was considered necessary and how the transfer process was achieved. Strauss and Corbin (1998) discuss the issue of insider knowledge of the phenomena under examination and state that maintaining objectivity can be problematic, as researchers are asked to set aside their own knowledge and experiences to inform interpretations. However, in reality, we all rely on our knowledge and experience to provide the means to understand the real world.

As stated earlier, I tried not to direct or prompt during the interview process, allowing the interviewee to offer their personal views or definitions of the transfer process (Merton and Kendall, 1974, as discussed by Flick, 2015). It is clear that a state of complete objectivity is not possible and that an element of subjectivity is required and even inevitable (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Williams, 2015). It is important, therefore, to try to
minimise the intrusion of such subjectivity into the data collection (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), which I tried to achieve by not guiding the interviewees, or ‘filling in the gaps’ in their recollections.

However, Charmaz and Mitchell (1996, in Hertz, 1997) discuss the phenomenon of objectivity and the ‘myth of silent authorship’ in qualitative research and believe that the ‘voice is the animus [author's italics] of storytelling, the manifestation of author’s will, intent, and feeling’ (193). They also believe that the animus is not what is actually in the story, or in this case, research, but the way that authors present themselves in the writing of them. It has also been widely believed that researchers should try to remain silent during their writing and, as Charmaz and Mitchell (1996: 193) claim, should be like ‘Victorian children: be seen (in the credits) but not heard (in the text)’ as social science researchers are not expected to voice their opinions in text as this may affect the objectivity of the research. However, Charmaz and Mitchell (1996: 194) believe that, while there is merit in humility and deference to the subject’s views, there is also merit in audible authorship and that the views of the author should not be silent.

Blumer (1969, discussed by Charmaz and Mitchell, 1996) also argues that one’s own voice can tell the reader what happened in the research process: the who, what, where and when, and that the researcher’s voice can clarify their own place in, and experience of the phenomenon and provide an important insight to the research. This issue has been of importance to me, the author of this research, to provide a deeper meaning and context of the process of transfer of Glasgow CIRV, using my unique position in the project under examination.

Mosselson (2010) also argues that recognising the role of subjectivity and the position of the researcher as a tool in the research process, enhances its ethical integrity and also the
analysis and interpretation of the data gathered. Mosselson (2010: 480) states that, instead of trying suppress one’s own voice from the research process, she found that including her own ‘positionality, personal artefacts and emotional responses’ to the research participants, could actually enhance the research process. This position is also discussed by Singhal (2014: 318) who argues that, while objectivity and subjectivity exist in a dialectical relation to each other, ‘there is no objective truth which fails to include the subjectivities of those involved in order to make meaning’ of the research topic. It is important that the researcher is able to ultimately reflect on the participant’s reality as separate and distinct from their own position, while also recognising that an element of subjectivity is also central to the researcher’s task.

It is an important point to make that my role and my in-depth knowledge of the project cannot be ignored or down-played by taking a purely ‘objective’ stance, in trying to minimise my ‘voice’, as commented on by Charmaz and Mitchell (1996). This position is recognised by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) who argue that the experiences of the researcher cannot be ignored and complements the research process. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 192) discuss the myths of objectivism and subjectivism and offer up an alternative approach, which denies the premise that objectivism and subjectivism are the only choices. The ‘experientialist’ approach allows a ‘bridging of the gap’ between both approaches of objectivism and subjectivism myths of impartiality and the possibility of being fair and objective. They argue that both approaches miss out on the way that we understand the world through our interactions with it and that objectivism misses that understanding. Truth, therefore, is necessarily relative to our cultural conceptual systems and it cannot be framed in any absolute or neutral conceptual system (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Furthermore, subjectivism misses the point that our understanding is a given in terms of a conceptual system that is grounded in our successful functioning in
our physical or cultural environments. Therefore, by recognising and using my own experiences, in this case my knowledge of Glasgow CIRV, and by adopting an ‘experientialist’ position, I can contribute positively to the research process, while still trying to maintain an element of objectivity.

The interviews conducted during this research were used to ascertain the participants’ views and perspectives on the transfer process, including, why they thought such a new approach to tackle violence in gangs was considered necessary and how the transfer process was achieved. Strauss and Corbin (1998) discuss the issue of insider knowledge of the phenomena under examination and state that maintaining objectivity can be problematic, as researchers are asked to set aside their own knowledge and experiences to inform interpretations. However, in reality, we all rely on our knowledge and experience to provide the means to understand the real world. As stated earlier, I did not direct or prompt during the interview process, allowing the interviewee to offer their personal views or definitions of the transfer process (Merton and Kendall, 1974, as discussed by Flick, 2015). Strauss and Corbin (1998) further acknowledge that a state of complete objectivity is not possible and that an element of subjectivity is required and even inevitable. It is important, therefore, to minimise the intrusion of such subjectivity into the data collection (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), which I achieved by not guiding the interviewees, or ‘filling in’ the gaps in their recollections.

There are many advantages and disadvantages to carrying out research for those researchers with an outside/insider perspective. For example, a person with an insider perspective of the organisation can have an in-depth institutional and historical knowledge of the subject under study (Edwards, 2002). The researcher may also be in the position of having personal relationships with those being interviewed and thus be
able to access information that would otherwise be inaccessible to others. Kim (2012) also states that such researchers are more likely to understand sensitive and secretive issues, which was pertinent in my case, as I had previously had access to sensitive material. However, the opposite may also be true with researchers’ relations, or lack of, with former colleagues, leading to accessibility problems.

It should be noted in this case that Glasgow CIRV was not wholly a police project, and was, in fact, a multi-agency partnership that was formed to tackle gang violence in Glasgow. However, police managed it and some key participants were police officers or police staff.

I was able to gain access to individuals involved in Glasgow CIRV who would otherwise possibly be unavailable to other researchers; for example, the Chief Constable, other senior police officers in Strathclyde Police, and a senior government civil servant, people that outsider researchers may find more difficult to access for interviews, though I cannot say for certain that my personal relationship had any influence in my gaining access to them. I believe that my personal relationships did assist me in gaining knowledge of the development, implementation and decision-making processes and mechanisms of Glasgow CIRV. For example, my personal relationships with key individuals in Glasgow may have helped to engender feelings of trust, allowing them to relax in the interview process and become less guarded in their responses; feelings that they might not have with a researcher who was unknown to them. On the other hand, there might also have been an element of ‘reactivity’ (Bryman, 2012), where my personal relationships with the interviewees may have affected the responses they gave to me, possibly presenting a biased view of the research by ‘painting a picture’ of positivity of the project and its impact. This is a position that I have taken cognisance of throughout this research and tried to avoid, by critically analysing the data collected and by not imposing my own
thoughts and feelings and not taking at ‘face value’ the opinions of those interviewed. I also had a professional working relationship with academics in America, who facilitated access to key individuals in Cincinnati involved in the US CIRV.

Of course, it can also be the case that former police officers who engage in research into the police can also be viewed with suspicion and their motives questioned by serving officers, who may see them as having an agenda that may 'harm' the police, for example, using their contacts and inside knowledge to report negatively about the police. Horn (1997), reflects on her position as a former police employee carrying out research into the police and finding an element of suspicion about her work and motives for the study. Junior officers saw her as a ‘management spy’ due to the fact that she knew senior officers who facilitated her access to the police. I did not experience such feelings of suspicion from officers and others involved in Glasgow CIRV, though it did seem that one or two senior police staff were of the opinion that I should not be engaged in such research on Glasgow CIRV, as they possibly saw such evaluation or research of the project as personally belonging to them to facilitate or allow.

However, in contrast to the position discussed by Horn (1997), Lowe (2015, forthcoming) discusses his position as a former police officer carrying out sensitive research with counter-terrorist officers. He found that officers tended to have a degree of trust and confidence in him due to his former role as a Special Branch police officer, known to some of the officers that he interviewed. It is clear in this case that being a former police officer was an advantage to the researcher and allowed a greater degree of access to interviewees, a factor that I also experienced in my research as discussed earlier.

Other disadvantages to the outside/insider perspective, which I struggled with at an early stage in this research, included the possibility that a researcher can be too descriptive,
and not be sufficiently distant from the subject matter and therefore not be as objective (Sikes and Potts, 2008). Consequently, it was important to consider my role in Glasgow CIRV and understand that there may have been bias in terms of objectivity and in not taking a critical enough perspective. Awareness of this issue throughout this research process has allowed me to try to address this and put aside personal feelings about the success or otherwise of Glasgow CIRV, the part I played in the delivery, and being conscious of my ‘cultural’ origins in relation to the police (Patton, 2002; Schwandt, 1997). For example, when carrying out an interview with a key participant in the policy transfer process, I was surprised that the person had such negative comments and views to make about the project in general. I almost found myself challenging these views and I had to ‘pull myself back’ and remember to remain objective and unbiased in my views and allow the interviewee to express oneself without contradiction or challenge.

It is becoming more common for former police officers to move from the police into academia (see Williamson, 2000; Wright, 2002; Lowe, 2015) and I have found that their reflections on research have helped me in understanding the research process from an outside/insider in terms of facilitating the research process and taking into account one’s own personal feelings and potential biases and to remain objective throughout. It should be recognised that I had a part to play in the transfer process and I have used my personal recollections in my discussion about Glasgow CIRV, as I cannot discount what I learned over the period of time that I was involved in the project. I have tried to be unbiased and objective in my discussions and used them to provide a rich description of the transfer process.

It should also be noted that in my role with Glasgow CIRV, I was involved in the drafting of a range of documentation including the quarterly reports and best practice guides
relating to various aspects of the project. Therefore, I had an in-depth knowledge of the contents and also how the information was collated for inclusion in them and I was able to use the information gathered to help provide a fuller picture of the policy transfer.

I feel that overall, my position as an outside/insider was advantageous to me in this research, as it allowed me to gain access to key participants and provided me with an opportunity to provide a full and rich description of the policy transfer from US CIRV to Glasgow CIRV. I have strived not to let my personal feelings come to the fore and remain to take into account my personal feelings and potential biases and to remain objective throughout the research.

**Ethical Considerations**

The importance of ethical issues in criminological research is commented on by Davies *et al.* (2011), who state that it is crucial that the researcher addresses the ethical and legal issues that may impact on the research and as part of the research design. Throughout this research, I have fully considered the professional ethical guidelines as set out by the university and ethical approval was sought and gained from the research committee of the Glasgow School of Business and Society at Glasgow Caledonian University.

Given my role in the police and Glasgow CIRV, I knew all of the key individuals interviewed in Glasgow in a professional capacity. Therefore, I had to remain objective throughout the interview process and not let my personal relationships with them interfere with or prejudice the data collection and subsequent analysis. Noaks and Wincup (2004) discuss the subject of anonymity during research and the importance that all participants are given assurances of confidentiality. However, it was recognised from
the outset that this is a very tight-knit field of work, and those interviewed may possibly be easily recognised through their positions in organisations and knowledge base. Given this situation, I informed all participants that I would not identify their names or gender in the research when I was seeking their permission and all agreed to be interviewed. A similar situation existed in Cincinnati, with the participants working in the criminal justice field and being known to each other. Again, the issue of ensuring anonymity was explained and all still agreed to participate in the research.

The Data Protection Act 1998, discussed by Gray (2014), relates to the storage of personal data on individuals who could possibly be identified by the data itself or by comments made by the respondents. It is also designed to place restrictions on the person holding the data, including how it was obtained, recorded and stored. In this research, all participants were informed by me at the outset of the interview that the data collected would be stored on my password protected computer that had been supplied by the university, and that all recordings gathered during the interview process would be destroyed by me at the conclusion of this research, to comply with the requirements of the Act.

I have ensured that all data protection issues regarding the storage of personal information are safeguarded with personal information and all recordings being deleted at the conclusion of this research.

Conclusions

This chapter has outlined the methodology that I have employed during this research, including stating the aims and objectives that are discussed throughout the thesis. I
introduced my role as a former police officer, involved in the transfer process of US CIRV to Glasgow CIRV.

The research design for this research is also discussed and explains why the planned, flexible design was chosen. The case study approach was deemed suitable as it provided me with the tools to collect, organise and analyse the primary and secondary data gathered. Furthermore, it also allowed me to gather comprehensive data and in-depth information of the two initiatives in Cincinnati (US CIRV) and Glasgow (Glasgow CRV), which included the processes, mechanisms and the subsequent outcomes of the policy transfer. Furthermore, this chapter also identified the primary and secondary sources used, and how they were collated and analysed and also discussed the issues of interview sampling and the schedule developed and concludes with a discussion of the coding analysis.

This chapter discusses and reflects on my role as an outside/insider (Brown, 1996; Reiner and Newburn, 2008) and how this impacted on my role as a researcher into the police and Glasgow CIRV, in light of my position within Glasgow CIRV, and the resultant ethical considerations related to that role and also as a former police officer. It also discusses the issues of access and the reactivity of the interviewees and the information gathered and reflects on how I tried to remain objective throughout and not impose my own bias, beyond using my own personal recollections to enhance the research. The chapter concluded with a discussion of the ethical considerations, including the anonymity of the interviewees and the data protection issues relating to the recording, storing and subsequent destruction of personal information held.

In deciding how to impose a logical, analytical and comprehensive structure to the findings, I decided to focus on the concepts of processes, mechanisms and outcomes of
the policy transfer, which form the basis of the following substantive chapters. Together they provide an in-depth analysis and a rich descriptive discussion of the policy transfer between US CIRV and Glasgow CIRV. Chapter 5 discusses the processes involved in the initial planning stages of the transfer, including the origins of the problems leading to the search for a new idea to tackle violence in gangs in Glasgow. Chapter 6 examines the implementation of Glasgow CIRV while Chapter 7 provides an analysis of the outcomes of the policy transfer. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes this thesis with a discussion of the main findings of this research.
Chapter 5 – Origins and Processes of Policy Transfer in Glasgow

Introduction

The Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) model of policy transfer includes a series of questions that informs the policy transfer process, as outlined earlier in this thesis. This chapter will examine the origins of the policy transfer process as it pertains to Glasgow CIRV and will concentrate on the subset questions listed below in order to shape the discussion:

- Why and when did the relevant actors engage in the policy transfer?
- Who transferred the policy/programme?
- From where were the lessons drawn?

The question ‘why and when do actors engage in policy transfer?’ was posed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) to ascertain the various reasons why decision makers decide to engage in the process of policy transfer, whether it be a coercive policy transfer or a voluntary policy transfer.

The consideration that there is a need for something new may emerge when there is dissatisfaction or problems with the status quo, and also when it is believed that a policy, programme or institution is no longer effective or is perceived to be ineffective. Proponents of this model also state that if governmental policies are seen to be effective then there is no need for change or to seek out new policies or programmes as everything can progress as normal. It is only when there is a breakdown in established policies etc., that one must search elsewhere for alternatives (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Rose, 1993).
This chapter examines in detail to provide a ‘rich’ description of the reasons why and when the various key actors in Glasgow decided to engage in what appeared to be a voluntary transfer process, looking to copy the US CIRV model from Cincinnati and the processes developed, which eventually led to the formation of Glasgow CIRV. It first gives an overview of the gang problem as it was perceived to exist in Glasgow in the period leading up to the formation of Glasgow CIRV in 2008, in terms of the nature and extent of the problems associated with gangs, including the key issue of violence. It discusses the various definitions and numbers of gangs and their members in the area that Glasgow CIRV was established, the east end of the city of Glasgow. In doing so, it discusses Glasgow’s gangs over the years in relation to research carried out by various researchers including Davies (2007), Patrick (1973), Deuchar and Holligan (2009 and 2010) and Kintrea et al. (2010) and it also examines the similarities and differences between Glasgow and Cincinnati gangs as in Chapter 2.

Key participants interviewed provided an insight to the perennial problems of initiatives tried over the years to deal with the violence of gangs. The interview data gathered suggested that there were various issues that played a part in the decision to look for a new approach to tackle gang violence and the subsequent policy transfer of the initiative from Cincinnati to Glasgow. Those issues identified included a lack of sustainability of previous attempts, failed partnership-working and an acknowledgement that policing was only part of any solution.

This chapter also analyses the development of the new approach to tackle violence, the idea to transfer the US CIRV model, and the fact-finding trips that led to the partnership building and development of Glasgow CIRV to address violent crime associated with gangs. Finally, the chapter discusses the framework put in place, the partnership
approach and funding structure that was insisted upon by the government before funds were allocated to allow Glasgow CIRV to proceed. This is a significant issue because it will also be argued that this had an impact on the sustainability of Glasgow CIRV and its eventual demise.

**The Violence Reduction Unit’s (VRU) Public Health Approach to Violence**

The Glasgow Community Initiative to Reduce Violence (Glasgow CIRV) was established in June 2008 by a partnership of agencies in the city, led by Strathclyde Police, through the auspices of the Violence Reduction Unit (VRU). The VRU was created in 2005 by Strathclyde Police and was designed to address all forms of violence, especially knife crime and the possession of weapons by young males in the Glasgow area. The unit was given a national remit in 2006 by the Scottish Executive (now Scottish Government) to become a centre of excellence to tackle violence.

On its inception, the VRU adopted a public health approach, as described by the World Health Organisation (WHO) report (Krug et al., 2002) on violence and health, which determines that violence has always been a part of society and that its impact can be seen in different forms throughout the world. According to the WHO, violence is a leading cause of loss of life for people between the ages of 15-44 worldwide. The WHO report also states that violence is preventable and that since the early 1980s public health practitioners and researchers have been examining the root causes of violence and attempting to find ways to prevent its occurrence (Krug et al., 2002).

Krug et al. (2002: 4) state that public health is ‘above all characterised by its emphasis on prevention. Rather than… accepting or reacting to violence, its starting point is the strong
conviction that violent behaviour and its consequences can be prevented’. It is not only about focusing on individual patients but also on preventing health problems to provide better care to the wider society. When applied to violence, this approach seeks to assess why violence occurs by determining the causes of violence, the factors that increase or decrease the risk of violence, exploring ways to prevent violence by designing, implementing and evaluating intervention programmes and finally, by the sharing of good practice.

The prevention approach, when attributed to violence, was explained by an academic who carried out an evaluation of Glasgow CIRV, as one of ‘harm minimisation’. He uses the analogy of intravenous drug misuse and the attempts in the UK to reduce the harm it caused. He explains that the public health approach to tackle the problem was to hand out needles and syringes to drug users in an attempt to reduce the problems associated with ‘dirty needle exchange’, which inadvertently led to an outbreak of HIV Aids in Edinburgh, related to intravenous drug abuse. This approach looks to address the underlying issues with violent behaviour and seeks to move them to something more constructive:

What’s referred to as a public health approach is really a process of harm minimisation......Now a public health approach [to deal with intravenous drug abuse].....would involve, actually providing needles and syringes. In other words, the exact opposite of the original criminal justice approach. As such, it was very controversial when it was first suggested, but now has become common practice around the world and that the thought there is, well, these people are going to inject themselves anyway, because the reasons for their drug abuse are deep-seated and related to all sorts of things
and their circumstances and simply denying them safer and cleaner and, therefore, safer ways of doing it is not the answer and you have to find other ways. (Glasgow CIRV Evaluation Professor Interview)

The approach of looking to work with those involved in violence, especially young males in gangs, was the aim of Glasgow CIRV. The use of the HIV analogy, and handing out clean syringes to intravenous drug users, demonstrates that taking an unusual approach, away from the normal criminal justice method of arresting offenders, may have a positive effect on the problem and actually help to reduce the drug taking:

So I think the public health approach to violence is the same. It’s not about in any way excusing or condoning the commission of violent acts but it’s about saying how we find a way of minimising the harm that accrues to both the victim and the assailant and their families and wider society. So it’s about trying to work with young guys who are in gangs or are affiliated to gangs and try to move them on to something a bit more constructive. (Glasgow CIRV Evaluation Professor Interview)

This ethos, of utilising the lessons learned in the case above and adopting a public health approach to tackle violence, echoed the key aims of the VRU, which had a stated intention to reduce violence through working with other partner agencies to seek long-term social and attitudinal change. It also looked to ‘focus on enforcement to contain and manage individuals, who are weapon carriers and are involved in violence, and to search for best practices and develop sustainable and innovative solutions to the violence problem’ (VRU, 2014).
There is an element of social crime prevention in the public health approach to dealing with violence, as advocated by the VRU. The model of engagement in Glasgow CIRV involved seeking ways to deal with the underlying social issues affecting gang members engaged in violence, for example, identifying health and social problems, like drug and alcohol abuse and anger management issues. The public health approach concentrated on the health problems, which also addressed alcohol and drug misuse.

This was a change of focus for criminal justice agencies, especially the police, to look at harm minimisation in this light. In the past, it was the role of the police to arrest and report offenders to the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) in Scotland for referral to the court system. Therefore, this approach as advocated by the VRU and Glasgow CIRV was a departure from recognised methods of dealing with violent behaviour.

**The need for a new approach in Glasgow**

The problems that Glasgow experienced, in relation to violence, gangs and territoriality, have been discussed by various researchers over the years, for example, Patrick (1973), Davies (2007 and 2013), Deuchar (2009 and 2010), Deuchar and Holligan (2008 and 2010) and Kintrea *et al.* (2010) and have been fully discussed earlier in Chapter 2.

It was noted that Glasgow has suffered from a ‘gang problem’ for generations, with Davies (2007) stating that ‘the Glasgow gangs were primarily viewed by local commentators as neighbourhood-based, fighting gangs rather than as criminal gangs’ (Davies, 2007: 406).

Davies (2007) further describes the situation in the 1920s and 1930s with Glasgow having gangs largely based on sectarian and territorial grounds, within certain inner-city
areas. The Bridgeton and the neighbouring Dalmarnock areas in the east end of the city had two rival gangs who regularly fought over their own territories and were delineated on religious and sectarian grounds. The predominantly Protestant ‘Billy Boys’ resided in Bridgeton, and the Catholic ‘Norman Conks’, formed from immigrant Irish families who had settled in Dalmarnock, regularly fought each other. It should be noted, however, that the formation of gangs along sectarian and religious grounds is not the case now, with gangs containing young males from both Protestant and Catholic religions.

In recent times, gangs in the east end of Glasgow, have largely consisted of young people, mainly white males, between the ages of 12 to 26, who were concerned with territoriality, respect and status issues. They are known by particular names and have populated the same areas over time, for example, the ‘Parkhead Rebels’ from the Parkhead area of Glasgow; the ‘Dentoi’ from the Denmilne Street area of Easterhouse; and the ‘Calton Tongs’ from the Calton area, to name but a few.

In contrast to Glasgow, Cincinnati had a different gang structure, which was commented on by the US CIRV Manager, who stated that they did not have formal structures with a ‘king pin’. It appeared that initially the Cincinnati Police Department were sceptical that the gangs actually existed and they believed that the gangs were more loosely connected together and came together to commit crime:

I guess like many cities, Cincinnati Police Department was in denial around the gang issue and I think a lot of that resulted from the formal definition of gangs. We did not have those well-formed gangs operating with the hierarchy, with a kingpin, these were more the loose-knit gangs, so once we started looking at the problem from that perspective, we could see that the gang problem evolved into these loose-knit crews, posses, whatever they call...
themselves, they hang together and commit crime. (US CIRV Manager Interview)

The Cincinnati Police Department engaged in an intelligence gathering exercise that analysed the gang networks that existed in the city and demonstrated the level of interaction, and the number of gangs in Cincinnati, an exercise that Glasgow CIRV also carried out later. The network analysis chart in Appendix 1 gives an indication of the gangs and their network of interactions that have established over the years in Cincinnati. As can be seen, these networks are extensive in nature and show the levels of interaction, both in collaboration and in conflict, that exist between the gangs.

My research has suggested that there were various reasons why Glasgow looked to adopt a new way to reduce and/or prevent gang-related violence, including, the issues of territorialism and violence and the impact on resources of city agencies, the media image of the city and the fear of crime experienced by the public as discussed below. However, Glasgow CIRV was established as the result of what appeared to be a gradual realisation that a new approach was required to deal with the gang violence issue in the city. This is in contrast to the reasons why Cincinnati adopted the new approach for them when they reached a 'trigger point' in homicide and shootings, which will be discussed later.

**Territorialism and Gang Violence**

Territorialism played a major part in violence in Glasgow, as previously discussed in Chapter 3, and research suggests that it was endemic in Glasgow, with gangs being traced back to the late 1800s (Davies, 2007; Deuchar and Holligan, 2008 and 2010; Deuchar, 2009 and 2010; Kintrea et al., 2010). The concept of 'defended neighbourhood' (Suttles,
1972), was the catalyst for young males involved in gangs to engage in violence with opposing gangs from other areas or neighbourhoods.

The prevailing view of those interviewed recognised that gang violence and territoriality, along with alcohol abuse/misuse, were among the key factors affecting the city and its public and were potentially having a direct impact on the ‘fear of crime’, in particular, the fear of violent crime. Interviews with various key participants revealed the scale of the problem perceived to be facing the city generally and the east end of the city, in particular, where Glasgow CIRV was established. The Director of the VRU commented that it had been believed that gang violence had always been a part of life in Glasgow and was almost seen as a societal and cultural norm with generations of family members being part of the gang structure:

Gang violence in Glasgow had always been viewed as something that was there. It was beyond what was a societal norm. It was almost a cultural norm. You know that’s what happens, that’s what we do, and that’s how it is. You know, your dad was a gang fighter, so you’ll be a gang fighter. (Glasgow VRU Director Interview)

The local police Area Commander for the east end of Glasgow also commented on the impact a gang was having on a particular area, Calton. This involved violence with guns and weapons, drug dealing, robberies and other acquisitive crimes, and also being engaged in fighting with other local gangs:

One gang I remember was the Calton Tongs and the impact that that gang was having on the area. They were involved in drug dealing….robberies….firearms offences…. and disqualified driving offences. They were also involved in the acquisitive crime stuff. They were breaking into houses and
stealing stuff out of the back of vans, parked at Bridgeton Cross, things like that and they were also involved in the violence between other gangs.

(Glasgow Police Area Commander Interview)

This image of a gang engaged in various criminal acts, as described by the police commander, resonates with Huff’s definition of an organised crime gang (OCG), who act together and carry out acquisitive crimes, as opposed to Huff’s definition of a youth gang, which engages in lower levels of crime (Huff, 1993). It should be noted that the Calton Tongs did not act like other gangs in the east end of Glasgow. They consisted of older members and did engage in serious forms of violence, including the discharge of firearms occasionally, whereas the majority of gangs that Glasgow CIRV were working with were younger and consisted of members who engaged in casual violence, though this could still be serious. However, the Calton Tongs were not defined by the police in Glasgow as an out-and-out OCG, as these gangs were seen to be highly organised, hierarchical and not tied to small geographical areas and they engaged in drug dealing, prostitution and other high-level crimes (WG Personal Recollection).

It was not only police officers that acknowledged the seriousness of violence in the city. The Director of Glasgow Community and Safety Services (GCSS) commented that gang violence and membership of gangs was in ‘the DNA’ of some communities, with membership lasting for generations and the gangs engaging in destructive behaviour, with families and mothers feeling the impact:

Gang violence impact on Glasgow has been going on for a long time and will continue to go on for a long time. It’s hardwired into the DNA of some communities. And that’s the way it is and until there’s structural changes in society that create different opportunities for second, third, fourth
generations, then gangs will always be seen as a place where people can get brotherhood or sisterhood, comfort, support, all the things that we need as individuals that we get from your job or your family.... It’s the bad things attached to the gang. (Glasgow Community Safety Director Interview)

The concept of violence being ‘hardwired into the DNA’ of communities in Glasgow implies that violence is seen as a way of life for young people in those areas that have a proliferation of gangs. It can also lead to a generational membership of gangs with grandfathers, fathers, uncles and brothers all belonging to the gang at some point in their lives. Peer pressure can also be applied to young people from their friends in the area to join the gang and it becomes a cultural norm that a person should gravitate towards the gang and potentially the violent lifestyle associated with it. This resonates with Sutherland’s (1947) concept of differential association debate, which states that young people learn behaviour by coming into contact with others who they associate with and this can influence their social norms. Their conduct is influenced by norms that exist in particular groups, in this case, the gangs, which they become members of, and in the case of gangs Sutherland believed that criminal behaviour was learned. He further argued that this criminal conduct is learned during the interactions with other gang members and is even communicated between generations (Sutherland, 1947).

Research (see SCCJR, 2011; Gangfree.org, 2014) into the reasons why young people join gangs, reveals that they might feel that they do not receive enough attention or sufficient support in the family environment, and might be trying to escape a negative home life and seek a father figure. Young people perceive that the gang can offer unconditional support and be the ‘family’ they seek, as a significant number of them come from broken families and have parents who are engaged in alcohol and/or drug abuse. Therefore, they
turn to their friends and peers in the gangs for that support (SCCJR, 2011; Gangfree.org, 2014).

As mentioned previously in Chapter 3, Suttles (1972) termed the territoriality issue or defending one’s territory, as ‘defended neighbourhood’, which can lead to conflict with others outside of the area. This issue was also commented on by an interviewee, a Service Provider who was instrumental in the delivery of services in Glasgow for Glasgow CIRV. Territoriality was a major problem in Glasgow and resulted in people being restricted in their movements from one area to another, being prevented from going to work and even having relationships with people from other areas. It was the view of the Service Provider that the gang problem in Glasgow was different from that experienced elsewhere in the UK and certainly in the US, where the gang problem was more in line with organised crime and being engaged in crime for profit, while the situation in Glasgow was more concerned with ‘defending one’s territory’. This position is different from that described earlier by the police commander when describing the actions of the Calton Tongs, who he believed acted more like an organised crime gang and less like a youth gang. These comments by the Police Commander and the Service Provider reflect a dichotomy of views and I would suggest that the view of the Service Provider resonates more with the recognised view of the local street gangs prevalent in Glasgow with other key participants in this research.

Furthermore, it would appear that the successive generations of young people involved in defending their territory, or housing schemes as they are known in Glasgow, take it upon themselves to do so without considering the views of the wider community. This was the view of the Community Safety Director in terms of territoriality and generational nature of gang membership:
I think the biggest problem regarding violence in Glasgow was territorial gang violence among young people. It resulted in people not being able to go out their house. It results in other people seeing particular areas as no-go areas. It quite literally results in people taking massive detours to get to places..... It’s all related to their fear of violence, which is prevalent across most Glasgow communities. I think for me that was the biggest problem. You know, we need to understand the differences and maybe this is where we’re fairly unique from other places in the UK and certainly the US. I think, their perception of gangs are, these organised groups of individuals who’re doing something for profit. We’re talking about crowds of young, predominantly young boys running about feeling that they need to…. ‘defend their scheme’. Now it appears to me that group of young boys... the only people they don’t seem to consult regarding whether they need to defend their scheme, is the people who live in their scheme who live in fear of these young boys hanging about in their groups, round about the shop fronts or wherever it happens to be. (Glasgow CIRV Service Provider Interview)

The Glasgow suburb of Easterhouse, a housing estate in the north-east of the city that was one of the focus areas of Glasgow CIRV, has long been associated with gangs and gang violence and has suffered from a long history of social problems, which have arisen due to the failure of the City Council to provide basic civic amenities when it was first built. In the late 1960s, a popular entertainer, Frankie Vaughan, became concerned about the level of gang violence in the Easterhouse area and co-ordinated a knife amnesty. He provided money from the proceeds of his shows in Glasgow to set up a youth project (The Easterhouse Project) to help young people and eventually claimed that he had solved the gang problem in the area (British Pathe.com).
However, this claim was somewhat ill-founded, with Easterhouse continuing to be the focus of violence and gangs. One local youth worker commented on the territorial issues and the violence that was perpetrated by gang members with a relatively large number of gangs (fifteen in total) in a small geographical area (Glasgow Youth Worker Interview).

The impact on families and small children, some as young as 7 or 8, was also experienced in the Easterhouse area of the city. Whereas, in other more affluent areas of the city, children would play ‘normal’ games, children in Easterhouse would engage in ‘mock’ gang fights. Research into gangs in Glasgow, as previously discussed in Chapter 2, by Patrick (1973), Davies (2007 and 2013), Deuchar (2009 and 2010), Deuchar and Holligan (2008 and 2010) and Kintrea et al. (2010), supports this view and argues that this type of social interaction can later have an impact on their lives as it reinforced the territoriality issues and the generational nature of the gangs. Children would naturally gravitate to the gangs that their older siblings or fathers had been in:

Children of about 7 or 8 when they were out playing... at chases .... would be playing gangs. They didn’t play cowboys and Indians or anything like that. It was Drummy and Aggro and Dento (names of local Easterhouse gangs) that they played, which is just a game of chases that generation after generation would play. Teenagers were limited in what areas they could freely walk in and out of. For some people, for everybody, for all young people, there was the perception that they couldn’t go in and out of different areas. For some young people, that was the reality. (Glasgow Youth Worker Interview)

Negative images of Glasgow have been a regular feature of the media in past years with headlines and stories emerging commenting on the ‘hardness’ and violence associated with Glasgow life and the gangs, adding to the ‘fear of crime’ in the city, with (Bartie,
claiming that Glasgow had the worst gang problem in the UK. There have been numerous stories in the press and television regarding the ‘hardness’ of Glasgow, with lurid headlines of knife crime, gangs, serious violence, including murder; along with works of fiction, for example, the book ‘No Mean City’ (McArthur and Kingsley Long, 1984), which depicted gang life in the Gorbals area of Glasgow, became a national best seller. Furthermore, two actors who portrayed a ‘hard image’ on television in playing the notorious Kray twins from London, admitted that they were terrified of the gangs in the east end of Glasgow after they had been confronted while filming a documentary there (Deadline News, 2013). All of the media coverage has played a part in the creation of the hard image of the city (Channel 4 Dispatches, 2009; BBC 2, 2010; Deadline News, 2013).

It was a regular occurrence for TV documentaries to film in the east end, in particular, Easterhouse, when discussing gangs in the city. For example, the territorialism aspect of gang fighting was the subject of a BBC 2 documentary that described the fighting between five gangs over their own areas, as the reporter calls it, ‘fighting for their streets’ (BBC 2, 2010) and serves to glorify the violence.

This territorialism aspect of life in the housing estates in Glasgow further manifested itself on people as young as 13 or 14, when they could not even leave the streets in the immediate vicinity of their homes as they were restricted to three or four streets:

By the time they were 13 or 14, their world had shrunk because they could only freely walk around three or four streets. And that was because they had an older sibling or a dad that was previously a gang member or a sibling 8-year-old and they were out playing chases and playing at gangs. So by the
time they were 12 or 13, they were the wee Drummy or the wee Dentoi.

(Glasgow Youth Worker Interview)

According to the youth worker, the gang fighting was a regular occurrence in the area with weapons being used. Usually alcohol and other substance abuse became a factor, adding to the volatile mix and leading to serious violence and injury and innocent bystanders would also be 'caught up' in the troubles:

Every night, particularly during the light nights, ... you would see mums walking up the hill pushing a pram and a brick or a bottle flying over their head..... One gang coming over the spare ground towards another gang’s territory and getting chased back. Nearer the weekends, add alcohol and other substance into that mix and there was the real risk that somebody was going to fall and they were going to catch somebody. So that’s when the main violence acts would come, so yes there was real violence. There were real, serious injuries. It was a common occurrence. (Glasgow Youth Worker Interview)

I also witnessed these types of incidents in my role as a police officer in the east end of Glasgow over a period of 15 years. Police officers were often called to attend instances of gang fighting, at times serious incidents of assault, in the area when two rival gangs had clashed, irrespective of the presence of bystanders not involved in the fighting. From my experience in the police, it was apparent that these gang fights were regular occurrences, especially in the summer months when large groups of young people, ranging in ages, and sometimes as young as 12 years of age up to men in their early 20s, girls as well as boys,
would engage in fights, often across busy roads that delineated district boundaries. It is an interesting point to note that girls were not usually members of gangs in Glasgow but were associated with male gang members. The people involved in the violence would often use weapons, including bottles, sticks, bricks and knives and even decorative swords. Alcohol also played a part in the violence with those taking part regularly being under the influence of alcohol when they were arrested (WG Personal Recollection).

Such violence and territorialism could impact on family life; on young people’s aspirations and education and being part of a wider society, instead of being restricted to a gang or its territory. It could also prevent people from realising their potential and seeking opportunities out with their locality:

The impact of territorialism and gangs I think, also bred a poverty of aspirations and kind of forced that poverty of aspirations in communities and it prevented people crossing community lines and it prevented real inclusion of young people and feeling part of a school and a school community rather than a smaller community based around a gang or based around a territory within the city. (Glasgow Education Director Interview)

The youth worker who commented on the impact on families and young people also referred to this situation. The restrictive nature of the gang affected people’s ability to gain employment in areas outside of their own territory. People could not travel on public transport to get to where the work was and this meant that they tended to remain in their own localities; this in turn led to a restriction on their life aspirations. Therefore, the people that the youth workers engaged with tended to come from single areas. They could not mix and work with groups of people from multiple areas for fear of conflict:
So we saw the impact it was having on families’... on young people’s aspirations. Why on earth would you work hard at school when your life revolves around three streets? Doesn’t matter what qualifications you might get, if you can’t get on a bus to go to where the job is, or you know, those jobs might as well be on the moon. They might be half a mile away from you but you can’t get there.... We could only work with young people from the immediate geographical area. (Glasgow Youth Worker Interview)

**Impact on Resources**

In addition to the impact on communities already highlighted, there was recognition that the issues of violence and gangs had a significant impact on resources across the city agencies at all levels. Time, staffing levels, finance and costs to society were mounting and in terms of the growing financial austerity, it was imperative that something had to be done as what had been tried in the past was not working, as stated by the Glasgow VRU Director:

What we had been doing didn’t work..... if your outcome was about reducing gang violence and reducing the number of victims then, no they weren’t working. (Glasgow VRU Director Interview)

Several key interviewees acknowledged the impact on the police, in terms of officers dealing with gangs and violence. One officer commented that the Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police, Sir Stephen House (now Chief Constable of Police Scotland), made it one of his priorities to tackle violence and that this would have a significant impact on the force’s finances (Glasgow Acting Chief Constable Interview).
The amount of time officers was spending on dealing with gangs was having an adverse effect on the time they could devote to deal with other issues and was not helping to reduce the ‘fear of crime’ for the public. The Area Commander stated that the impact on police time was:

Horrendous. A disproportionate amount of policing time was spent responding to incidents involving gang violence. There were people living in that area who didn’t want to come out of their houses at night..... There was no reassurance for the public that the police were there and that they were going to make a difference to it, because we were spending a disproportionate amount of time in places like Glasgow Green dealing with gangs within the Green, which then meant that we weren’t dealing with the elderly woman in Alexandra Parade who wanted to walk down the street and go for a loaf of bread at 10 o clock at night but was terrified to do so because of what she perceived was happening outside and she didn't see a police officer there. (Glasgow Police Area Commander Interview)

This view is shared by the Police Divisional Commander who also commented on the amount of administration time that is involved for police officers, that had an adverse impact on their time, therefore preventing officers from being on the streets to deal with other matters (Glasgow Police Divisional Commander Interview).

The impact on police resources, as a result of gang violence, was also noted by the Glasgow CIRV project manager who had previously been a Detective Inspector in the east end of Glasgow:
There is a difference in dealing with a serious assault. When it’s one person, it can be allocated to a detective constable to deal with it the following day, they can follow up the enquiries and deal with that. The difference with a gang-related incident is that is multiplied by 15 or 20. You know all of a sudden you have 15 individuals to deal with and just resources wise it becomes a massive demand.... With a gang-related incident, you could almost have your entire sub-division of cops all dealing with the aftermath of that incident. So resources wise it has a massive impact on dealing with the aftermath of these incidents. (Glasgow CIRV Project Manager Interview)

Furthermore, the impact on other agencies was also realised in dealing with the aftermath of violence. This use of time, resources and finance can have a negative impact on providing other services. For example, the Home Office Research Study (2000) on the costs of crime indicates that the cost of violence to the UK society was £14 billion per year, while more recent research on the cost of violence to the NHS in England, puts this cost at £29 billion per year (Bellis et al., 2012). This cost of dealing with violence places a huge burden on society and the National Health Service (NHS) in particular, in addition to the police and justice system:

You could actually be strategic just for a minute make a link to all the partners as well. Because you know gang violence often ends in a serious assault. Those people end up having their jaws reconstructed in the Glasgow Dental Hospital. They end up going into one of our A and E departments to get stitched up. That actually has a knock on effect to beds and operating lists and it could affect your elderly mum or my elderly mum who’s been waiting for the hip operation for two years. Suddenly she’s back down the list because
gang members are getting stitched up and there’s no theatre time left.... you can start looking at NHS budgets. 6% of the entire NHS budget is about dealing with violence in hospitals. That’s hundreds of millions of pounds across the UK. That impacts on everybody. (Glasgow Police Divisional Commander Interview)

The financial costs to society and the impact on resources for the Social Work department were also clear in the view of a senior Social Work Manager, who commented that the impact on society in general severely affected the ability of social services to make a difference. The manager further commented that young children were being born into a violent culture and environment and would fall into the same patterns of offending in their later lives. Women also suffered the consequences of violence and there was a lack of positive images for them (Glasgow Social Work Manager Interview).

The ‘lack of aspirations for children and young people’, seems to be somewhat simplistic in its outlook and implies that all such children and young people fall into this category. However, this does not take into account the majority of young people who do go on to lead normal lives and do not end up in gangs and a life of crime.

The issues of women suffering at the hands of their partners in cases of domestic violence and suffering from mental health problems were also raised by the social work manager, who believed that these violence issues impacted on them and led to the lack of positive role models in the family. Mothers could not perform the role of nurturing and guiding young people and consequently they were powerless to prevent them joining the gangs and ‘falling into the trap’, of behaving in a certain way as dictated by their peers:

There were.... huge issues with domestic violence, issues with mental health problems not surprisingly for women. There was no positive image there. So
there was no hope of a nurturing relationship for children and young people in those circumstances. Just because of the fact that people were expected to behave in a certain way and there was no possibility of a motherly influence, if you like, being allowed to be brought to bear in that parenting. (Glasgow Social Work Manager Interview)

The views expressed by the Social Work Manager indicates that some children and parents, especially mothers, were tied into the violence culture from birth as a result of where they came from. The generational nature of gang membership and violence, as discussed by Kintrea et al. (2010), is again apparent from the comments, with young people ‘taking over’ from their older brothers and/or fathers in the gangland culture. The comments above regarding the lack of a nurturing figure, again seem to be rather general in nature and do not take into consideration mothers who do provide a nurturing figure for their children and keep them from falling into criminal ways.

*It’s Not Working!*

One of the key issues in the policy transfer process is the case of voluntary transfer, when it becomes apparent to key actors that there is some dissatisfaction or problem with the status quo. When any policy, programme or institution is no longer effective, or is perceived to be ineffective by the key actors, then it becomes apparent that there is a need for a new approach to be implemented (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Rose, 1993).

This research has indicated that one of the main reasons why Glasgow developed the policy transfer of US CIRV was that there was a distinct dissatisfaction with past programmes and initiatives and problems with the status quo on how to tackle the issues.
What had been done and what was being done, by various agencies, was no longer effective or was perceived to be ineffective by many of the key interviewees.

There was a general feeling in the city’s statutory and voluntary agencies that these issues of ‘the fear of crime’, territoriality and gang violence were having a serious impact on the daily lives and future of the public, including the young people involved in the violence, and that past attempts to tackle the problems, by all of the agencies involved, were not working, as commented on by the Director of the VRU:

There was an assumption about it. That’s what we did and that’s all you could do, you couldn’t do anything else…. I’ve often said it, we pick up the ones who are injured and call them victims and we catch the ones who are fighting and assaulted and we call them accused, but that’s quite a random outcome, and we only caught the feckless and the stupid so it was, and we kept doing it…..We never seemed to tackle it. (Glasgow VRU Director Interview)

These comments suggest that the police were not selective in who they arrested when they turned up at gang fights. They would deal with those who were injured and 'label' them as victims and arrest those they caught and 'label' them as accused and pass them on to prosecutors, but this was not having any long-term impact on the problems. The Director further commented that even when murders occurred it seemed that there was almost an acceptance of the fact that murders were commonplace.

The Glasgow VRU Director further commented on the cultural acceptance of violence in Glasgow in recalling a meeting in London with the Home Secretary and others that had been instigated in response to a series of homicides in London. The Director listened at the meeting and realised that the public in Glasgow seemed to accept the levels of violence. Glasgow had witnessed three men murdered in the course of a weekend, all
under 19 years of age yet nobody seemed to care. It was almost as if the social and economic factors in the city, high levels of social deprivation in relation to alcohol and drugs misuse and unemployment, determined that these young men would die anyway of either alcoholism or a drugs overdose. There almost seemed to be a perverse pride in the fact that Glasgow had this image of being ‘tough’ and even professionals perpetuated this image (Glasgow VRU Director Interview).

The view of cultural acceptance and perverse pride in Glasgow's image of being tough by certain professionals was corroborated by the youth worker, who mentioned this in relation to the public perception of violence in Easterhouse:

They accepted that was the norm and that was as it is. And some people were a bit downtrodden by the perception of Easterhouse and, unfortunately, some people wore it a bit like a badge of honour and took a perverse pride out of the notoriety. (Glasgow Youth Worker Interview)

Any attempt to tackle the problems proved to be unsustainable. It was clear that the city agencies had been engaged in trying to tackle the problem for many years and that the approaches adopted were not working. For example, a Housing official commented that short-term projects were favoured in the past and tended to focus on small geographical areas:

We have been trying to deal with the issues of gang violence in Glasgow for many, many years and in GHA (Glasgow Housing Association) we recognised that the approach taken simply wasn't working as the problem just went from generation to generation. What was tried in the past, was short term projects. We would have a, have an impact on a relatively small area.
Therefore, the problem was just moved elsewhere. So what we required was a joined up approach to the issues. (Glasgow Housing Officer Interview)

The issue of the potential displacement of crime, as a result of the ‘short term projects’, has been discussed in the past in relation to the use of dispersal zones to tackle crime in a particular area. This power to use a dispersal zone was used in the Parkhead area of Glasgow in 2009 for a period of four months in an effort to combat a rise in serious crime by one gang, in particular, the Parkhead Rebels. Clarke (1997, discussed in McMillan and Robertson, 2011) comments that displacement can have an effect on target, time or place, however, an evaluation of the Dispersal Zone in Parkhead (McMillan and Robertson, 2011) found that police reported little evidence of dispersal in this instance, possibly due to the large geographical area of the dispersal zone.

Other interviewees supported the view that what had been tried in the past was not working, with the Education Director commenting that there was recognition that something had to be done differently, especially for young people involved in the gang violence (Glasgow Education Director Interview).

The recognition that past programmes had been ineffectual was a subject of comment by a government civil servant, who noted that what had been tried in the past in relation to gang violence, had not delivered the required results:

......There was recognition that, as we began to focus in, not just on violence, but then on gang violence, whatever it was, generally around violence wasn’t quite delivering the results that we needed. (Government Civil Servant Interview)
Various interviewees, including the Social Work Manager, were of the view that the previous approaches to tackle gang violence had been ineffectual and ‘piecemeal’. A single agency, on its own, could not solve the problem and there had been a lack of strategic thinking in the past. Police officers also commented on the failure of past approaches and the continuing violence issues. One officer stated that ‘it was clear it hadn’t worked because the gang violence was still there’ (Glasgow Police Task Force Commander Interview), while another officer stated:

> There was a huge recognition that it hadn’t worked and that was quite simply because the gang violence and culture was still continuing and it didn’t seem to matter what we did. (Glasgow Police Area Commander Interview)

This research has established that there had been a growing recognition and realisation among city agencies and the Scottish government that what had been tried in the past was not working and was ineffectual. There was dissatisfaction with past initiatives that had been short-term and localised and it was recognised that the status quo was not an option, therefore the circumstances and timing led to the voluntary transfer of the US CIRV model from Cincinnati.

**US CIRV ‘Trigger Point’**

In contrast to the gradual realisation and recognition that what had been tried in the past was not working in Glasgow, it was discovered during this research that Cincinnati reached a ‘trigger point’ with the growing homicide rate, leading the authorities to say ‘enough is enough’ after years of unrest and violence. The point came when city officials and police recognised the need that a new approach was required.
In April 2001, the city of Cincinnati, Ohio, experienced a major race riot (the last in a major US city before the events in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014), which started in response to the shooting of a young black male by an off-duty police officer. He was the fifteenth black male to have died as a result of contact with police in a six-year period at that point, though it should be pointed out that a majority of these shootings were deemed by the police to be ‘clean shootings’, because the suspect posed an immediate danger to the officers or members of the public. It was noted at the time that the Cincinnati Police Department lacked widespread legitimacy in many areas of the city, due to poor community/police relations (Engel, 2013, in Deuchar, 2013).

The civil unrest and riots lasted three days with looting and the burning of cars and property (see Appendix 8). In the aftermath of the riots, a series of litigations were filed that led to the US Department of Justice engaging in federal oversight of the Cincinnati Police Department for six years (Engel, 2013, in Deuchar, 2013).

Eck and Rothman (2006) report that the Cincinnati Police Department had to make substantial changes to procedures, policies and training in a variety of practices including the use of force and was compelled to take on board the problem-oriented policing ethos (Goldstein, 1990). This became the norm and strategic practice for the department in all aspects of policing and meant that the police department had to become more forward thinking and less reactive in dealing with crime and violence. Rather than focusing on past crimes, more analysis was required to identify the underlying issues and devise solutions to deal with them.

The community became increasingly violent and the use of firearms increased, with a resultant rise in homicides and the targeting of police officers. Illegal guns started to flood the city, and by 2006, the homicide rate in Cincinnati reached an all-time high of 88
homicides per year with an average of 35 shootings a month, while violence in the predominantly minority communities continued to rise (Engel, 2013, in Deuchar, 2013).

Police tactics involved proactive and aggressive enforcement in the high-crime areas of the city. However, these tactics only led to more conflict with the communities and did not impact positively on the violence levels. Engel (2013: xviii, in Deuchar, 2013) states, these tactics failed due to the 'lack of focus on specific offenders, groups, gangs and places. In addition, it failed to establish police legitimacy among the community – a necessary component for effective and equitable policing'.

In a similar vein to that experienced in Glasgow, where the VRU Director commented that the police in Glasgow just arrested those involved in gang violence and that this approach had not worked, so indeed the Cincinnati police chief realised that the police could not arrest their way out of the situation they found themselves in and stated that it:

    ....always came back to the same thing, more arrests, more arrests, so we are making all these arrests and nothing is changing. on and on and on, and so it became quite clear to us that we were not being successful and also, I guess you could almost call it an epiphany that we were not going to arrest our way out of this situation. (Cincinnati ex-Police Chief Interview)

This view was shared by a senior Cincinnati City Councilman who was aware of the work that had been carried out in Boston by the police and academics in dealing with their homicide problem in the 1990s as part of the Boston Gun Project. He approached the police chief and outlined his thoughts that the police could not deal with this problem themselves (see Braga et al., 1997 and 2001; Engel, 2013 in Deuchar, 2013).
The decision by the Cincinnati Police Chief to meet with Professor Kennedy, the architect of the Boston Ceasefire Operation, led the police and city officials in Cincinnati to form a new approach to tackle the gang violence and the idea of US CIRV was founded as a move away from a purely law enforcement strategy. The Police Chief commented:

I travelled up to Columbus, Ohio to hear a presentation on his system and process that he had invented, which is basically the carrot and stick or whatever you want to refer to it ........ and we were kind of sceptical about it, in fact extremely sceptical about it...., but in follow-up talks with David Kennedy, asking him one question, if we go with you, what is it you can promise, what do you envisage that we could experience and he said, “quite frankly I really believe that you can reduce gang-related homicides by as much as 50% - 75%”, and when he said that, I said, “I tell you what, nothing else is working so let’s go with it”. (Cincinnati ex-Police Chief Interview)

The approach adopted by Boston relied on the concept of problem-oriented policing (POP) that was developed by Goldstein (1979 and 1990). Goldstein argued that the police could achieve greater efficiency by using the problem-oriented approach, rather than in reorganisation of the police service or in better management. Goldstein (1979 and 1990) believed that the police needed to be more proactive, instead of being reactive to issues. This required the police to analyse the problems they faced to determine the reasons why they occurred and why certain places were more prone to crime. This would lead to them not having to return on a regular basis to the same places and people as they would look for solutions to the problems to prevent them reoccurring. Thus, ‘problem-oriented
Policing is a management approach designed to make the most efficient use of police resources' (Clarke, 1995: 97).

This approach shares some of the same characteristics with community policing, where the community identify and define the problems that affect them. According to Tilley (2008), it allows the police, through in-depth analysis, to identify patterns and commonalities, such as:

- Repeat victimisation – the heightened risk experienced by repeat victims.
- Hotspots – the concentration of incidents or crimes in certain places.
- Prolific offenders – a minority of offenders are found to be responsible for a higher proportion of offences.
- Hot products – some items are attractive to offenders and are thus more likely to be stolen.
- Hot classes of victims – certain victims are particularly vulnerable to certain crime types (Tilley, 2008).

It is recognised that generally, problem-oriented policing produces positive results and helps the police reduce local crime, disorder issues and problems (Eck and Spelman, 1987). Furthermore, the police also embraced the statistical analysis of crime problems and began to map areas or hotspots, as they are more commonly known, where crimes occurred on a regular basis (Sherman et al., 1989: Weisburd and Lum, 2005).

Professor Kennedy and others and the Boston Police Department in the mid-1990s used this approach to address the growing problem of youth and gun violence associated with gangs in the city. Braga et al. (1999) report that from the mid-1980s continuing until the early 1990s, there was an increase in firearm homicides involving youths and in
particular, young black males. They noted that between 1984 and 1994 the homicide rate for young black males, under the age of 18, increased by 418% involving handguns while the rates for the use of other guns in the same category also increased by 125% (Fox, 1996a, discussed in Braga et al., 1999).

In order to address the high homicide rates, academics and police practitioners developed interventions, which became known as the Boston Gun Project, or Operation Ceasefire (see Kennedy et al., 1996; Kennedy, 1997; Braga et al., 1999 and Braga et al., 2001).

The Boston Gun Project also adopted a focused deterrence strategy to tackle gang-related violence and a ‘pulling levers’ strategy, as explained below, to first identify at-risk gang members and thereafter communicate the consequences of continued violence to them. The academics and practitioners in Boston realised that a small number of individuals involved in gangs or groups were responsible for a majority of crimes.

‘Pulling levers’ is described as using every means available to target gangs as a whole, including individual members. Such a strategy allowed the Boston law enforcement agencies to respond to serious violent incidents, involving gangs, by ‘pulling’ every law enforcement lever available to them, for example ‘shutting down drug markets, serving warrants, enforcing probation restrictions, making disorder arrests, dealing more strictly with any resulting cases as they made their way through prosecution and adjudication, deploying federal enforcement powers and the like’ (Kennedy, 1997: 462).

These ‘levers’ and the aim to use them were communicated to the gangs and their members through a series of meetings and forums. The Boston Gun Project appeared to be a success and it focused on violence in gangs and by gang members, particularly gun violence. In the years between 1991 and 1995 Boston experienced 44 youth homicides.
per year on average. In 1996, this number dropped to 26 and then further decreased in 1997 to 15, a 63% reduction in youth homicides (Braga et al., 2001).

**A Radical New Idea for Glasgow and Scotland**

This research has found that the various agencies in Glasgow, including the police, Social Work, Education and Community Safety Services were of the opinion that the gang violence problem in Glasgow needed to be addressed and there was dissatisfaction with the previous attempts to deal with it as they had proved to be ineffective. It was apparent that a new and more sustainable approach was required.

In 2006, the then Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police, Sir William Rae, asked two senior police officers, the Director of the VRU and an Assistant Chief Constable (later to become the Acting Chief Constable) in charge of violent crime, accompanied by the Glasgow Community Safety Director, to go to America, including Harvard University, Boston, and Chicago, on a fact-finding mission as part of their work on the Violence Reduction Board for Glasgow. According to the Acting Chief Constable interviewed, Sir William Rae had an interest in initiatives that had been tried in America to deal with violence, including the Boston Operation Ceasefire project as discussed earlier in this research. However, while in America, the Acting Chief Constable explained that:

> We … heard about CIRV (US CIRV in Cincinnati) and we were seeking out best practice, good ideas and new things to try out and tackle the horrific issues around violence in the Strathclyde area and the west of Scotland. What really appealed to us about (US) CIRV is it was really a partnership approach to things. It was something that we had perhaps tried in different small parts
but we hadn’t done it in the way that they had. (Glasgow Acting Chief Constable Interview)

According to the VRU Director, in 2007, the Chief Constable (Sir William Rae) received an invitation to attend a meeting of chief police officers in America. He directed that a member of the VRU (the Deputy Director) go in his stead, who thereafter attended the meeting and there learned about the work of Professor Kennedy and Operation Ceasefire in Boston, and also the work being carried out in Cincinnati (US CIRV).

The Director of the VRU recalled that when the deputy director came back and explained what had been seen in America, it appeared to be a good fit for Glasgow. The VRU Director explained the process to the Force Executive and how it would work in Glasgow, and received the ‘go-ahead’ from the Chief Constable:

We went to a meeting of the Force Executive ... and we said, “right we’ve got this plan for gangs but there is a risk involved for the police because our role in it is to say ‘stop this or else’ and if we fail in that, then there is a reputational risk and you need to be up for that”. To their credit, they all said go for it....and they said, ‘what’s the detail of the strategy’? Well, we identify all the gang members, we’ve done that anyway, we bring them in, we tell them to stop or else and there’s another way and we ask the community to help us and they’re saying and ‘what else do you do’? That’s it. That’s exactly it and we kept it simple and it was really simple from the outset. And Willie Rae said go ahead and do it. (Glasgow VRU Director Interview)
‘Selling the Idea’ in Glasgow

Before the idea could be developed into a working concept, the next stage in the process was for the VRU staff to ‘sell the idea’, build consensus, gain approval and establish partnerships with key agencies, in order to realise the establishment of this new approach for Glasgow.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the VRU had developed a public health approach to tackle violence in Scotland and it was decided to adopt a similar approach to tackle the gang violence problem in Glasgow. This approach was to attempt to deal with the root causes of the violence, by endeavouring to engage with young people involved in violence and gangs, and thereafter, to devise a strategy to identify the social and health factors that may lead a person to become involved in gangs and the violence associated with them and offer support and advice to those that needed them. However, the VRU Director explained that the public health approach to dealing with violence did not initially ‘sit comfortably’ with the senior police management at the time:

It was difficult to start with I suppose. Sir Willie Rae got it (ex-Chief Constable). Lots of the senior divisional commanders, stuff like that, didn’t get it at all. Some of them tried to get it and couldn’t. Others didn’t even have the energy to even work out how they did it because they just wanted to go on and do their stuff because it was too difficult. (Glasgow VRU Director Interview)

However, the new Chief Constable, Sir Stephen House, who took over from Sir William Rae later in 2007, did understand and fully supported the position that the VRU adopted in relation to public health. The Director further stated that the police role was to deliver
the operational requirements and the VRU would provide the direct links between the delivery end of operational policing with an ‘intrusive supervision and performance framework’ (Glasgow VRU Director Interview). The VRU would also provide the evaluation and understanding of the problems and the partnership building required.

The role of the VRU was to ‘sell the idea’ of the focused deterrence strategy devised in Cincinnati (US CIRV) to other partners in Glasgow and gain their acceptance and support. At that time, this approach had never been tried outside the US before, though it was being used in a number of American cities with varying degrees of success¹.

There was recognition that the ‘police could not solve the problem on their own’ (Glasgow Youth Worker Interview). The social and economic problems commonly associated with certain areas, where gang violence was seen to be endemic, included low levels of educational attainment; high unemployment, especially for young people; poor health issues, including alcohol and drug misuse (see Craig, 2010; Deuchar, 2009 and 2013; Kintrea et al., 2010). These issues, taken together, were the responsibilities of the statutory agencies and not the sole responsibility of a single agency, for example, the police. It would need, therefore, the concerted efforts of all interested parties to achieve success. The VRU Director explained that they planned to use the public health approach to tackle the violence and that to do this they had to explain the ethos of the approach, and how it would apply to the gang violence problem to other potential partners:

There would have been no point us demonstrating that public health was okay for dog fouling, or public health was okay for something else. It needed to be something that people said, bloody hell that is a problem. And if you

¹ It has since been implemented in Adelaide, Australia and the London Borough of Enfield in England (Engel, 2013 and Graham, 2015).
fixed that then people would think maybe this works, maybe this idea of collaboration works, there's something there. It wasn't a gamble because we weren't trying to prove if it worked, we were trying to prove that we could deliver it in Scotland because it already worked in Cincinnati and all over America. The idea of it working just made sense. (Glasgow VRU Director Interview)

The VRU Director explained that the first stage in ‘selling the idea’ to partners was identifying the relevant area of the city to examine. As mentioned previously, in an earlier intelligence gathering exercise, the VRU had asked police divisional crime analysts to carry out an examination of the gangs in their area and profile various factors, that is, gang names, gang member identities, risk factors, areas that they fight in and who with, what they fight about and any criminality that they might be involved in, for example, drugs, violence or acquisitive crime. This exercise, which led to an increase in information inserted into the Scottish Intelligence Database (SID) was the first time that it had been carried out on this scale in the Strathclyde Police force area and it identified that the east end of Glasgow was the worst affected by gangs and associated problems:

We found that the east end of Glasgow was worse. It had most people involved in gangs, most violence, most frequency and most risk so that’s where we went. (Glasgow VRU Director Interview)

It appeared to be a robust exercise in that it used all available sources of information available to the police at the time. However, the police are not the only sources of information and it could not be claimed that the information uncovered, painted a whole picture of gang membership in the area. Other sources of information can be used, for example, local groups and schools. In my capacity in Glasgow CIRV, I visited local schools
to engage with the Head Teachers and gain their assistance, especially with regards to having young people attend the forthcoming Self-Referral Sessions (discussed in Chapter 6). On one occasion, the Head Teacher was presented with a list of young people that police intelligence had indicated were at the school. The Head Teacher then stated that there were a number of additional pupils who were engaged in gangs that were not on the police intelligence list. This also proved to be the case with the other schools in the area and led to a significant increase in identifying those young people involved in gangs and violence (WG Personal Recollection).

The process of 'selling the idea' commenced with a series of meetings with those parties involved in the delivery of services in the east end of the city. The Chief Constable and others had recommended that the Director of Education for the area, a senior Social Work Manager and a Work and Pensions official, be approached and the VRU Director explained what co-operation was needed. It was apparent that the departments were all potentially dealing with the same individuals, who might be ‘challenging’ in terms of their social needs, health needs, their behaviour and were generally difficult to engage with, by all agencies, and this was highlighted to the relevant parties:

We went to see individuals that we either knew or were recommended to us... *(Social Work)* and *(Education)* and both of them clicked immediately. We said, “look we are not asking for resources from you. All we want to do is co-ordinate resources that already exist because you are already working with these people and they’re a challenge for you, for social work. They drag down lots of your services and education. These are the guys that are excluded. These are the guys that are causing problems in your schools, they will be the same”. We went to the Department of Work and Pensions and said, “these
are the guys that you can’t get jobs, you can’t reach into” and that was it. They saw it. (Glasgow VRU Director Interview)

The VRU Director further explained that this process was continued throughout the city and included speaking to representatives from the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) and the Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration (SCRA), responsible for the running of the Children’s Hearing system in Scotland\(^2\). These organisations were deemed important, as any transgression on the part of a gang member may result in prosecution, with anyone aged 16 and over, reported to the Procurator Fiscal’s office and anyone less than 16 years of age reported to the Reporter (SCRA), for consideration of a case presented to the Children’s Hearing Panel.

Other parties included Glasgow Housing Association (GHA), which was the biggest housing provider in the area. However, the VRU Director expressed some misgivings about the level of engagement of some organisations. He believed that people higher up in the various organisations should have been approached. The Community Planning Partnership\(^3\) was approached and informed of what was planned. This contact was vital

\(^2\) The Scottish Justice system developed a unique way of dealing with children and young people as a result of the Kilbrandon Committee Report (SHHD, 1964) that led to the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 and established the Children’s hearing System as an alternative way of dealing with the ‘needs not deeds’ of children and young people. It not only deals with children but also their families and is delivered through a Children’s Panel system of lay people, specially trained to act as Panel Members, appointed by the Scottish Government. It not only deals with offenders but also those in need of care and protection as the Kilbrandon Committee deemed that offending by those young people and children could have come about as a result of the wider social and personal environment in which they developed. The Hearing system is administered by the Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration (SCRA) (Donnelly and Scott, 2013).

\(^3\) The Community Planning Partnerships (CPPs) were established by the Scottish Government as part of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 2004 that placed a legal obligation on agencies to work in partnership together, for example, the police, housing, social work and councils among others. Glasgow CPP was established in February 2004 to bring together the key public, private and voluntary agencies to deliver better and more co-ordinated services in the city.
to the planned sustainability of the project, however, this proved to be somewhat contentious, as will be explained later:

Glasgow Housing was another...... because they were vital to it, .... because we ‘plumbed in’ at the wrong level there and I think maybe that's where we should have been higher up.... So they got it and within his own sphere of responsibility, he was able to deliver what he could (Housing Official). (Glasgow Senior Social Work Manager) was the same at her level, (Glasgow Education Director) was higher up which was fine and was at a reasonable level but we should have been at the Community Planning Partnership level, although we did go to them and speak to them and said this is what we’re doing and we didn’t hide it from anybody. (Glasgow VRU Director Interview)

This issue of achieving the correct level of engagement appears to have had an impact on the sustainability of the approach in later years and will be addressed later in this thesis. The issue of the appropriate level of engagement proved to be difficult to achieve. The VRU Director commented on the ambivalence to the initiative of the Glasgow Community Planning Partnership (CPP), which surfaced when the VRU Director and the Glasgow CIRV Manager attended a Glasgow CPP meeting to inform the group of the proposed initiative and to seek approval and guidance as to membership of the proposed partnership (Glasgow CIRV):

“Aye, just you carry on with that then. Just you carry on”. That was it. There was no buy-in. I mean, I remember the night (Glasgow CIRV Manager) and I went to a meeting .... and we said, “here’s what we want to do, here’s what we’re planning to do, here’s where we are with it”. He said [Chair of the CPP], “Aye good then”. (Glasgow VRU Director Interview)
Other key people in Glasgow were not as supportive about the initiative and had misgivings about the approach being proposed by the VRU. The Director of Glasgow Community and Safety Services (GCSS), who had initially been to America with the ACC and the VRU Director, commented that the gang culture in America was different from that in Glasgow and that in the opinion of the Community Safety Director nothing had been seen of value to transfer to Glasgow during the visit:

When we returned from Boston, I hadn’t really seen anything that I thought was particularly innovative or that interesting. And for me the gang culture in America was entirely different, and of a nature, quite literally for me, beggared belief, where murder, weapons like firearms, was actually commonplace. It was also very racial with black gangs, with Mexican gangs and gang membership at an entirely different level from what it would be in Glasgow, Scotland. ....... I never saw much there that I thought was transferrable if I was honest. However, obviously [Glasgow VRU Director] did and thought that the way to do that was to create a project and again my idea of what a project would look like would have been a multi-agency team........ However, the board thought a project might contribute, I suppose, to the reducing violence agenda. It was at a time when GCSS was kind of brand new. We were starting to look at things as well. For me, the scale of the issues and you know, I had a big organisation, I just couldn’t see how a project would sort that. ....... So, I was never a staunch advocate of setting a project up and calling it CIRV. (Glasgow Community Safety Director)

The views of the Community Safety Director indicate some reticence towards the planned initiative. Glasgow Community and Safety Services (GCSS) were a huge and influential
agency in the city and their participation was crucial to Glasgow CIRV. The statement that it was not ‘particularly innovative or that interesting’, reveals that the organisation perceived that it was ‘forced’ or coerced into providing assistance to Glasgow CIRV by the other key participants. The following statement indicated that there was a sense of scepticism, of guarding one’s own resources and that it was a waste of money:

You know I had a big organisation, I just couldn’t see how a project would sort that. You know Glasgow City Council’s got a budget of £3 billion and if we have a violent city and we’re spending £3 billion on public services, you kind of look at the £3 billion you’re spending before you spend three hundred thousand (£300,000) on eight people [Glasgow CIRV] to kind of compensate for the failure of the £3 Billion. (Glasgow Community Safety Director Interview)

GCSS was in the early stages of their own development as a city agency and Glasgow CIRV was seen as a distraction and diverting resources away from those that might have been accessed by GCSS. These views of scepticism and reticence may go some way to explain the lack of sustainability of Glasgow CIRV and will be addressed later in this thesis.

However, these views, expressed by the GCSS Director, did not prevent GCSS from playing a part in the initiative, along with others, who gave their support. They did provide a member of their staff and accommodation for the team. In addition, the Social Work Department appointed a senior manager, who had responsibility for the north and east of the city, to work with the VRU in developing the Glasgow CIRV initiative.

The Social Work Manager explained their role in Glasgow CIRV and their involvement in the process. The manager was initially approached by senior management and asked to sit on the newly forming Steering Group, as this manager had responsibility for the east
end of the city, where it was proposed Glasgow CIRV be based:

I didn’t know very much about it and I went along to an initial steering group where people were talking about the initiative. I was quite enthused by it. I became involved really because I have been working in Social Work for the best part of 25, 26 years and always working in the north east of Glasgow. Always kind of working with traditional methods of social work and I enthused about anything we could do to... try to turn the tide of the violence and the soul-destroying nature of what that kind of does to people. So when anybody was coming up with an idea about something we could do I was quite enthused about it. (Glasgow Social Work Manager Interview)

The territorialism and gang violence issues discussed earlier, emerged again in schools with the Education Director commenting that these issues gave him an interest in what the VRU staff had to say:

The issue would be that it came about from some general conversations with [Glasgow VRU Director] in the first instance and then some issues related to gang violence in the city and the impact of that on education and gangs and territorialism in schools... I had a look at background research that they sent me and.... Saying..., I am happy to work with you to look at whether or not this was a transferrable model along the Cincinnati lines and into education and into Glasgow in its entirety ... and for me then to say there’s merit in this. (Glasgow Education Director Interview)

Following on from the building of the partnership, the VRU set out to bring over some key people from Cincinnati and carried out a series of community-focused events in the east end of Glasgow. Those brought to Glasgow included Professor David Kennedy, who had
been instrumental in developing the Boston Gun Project and assisted in Cincinnati, and the US CIRV Manager, who both attended meetings and provided an insight into their experiences.

**Government Approval and Funding for Glasgow CIRV**

Government funding was seen as a crucial aspect to the initiative and necessary to give it credence. The VRU Director stated that, as the VRU was funded both by the government and the police forces in Scotland at that time, they already had good relations with the government civil servants and ministers, especially the Justice Minister and Community Safety Minister, with whom regular meetings were held to discuss current and planned initiatives to reduce violence, along with the Chief Constable. In this case, following the visits to America, the VRU presented the plans to the Government and sought Minister’s approval to implement and to provide funds for the planned initiative, that would develop into Glasgow CIRV.

A senior Scottish Government Civil Servant explained the funding process, and stated that the VRU was the driving force behind the plan, rather than the Government. He commented that it was not all ‘plain sailing’ for the VRU to gain this approval from ministers. The Scottish Government had always taken an interest in violence and had already established a Violence Reduction team within the government:

> The category of violence began to become clear to us, domestic violence, gang violence, youth violence, intimate partner, you know, non-intimate partner, various taxonomies that allowed us to be more nuanced. So probably around 2008 we began to look and think a bit more about gang violence but there
was no political imperative for us to do that. That was more of an evidence-based recognition of a potential problem, mainly by understanding where violence in Scotland was happening. It was mainly happening in Glasgow and the west of Scotland. (Scottish Government Civil Servant Interview)

It is interesting to note the comments made by the civil servant in relation to the lack of ‘political imperative’ to tackle the problem. One of the principal groups involved in the policy transfer process, as discussed by Dolowitz et al. (2000), are elected officials. Rose (1993: 52) states that ‘their values give direction to public policy and their endorsement is needed to legitimate the adoption of programmes’. He further comments that they also have a role to play in determining the guidelines and boundaries of acceptable policies during their term in office. Should elected officials not be in favour of a policy or programme then it is highly unlikely that any such policy would be implemented, even though it may have benefits. Furthermore, even if other non-elected officials want to adopt a policy, it is not likely to succeed if politicians are opposed to it or they do not see the benefits (Dolowitz et al., 2000).

This research has revealed that, in the case of gang violence, elected officials in the Scottish Government and at local level in the city, were not actually putting pressure on the police and others in Glasgow to find ways of dealing with the violence. They were not forcing them to look at alternative ways from elsewhere, and they were not providing direction or pressure to implement a new strategy. Indeed, the VRU Director also commented on the fact that the city council was not putting pressure on the police to do something:

None. None and that was one of the challenges, although nobody could deny there was an issue. Nobody chapped the door and said you need to do
something about this or something about that. We were just doing our thing.
I mean in the broader context Willie Rae had said “do something about
violence that was sustainable”, that’s how we arrived at the public health
thing and the gangs stuff was in it but there was no drive. Glasgow City
Council were not saying what are you doing about it. (Glasgow VRU Director
Interview)

The government Civil Servant explained that the Director of the VRU presented a plan to
the Government seeking their approval and funding to allow the Glasgow CIRV initiative
to proceed. This involved going through a long and complicated process of ‘due diligence’:

At that point CIRV came on, there was a long, long process that my team was
involved in working with (the VRU Director and his deputy), where our role
there was to make that project development amenable to government
funding. I know that to some extent it can become frustrating for partners.
We are not venture capitalists; it is our job on behalf of taxpayers to be very
conservative about public money and in a sense that almost came into
conflict with the radicality of what was being proposed from Cincinnati and
Boston. It is not a good thing for us to be radical because that’s venture
capitalism, not public expenditure. ... If you want public money invested, you
have to go through due diligence. (Scottish Government Civil Servant
Interview)

It is clear in this case that the process of ‘due diligence’ commenced through the offices of
the VRU and the government officials before the elected officials became involved. There
is a civic duty placed on governments to ensure that public money is spent wisely and the
role of the civil servant was to ensure that the model of funding put forward for approval of government ministers was robust and provided the necessary outcomes:

CIRV (Glasgow CIRV) very quickly became the chosen model. … Our decision-making process is to seek the authority of Scottish ministers to use their powers under the budget and allow the parliament to spend public money on this. We were very happy to say that we would lend support to the VRU, but our main role there was to advise ministers that this would lead to the outcomes and the policy outcomes that they were looking for, and secondly, to assure them that any money spent on this was appropriately being spent on something where risk had been fully assessed. (Scottish Government Civil Servant Interview)

The civil servant explained that the decision to support the VRU, and hence Glasgow CIRV, had a substantial political oversight with Government Ministers agreeing to provide support or funds, based on very detailed advice from civil servants, who thereafter monitored the progress, or otherwise, of the initiatives/programmes/projects. Support from Government Ministers was also forthcoming in a more ‘visible’ way with regular visits to the VRU, police and city agencies, along with regular updates and comments being made in parliament and speeches (see examples of comments on Glasgow CIRV at Scottish Government, 2010b and Scottish Government, 2011).

The Scottish Government made a commitment to approve the funding of Glasgow CIRV, as the VRU provided ‘sufficient robustness’ that met the requirements for the Government to allow the decision-making process to go forward (Scottish Government Civil Servant Interview) and subsequently £1.6 million was allocated, over three years, to allow Glasgow CIRV to be implemented.
However, there were some misgivings and reservations expressed and the Government set conditions before the funding was granted. The Civil Servant explained that the Government:

*Were not prepared to enter into a bilateral arrangement with Strathclyde Police for the delivery of this. We believed that the evidence told us that this wasn’t a genuinely multi-agency partnership approach, even if coordinated by Strathclyde Police. We were not prepared to go forward with the funding of this project without the Community Planning Partnership being the ultimate signatories. That was critical to us. I believe that was a positive role we had. I believe that it would not have happened if we had not insisted it happened. I believe that it would have been a Strathclyde Police project and let’s say that it would be worth reflecting on to what extent the position we ended up with. I would reflect that we did get a commitment for the Community Planning Partnership to roll out CIRV if it proved to be successful.* (Scottish Government Civil Servant Interview)

There is some evidence in the comments above that the government believed that even at the late stage of seeking funding, the partnership approach proposed at this point was not a true partnership. The government were not prepared to divest such large sums of money to the police alone and stated that in order for the funds to be allocated the CPP should be the ultimate signatories, undertake an oversight role and commit to a longer-term roll-out if the initiative proved successful.

This was a crucial factor in the decision-making aspect in the policy transfer process, in relation to sustainability, as the Government Ministers had to be reassured that the proposal was viable. It was also required to ensure that a credible partnership base of
interested and committed agencies was developed to provide delivery of the services and also to integrally bind partners into the process:

So that was a contribution we made and in the end the decision-making process was based on Scottish ministers agreeing on a proposal signed by the Community Planning Partnership in Glasgow for the CIRV project.

(Scottish Government Civil Servant Interview)

In order to secure the funding from the Scottish Government, the VRU Director again approached the Glasgow CPP directly to seek their commitment, approval and adoption of the proposed strategy as part of their outcomes, and ultimately their signature, as required by the government to obtain the funds. In order to achieve this commitment, an agreement was reached that ensured Glasgow CIRV would seek to address some of the CPP overall goals under the Single Outcome Agreement (SOA) between Glasgow CPP, and the Scottish Government, i.e. reducing violence, incidences of anti-social behaviour and reducing the fear of crime, under the ‘Safe Theme’ for the city (see Appendix 9).

The VRU Director made a commitment for Glasgow CIRV to ‘link in’ to these Local Outcomes, by assisting the city in reducing the impact and incidence of antisocial behaviour, reducing the involvement of young people in crime and reducing the fear of crime in addition to reducing violent crime. As a result, the Glasgow CPP agreed to be the ultimate signatories for the project. The VRU and Glasgow CPP agreed to implement the project in the east end of Glasgow and at the end of the funding period, agreed with the government that the project would be ‘taken on’ by the city agencies and ‘rolled-out’ across the rest of the city.

In addition to the approaches to the CPP by the VRU Director, the civil servant commented that the Communities Minister, Mr Fergus Ewing, and the Justice Minister, Mr Kenneth
McAskill, also met with senior city officials, including the Director of the GCSS to add their support for Glasgow CIRV, and hence, the government funding was secured and the project could be designed and implemented.

**Conclusions**

Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) make the distinction between voluntary and coercive policy transfer and in applying their model to Glasgow CIRV, it is clear that this was a case of voluntary transfer as opposed to key actors being forced or coerced into it. In this instance, it is apparent that the main driver of the voluntary policy transfer was a level of dissatisfaction with previous attempts to deal with violence. Therefore, the timing was right for the key actors involved, to search for and implement a new approach.

This chapter has provided a ‘rich’ and detailed description of the reasons behind why and when the key actors engaged in the process of the policy transfer from Cincinnati to Glasgow and who these actors actually were. The reasons why the participants in Glasgow decided to search for new ideas to tackle the gang violence culture that had existed in the city for generations were varied, including territorialism, fear of crime, the negative media images about the city and the impact on resources of the various city agencies.

The prevailing opinion of all interviewed was that territorialism led to regular disturbances and large-scale fights taking place between rival gangs, with violence sometimes becoming serious and leading to loss of life. The police were powerless to stop the fighting and relied on arresting and reporting offenders to the courts. However, this was having little or no effect on the long-term issues and outcomes and it was recognised
that no single agency alone could effectively deal with the problem. It had to be a wide-ranging and multi-agency partnership approach that was adopted to try to make a difference.

The generational nature of the gangs was also highlighted and it was apparent that young people joined gangs for many different reasons, including peer pressure and the fact that their older relatives had also been in the gangs, including their fathers, uncles and older brothers. Some gang members viewed the gang as a support mechanism to replace the lack of support that they may perceive in the family home, due to coming from broken families or those suffering from alcohol and/or drug misuse and domestic violence.

The negative images portrayed in the media have long been an issue for the city, with newspaper articles and television documentaries highlighting the violence and gangs (BBC 2, 2010 and Deadline News, 2013). This can and does lead to a fear of crime being experienced by members of society, with the fear of gang violence having an impact on people and prevents them from going out, especially at night, in those areas affected (Glasgow Police Area Commander Interview).

Finally, the impact on resources for the agencies involved was also raised by various interviewees, who commented on the substantial costs to society and the agencies and how this impacted on their ability to divert funds elsewhere.

It was for these reasons discussed that there was a growing realisation in the city that something new/innovative had to be done about the violence. This was in contrast to Cincinnati, where they reached a ‘trigger point’ in the violence due to a significant rise in homicides and shootings attributed to the gangs.
In Glasgow, it was found that there had been a wide range of key actors involved in the process of the policy transfer of the gang violence reduction project from Cincinnati to Glasgow. These included senior police officers from Strathclyde Police, including the Chief Constable, and the Force Executive and divisional and local police commanders. The VRU was instrumental in the search for new ideas and identified the US CIRV project in Cincinnati as good practice and engaged in a series of fact-finding visits and information sessions to build partnerships with city agencies and the local community in the east of the city.

It can be argued in this respect, that the police were part of an epistemic network or community, as discussed by Haas (1992: 4), who defines an epistemic community as ‘a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’, and formulated the framework as a method for investigating the influence of knowledge-based experts in international policy transfer. These epistemic communities have a level of control over the production of knowledge and information, which allows them to articulate cause and effect relationships and frame issues for collective debate and, therefore, transfer their policy projects onto the global stage (Haas, 1989 and 1992; Dunlop, 2009).

Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) highlight the key role that elected representatives can play in the policy transfer process. In this instance, national and local elected representatives and Scottish Government ministers did not play a significant role in the policy transfer of the US CIRV to Glasgow in the sense that they did not apply pressure for a new approach to be undertaken. However, the Scottish government did provide the necessary funds to allow Glasgow CIRV to be established, after applying a process of due
diligence to the application for the funding. The government also placed a requirement on the VRU to seek the oversight responsibilities of the Glasgow Community Planning Partnership (CPP) to ensure that the Glasgow CIRV was not only a police initiative. This would also allow for a level of sustainability to be put in place, as the onus was on the CPP to take forward the model at the end of the funding period. However, this did not happen as will be discussed in a later chapter in this thesis.

The next chapter looks at the issues surrounding the implementation of the policy transfer in Glasgow and discusses the early lessons and fact-finding visits to America that informed the process. It also discusses the various mechanisms used in Glasgow to implement the programme of violence reduction, analyses key similarities and differences between both cities and the underlying constraints and restrictions, pertaining to this particular policy transfer, that resulted in an initial aim to copy the violence reduction initiative becoming an emulation.
Chapter 6 - Mechanisms and Implementation of Policy
Transfer in Glasgow

Introduction

The origins of the policy transfer process for Glasgow were examined and discussed in Chapter 5; including the reasons why and when the various key actors in Glasgow decided to engage in the voluntary policy transfer process, looking to copy the US CIRV model from Cincinnati and the processes followed, that eventually led to the formation of Glasgow CIRV. This was created in an attempt to tackle the violence associated with gangs in the east end of the city.

Following on from where the previous chapter ended, this chapter looks in particular at the questions:

- What was transferred?
- Were there different degrees of transfer?
- Did anything restrict the policy transfer?

This chapter provides a ‘rich’ description (Bazeley, 2013) of the various processes and mechanisms used in Glasgow and critically discusses the implementation of the programme of violence reduction transferred from Cincinnati, by analysing key similarities and differences between both cities and the underlying constraints and restrictions relating to this particular policy transfer. It discusses the early visits to Cincinnati by the Glasgow CIRV project manager and other members of the team that led to the structures of US CIRV being copied by Glasgow CIRV. It also examines the early
plans, the engagement processes developed in Glasgow, compared with those in Cincinnati, and also the use of partner agencies that offered their services to Glasgow CIRV.

**Early Lessons-Fact Finding Visit to Cincinnati**

During the funding approval process to the Scottish Government, a Chief Inspector, who worked within the VRU, was appointed Project Manager for Glasgow CIRV, and was to ‘champion’ the focused deterrence strategy approach to be followed and to lead any team that would be established.

One of the first tasks of the manager was to build relationships with the main partners, for example, Social Work and Education, and to further enhance the knowledge and lessons learned by the VRU senior management. At this time, information about US CIRV in Cincinnati had only been gathered by the VRU Deputy Director during a visit to America, as discussed previously, and it was believed that it was important to share this information with other key partners. To this end, the Glasgow CIRV Manager, accompanied by a senior Social Work Manager and an Education Director, went on a fact-finding trip to Cincinnati, to gain a better understanding of the US CIRV, its ethos and operations:

> I was probably quite fortunate that I got the time and position to champion taking that forward. So when it actually became a partnership decision, was really something that slowly evolved in winning hearts and minds…..of key players…..that was Social Work, Education and they became part of the fact-finding mission when we went to look at this. (Glasgow CIRV Manager Interview)
The trio visited Cincinnati in early 2008 and while there, carried out full observations of the US CIRV, its operations and interviewed staff, including the US CIRV manager, the police officers involved and academics from the University of Cincinnati.

The Social Work manager explained that they went to Cincinnati to get a better idea of the US CIRV model as described by the VRU management and to look at how it ‘worked’.

The manager also commented that the assumption was that it already worked and that they were going to examine how it would work in Glasgow:

    We went out to see it in practice, which was a great privilege to actually be able to see it in action and I think for me it just helped me to visualize how it could work in Glasgow. Because the intention always was going out to see what we would need to do to make it work, not going out to see whether it worked....so how do we make this work in Glasgow? The real opportunity was seeing it through, and as you were watching things happening, asking questions about how would we do this? It wasn’t “this is great how they do it?” (Glasgow Social Work Manager Interview)

The Glasgow Education Director expressed some concerns about whether the model could be copied directly and transferred to Glasgow without some consideration for the local context:

    I was a bit concerned about how transferable some of it was into a Scottish context and whether or not they were going to try and straight lift the model or whether or not we would actually be taking a model and adapting it for a context. (Glasgow Education Director Interview)
It is clear from the above comments that, even at that early stage, members of the group were thinking about how the US CIRV model would be made to ‘fit’ into Glasgow by taking into account local contexts, rather than merely copying it. This is in contrast to the view of the Glasgow CIRV manager (Interview), who believed that the US CIRV model was copied in ‘its entirety’, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

The visit had a profound effect on the Social Work Manager who could not believe that Glasgow had not thought about this approach before. The Social Work Manager commented that it had been running in Cincinnati for at least 2 years at that point (in actual fact it had been running for considerably less time than that, as it had been established in 2007). The partnership approach that was operating in Cincinnati also had a big impact on the manager’s sense of ownership of the violence problem and the breaking down of agency barriers and working in silos:

I have to say I was completely bowled over by it. I couldn’t actually understand why we were only just finding out about it given that they had been operating it for the best part of 2 years at the time. I thought that my first impressions were that the couple of multi-agency meetings that I went to were extremely well organised.....and I thought that was real commitment to trying to get the barriers down and making it work. (Glasgow Social Work Manager Interview)

The Glasgow Education Director also saw significant benefits in the approach adopted by Cincinnati in relation to young people, with better outcomes and results and the changes it made to their lives. The Education Director explained that the Cincinnati model appeared to offer routes out of trouble and into other more personally beneficial areas for young people including, for example, education, employment or real jobs and making
changes to a systemic culture. The Director also commented on the generational lack of ambitions and poverty of aspirations and how important it was to break the cycle:

I am particularly interested in getting something out of the other end for it. It is not just about doing something. It is about what change has it made? So in many ways that’s where the development into CIRV in Cincinnati interested me because it appeared that it offered young people a route out of something. Whether it is into further education or whether it is into employment or real jobs, real people or real opportunities and actually changing a systemic culture. I think that’s what’s around for some of our kids in Glasgow schools, those second and third generation lack of ambition, poverty of aspirations. And I think those are things that we needed to try and break that cycle.

(Glasgow Education Director Interview)

These comments by the Education Director, in relation to the lack of opportunities and ambition, resonate with the thoughts of Craig (2010) who discusses Glasgow’s inequalities, social problems and divisions of class and that it suffers from poor health, high crime rates and violence. These issues need to be addressed in order to make a difference to their lives and society in general. Trying a new approach that offers alternatives and breaking the cycle of deprivation could perhaps result in significant positive differences to those engaged with the project.

Personal observations and being able to see a project in-situ is crucial in helping people understand how processes work. It is clear, from the comments made by the people who visited Cincinnati and saw US CIRV in operation, that it was an invaluable experience for them. The Glasgow Project Manager was able to learn of the structures and processes that US CIRV had employed while the Social Work and Education officials could see the
benefits of the partnership approach in operation for themselves. They were then able to bring their experiences back with them, help to formulate the project in Glasgow, and express their views and enthusiasm to others by disseminating information about the structures of US CIRV, as discussed below.

However, it is apparent from the comments made above, and from those made in the previous chapter, regarding the initial visits to America, that there appears to have been little detailed empirical research carried out by the key actors in Glasgow into the initiative in Cincinnati and Boston, prior to the decision being made to attempt to copy it and transfer it to Glasgow. The early visit to America by the Deputy Director of the VRU, at the insistence of the then Chief Constable, Sir William Rae, appears to have been the only research carried out in-situ, to ascertain the views and examine the model and decide if it was suitable for Glasgow. This visit entailed speaking with David Kennedy, the architect of the Boston initiative and seeking his views. This led to the visit to Cincinnati by the Glasgow CIRV Manager and the senior Social Work and Education officers as discussed above. However, this was planned after the decision was made to proceed with the model in Glasgow. It could be argued that the members of staff who travelled to Cincinnati to view US CIRV went with preconceived ideas that it would work as it had in Cincinnati. While there, they spoke with various members of the US CIRV to gain their views, but it could be argued that these voices were possibly biased towards the efficacy of US CIRV and were not critical of the approach used.

This apparent lack of prior research into the efficacy of the model and engagement with actors who have a ‘vested interest’ in the model, resonates with that discussed by Peck (2011), who discusses the increase in the rate of transfer, or mobility, between ‘jurisdictional boundaries, both ‘horizontally’ (between national and local political
entities) and ‘vertically’ (between hierarchically scaled institutions and domains), and that these transfers are accelerating due to the ‘shortening policy development cycles’. Peck further argues that ‘fast-policy’ regimes are characterized by the pragmatic borrowing of ‘policies that work .... and by a growing reliance on prescriptively coded forms of front-loaded advice and evaluation science’ (Peck, 2011: 773). There is an urgency to push through the transfer of the policies etc. that does not fully take into account local contexts that may affect the ultimate failure of the policy borrowed or transferred. McCann and Ward (2012: 330) echo this by stating that actors are ‘compelled to look to shape new innovative – and quickly and cheaply workable – ‘solutions’ to local programmes by assembling the packaged models in combinations suited for their particular places’.

I would argue that this was the case in Glasgow, as there was limited empirical research carried out into US CIRV before the ‘rush’ to copy the model for Glasgow. Local socio-economic, environmental and legal contexts were not examined in detail prior to the decision being made to proceed with the transfer. This led to Glasgow CIRV management looking to copy US CIRV without due consideration of the full picture in Glasgow and a full empirical analysis of US CIRV prior to the decision being made to transfer it.

**US CIRV Structure**

The members of the Glasgow CIRV team who visited Cincinnati observed first-hand the project business model for US CIRV that was designed by Proctor and Gamble (P and G) executives. This model aimed to provide the focus and sustainability for the US CIRV Strategic Governing Board, who also hired the full-time project manager to provide day-to-day management and direction (Tillyer et al., 2012).
This model had four main components (see Appendix 10) and was designed to ensure sustainability and outline responsibilities for implementing and operating the project, and also displaying greater responsibility and accountability on a hierarchical basis. This was a significant difference from the model designed for the Boston Gun Project, the original inspiration for US CIRV. It was felt by the US CIRV project manager that Boston did not have any real structure, as it was based on personalities rather than on business structures. This became apparent when staff moved posts:

I don't know that Boston had a real structure. I think from actually participating in the national network and going to a lot of their meetings, interacting with other cities, that Cincinnati kind of created the organisational structure, and other places didn’t really have that. It was based more on personalities of individuals and I think that’s what happened to them when it started to fall apart, because these individuals either moved on or in fact, I know that is exactly what happened within the police department. (Cincinnati CIRV Manager Interview)

The Governing Board was at the top of the business model, under which sat the Strategy Implementation Team, which included the leads of the individual strategy teams, the Law Enforcement, Services Team, Community Team and Systems Team. Also on this group sat the overall Project Manager and the consultant, Professor David Kennedy (Engel, 2012; Tillyer et al., 2012).

It was this structure that the Glasgow officials decided to replicate or copy for Glasgow CIRV as they saw it as an efficient and sensible solution to their violence problem. However, it will be argued later in this thesis that Glasgow CIRV failed to fully and
successfully replicate this business model, which perhaps partly explains why Glasgow CIRV ceased operations in July 2011.

While in Cincinnati, the Glasgow officials also attended a ‘Call-In’ session at the Court House. The ‘Call-In’ was the method used by the US CIRV to bring together selected gang members in the courtroom to listen to a series of speakers from different agencies and voluntary organisations, delivering the key messages of US CIRV. (*This particular aspect of Glasgow CIRV will be fully discussed in the next chapter*). This proved to be an important and powerful aspect of the visit, which had quite an impact on the Glasgow officials. For example, the Glasgow Social Work manager explained that it had quite an emotive effect personally, especially as it was apparent that it had an impact on the young people and adults in the room:

> When we went along to the ‘Call-In’ session, again I was just quite staggered with that. You could see the immediate impact on young people and adults. It wasn’t something that you went away thinking that they must have felt this or how did they feel. You could actually visibly see the impact on them. (Glasgow Social Work Manager Interview)

The Glasgow CIRV project manager also used this visit to shape thoughts on how the initial Glasgow CIRV ‘Call-In’ sessions (later changed to Self-Referral Session) would look like (Glasgow CIRV Project Manager Interview).

**Building a Team in Glasgow**

On return from Cincinnati, the Glasgow CIRV Manager set about building a team and setting in place the structures required to enable Glasgow CIRV to become operational.
As previously discussed, the VRU had already carried out an analysis of the gang problems in Glasgow and had discovered that the east end of the city, (covered by ‘B Division’ of Strathclyde Police at the time), was the worst area in the city and the wider police force area affected by gangs. It was in this part of Glasgow that Glasgow CIRV was based (WG Personal Recollection).

The VRU and the Glasgow CIRV manager put in place an intelligence-gathering phase, similar to that carried out in Cincinnati, to examine in greater detail the gang situation in the police division in question. This involved speaking to the police intelligence analysts in the division and the local police officers in the area, including all Community Policing and Response officers, in an effort to gather as much relevant and up to date information as possible. In turn, the local Community Policing officers were also asked to contact and speak to local community groups and youth workers to further enhance the membership picture of the gangs (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview).

A baseline date of 1st January 2007 was set for intelligence (any intelligence held before this date would be discarded) and it was established that there were 55 known gangs (see Appendix 2), comprising at least 650 members identified by police intelligence, aged between 12 and 26 years of age. The peak ages of the young people involved in the gangs were between 14 and 18 years of age. This information was then utilised to build an Excel database of the known gang members to be used in the engagement process of Glasgow CIRV (Linden, 2012).

Other members of the Glasgow CIRV team were appointed in June 2008, including me, the author of this research. At the time, I was an operational police Inspector based in the Easterhouse and Shettleston areas of the east end of Glasgow and was appointed to act as the Co-ordination Team Leader and as the deputy to the Glasgow CIRV Manager. My
role involved the day-to-day running of the team and co-ordinating all partners and service providers. I was also responsible for devising, planning and running the ‘Call-In’ sessions (later to be called ‘Self-Referral Sessions’) that would be put in place in the coming months (WG Personal Recollection).

The team also comprised various personnel from other partner agencies. These included; a member of the Social Work department, an education officer, a member of Glasgow Community and Safety Services (GCSS) and a Glasgow Housing Association (GHA) officer. They also included a further police Inspector who was in charge of the Community Team, two Community Police constables, also from the east end of Glasgow, and finally, an Intelligence Analyst; all police personnel were seconded from Strathclyde Police (WG Personal Recollection).

**Glasgow CIRV Structure**

The Glasgow CIRV Manager was responsible for producing a strategic plan that provided the background information and direction to be taken by the Glasgow CIRV team and was classified as a ‘Restricted’ document in terms of being placed in the public domain by the police. The document was completed with my assistance, as the Deputy Glasgow CIRV Manager, and knowledge of the document and its contents have been used to recall relevant information while ensuring that ‘Restricted’ information is not referenced in this research (WG Personal Recollection).

It is clear, from comparing the US CIRV model with that of the Glasgow CIRV model, as discussed in the Glasgow CIRV Strategic Plan, that Glasgow CIRV set out to copy the US CIRV model of operation with a Strategic Oversight Group overseeing the process. When
the Glasgow CIRV Manager was asked what parts of the US CIRV had been deemed suitable to be transferred, the manager replied; ‘It’s entirety to be honest’ (Glasgow CIRV Manager).

The Glasgow CIRV Strategic Plan determined that the Glasgow model would be managed on a daily basis by an Implementation Team, comprising the CIRV Manager and the four team leads from the Co-ordination, Enforcement, Communities and Services Teams. This structure mirrored that in Cincinnati, the only difference being in the name change of the ‘Systems Team’ in Cincinnati to ‘Co-ordination Team’ in Glasgow.

**The Glasgow CIRV Oversight Group**

The first stage in the process of establishing Glasgow CIRV was to set up a Strategic Oversight Group to have control of the project on behalf of the Glasgow Community Planning Partnership (CPP) to provide strategic direction when required. It was also the responsibility of the group to monitor results and ensure resources were available to sustain them. Progress was monitored on a quarterly basis, to make sure that the highest priority actions were identified and implemented quickly. The group also looked to guarantee that partners were committed to both long-term and short-term goal setting and planning. This group was formed with members of the main city agencies, with the VRU Director acting as Chairperson (see Appendix 11).

**The Implementation Team**

The Implementation Team acted as an operational oversight team and comprised the four leaders from each of the delivery strands of the model, which were responsible for the
operation of Glasgow CIRV. This team met on a daily basis to ensure that the key targets were being met and that information was being shared with partners as appropriate.

**The Coordination Team**

The role of the Co-ordination Team, (of which I was the lead officer, see discussion in relation to my role in Chapter 4), was to develop and implement the project and in doing so, adopt a system to ensure a measure of sustainability and quality assurance. This involved maintaining links with partners, including enforcement agencies, for example, the Police, Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) and Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration (SCRA). Also included were the statutory agencies, for example, Education, Social Work, Housing, Glasgow Community and Safety Services, and the voluntary agencies and service providers (WG Personal Recollection).

This task was achieved by adopting the same corporate principles as the US CIRV team had developed, and was designed to increase transparency, accountability and sustainability. The Coordination Team would also oversee the Glasgow CIRV evaluation process when it was established. In addition, the Coordination Team was responsible for developing gang intelligence, at the level of an individual, which also involved preparing appropriate intelligence reports, problem profiles of individuals and gangs, and co-ordinating any ‘tasking’ requirements. The term ‘tasking’ comes from the police term, Tasking and Co-ordination Group (TCG), which was established at local, divisional and force levels. This type of group would meet on a regular basis to discuss any issues that may have occurred and to decide on plans for the future. This term was used in Glasgow CIRV by the Coordination Team in its working practices and it would prepare action plans for the Enforcement Team to carry out around the time of any planned ‘Call-In’ Session (WG Personal Recollection).
The Co-ordination Team was also responsible for developing further intelligence about the street gangs from police systems, gang members, community members and other agencies. Furthermore, the team was also responsible for the development and implementation of any systems needed for Glasgow CIRV initiatives and the management, co-ordination and delivery of the ‘Call-In’ sessions.

The parallel team in US CIRV was called the Systems Team and was led by a professor from the University of Cincinnati. The role of the university staff was to provide analytical support, data gathering and intelligence analysis guidance to the police department.

The role academics played, in providing the analytical and intelligence analysis, had been lacking in the Cincinnati Police Department, as acknowledged by the Cincinnati Police Commander delegated to the project who explained what kind of assistance the police department had received from the university:

Two or three key pieces. One was the education on measuring your work so you don’t keep making the same mistakes over and over again. We thought we knew how to do that and then we worked with the team and I realised we knew s**t about that and so we got a lot better at measuring and not repeating the same mistakes over and over again. Number two was the whole concept of intelligence gathering, data gathering, not just getting names and addresses, but getting a whole lot more than that. I knew nothing about network analysis. That was all from the University. Every bit of that education came from the University. I am going to make crime analysis the third thing, even though link analysis is close to it. We thought we knew how to do crime analysis; we knew how to push pins in a map. We were map-makers. I have travelled the country and looked at what other agencies call
analysis. It's garbage. It's what we used to do. We are very good at that and I am very proud of that and that is all directly attributable to [the university] staff. Fourth is in the IT perspective, helping us with database creation, helping us with software acquisition. That stuff is fantastic and really I have a fifth one, [the professor] has successfully written us grants, which has got us funding. So those are all things I would not have had. It's not like I wouldn't have had it as much. It's, I just wouldn't have had it at all. We would have been struggling if I hadn't had [the professor's] assistance with those things. (Cincinnati Police Commander)

The importance of academics and the roles they carried out in the US CIRV set up cannot be underestimated. The professor from the university, in particular, was instrumental in ‘pushing’ the partnership-working aspect of US CIRV, by providing an expertise in quantitative analysis and was able to offer advice on data collection from the outset of the programme, which would allow in-depth evaluations to be carried out on a regular basis.

The presence of an independent academic and expert in evaluation processes using analytical data gathered from the project was missing in Glasgow CIRV, as proper evaluation measurements were not taken into account at the outset of the project. Glasgow CIRV did form a small evaluation team with members drawn from the Strategic Oversight Group, but this was not done until the project had been operating for several months. I believe that this lack of performance measurement data had a negative impact on providing a robust evaluation of Glasgow CIRV's performance at a later date, which may have impacted negatively on the long-term sustainability of the project.

The roles and the ‘makeup’ of the Systems Team in US CIRV were distinctly different from that operated by Glasgow CIRV. The concept of the intelligence provision being supplied
by an outside agency, in this case, the University of Cincinnati, was ‘alien’ to the police structure in Glasgow, where all intelligence and analytical provision was supplied by Strathclyde Police (WG Personal Recollection).

Indeed, the role of university staff in US CIRV was initially met with scepticism within the Cincinnati Police Department as it went ‘against the grain’ for outsiders to be given access to confidential information. The police captain had to ‘sell’ the idea to the officers. However, it did not take long for the officers to realise their own shortcomings and accept the skills of the university staff:

I had to go ‘sell’ (the idea of working with students) to my cops. I had a very elite group of cops that know how to police, so I am going to bring four college students into this mix and I am telling them that and they kind of looked at me as if I was growing a second head, but I said. “Guys, we are going to do this. This is what we need”. It took one meeting with those four kids and my cops, and my cops said, we need them on the team, they were embedded with us for eight months.....The UC (University of Cincinnati) people trained us and they built us a database in an afternoon that we still use today. They also, more importantly, what made us able to package this into neat packaging to get the prosecutor to take this gang investigation. (Cincinnati Police Captain Interview)

The comments above by the police captain highlight a sense of ‘isolationism’ and ‘suspicion’ in the police officers, in not trusting outsiders, as discussed in respect of ‘cop culture’ by Reiner (2000). Police officers tend to treat those people with whom they come into contact, with a degree of suspicion; in this case the University of Cincinnati advanced quantitative analysis postgraduate students, under the guidance of Professor Engel, and
they also engage in isolationism and solidarity in closing ranks to outsiders. It was this aspect of ‘cop culture’ that the police captain had to break down, in order for his officers to accept them into their ‘team’. This was achieved after only one meeting when the officers saw the benefits of working with the ‘outsiders’.

In contrast, the Glasgow CIRV team police officers did not appear to have these feelings of ‘isolationism’ and ‘suspicion’ when working with the other members of the team from out-with the police. It was commonplace in Glasgow for police officers to work alongside other agencies and I believe that this helped to break down barriers and enhance partnership-working within the Glasgow CIRV team (WG Personal Recollection).

**The Enforcement Team**

The role of the Enforcement Team in Glasgow CIRV involved forming partnerships with other law enforcement agencies, for example, the local police and force resources, the Procurator Fiscal service in Glasgow and the council enforcement agencies provided by GCSS. These agencies had to be capable of disrupting the dynamics within youth street gangs, whose members were involved in serious acts of violence, for example, weapon carrying offences, assaults, serious assaults, attempted murder or murder (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview). This was not just about targeting and arresting individuals: It was also about trying to divert people away from violence, as prevention was seen to be more effective than the police merely trying to arrest their way out of the problem. This had been acknowledged as being ineffective as discussed in the previous chapter.

Braga *et al.* (1999 and 2001) discuss the importance of utilising peer pressure within groups or gangs to force change away from supporting violence to stopping violence resulting from disputes over territory, and issues of respect and disrespect with members
of other groups or gangs. Peer pressure can be a powerful tool when viewed from ‘both sides of the coin’. Young people can be pressured by their friends or peers into carrying out criminal acts in order to ‘fit in’ or to stop themselves being victimised. However, as Braga et al. (1999 and 2001) discuss, peer pressure can also be used positively. It is this positive approach that Glasgow CIRV was looking to replicate.

If a person from the gang commits an offence, the law enforcement message was that the whole gang would be targeted, not just the individual. All members of the gang had to take responsibility for the actions of everyone in the gang and the hope was that the gang as a whole would act as a deterrent on individuals and prevent violent acts from occurring. Anecdotal evidence that I gathered during my time in Glasgow CIRV tends to support this position. On one occasion, I was informed by a youth that he saw an incident in an area in the east end of the city, where one young male was in an argument with another and this led to one male chasing the other with an axe into a dead end street. He was about to assault the male, which, given the nature of the weapon, could have resulted in serious injury or worse, when he was stopped by other members of his gang. They were heard to say that they were all engaged in various activities with Glasgow CIRV and that they would all be blamed for the attack if it continued. This intervention by his peers stopped a serious violent act from being carried out and shows that the positive side of peer pressure can be effectively used (WG Personal Recollection).

The Enforcement Team were also responsible for the sharing of information across agencies and responding to gang-related violence as required. This included forging close ties with the newly formed Gangs Task Force of Strathclyde Police, who had a force-wide remit to tackle gangs:
We liaised quite regularly with the Gangs Task Force. When I joined the project, the Gangs Task Force were described as the enforcement arm of CIRV and part of the overall message of CIRV was that the violence must stop. But if it wasn’t a deal, the agreement was if the violence didn’t stop then it would be dealt with robustly, and part of that robust response would be using the Gangs Task Force. So they were quite an important element to the project.

(Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview)

In contrast, the US CIRV Law Enforcement Team appeared to be more robust in its role in the US CIRV structure. It was led by a senior police officer, who had complete autonomy to carry out appropriate actions and was located in the police department, as opposed to the structure in Glasgow CIRV, where the Law Enforcement Team was located in the central Glasgow CIRV office (not a police building) and was led by a police constable. The structure in Glasgow CIRV meant that the law enforcement response to any violent incident had to be negotiated with the local divisional, or the Gangs Task Force management, before any action could be taken. This led to some delay in any actions being carried out and disagreement about what was an appropriate response. These delays could then become such that any police or law enforcement action was detached from the actual incident and any effect was lessened (WG Personal Recollection).

Furthermore, the US CIRV Law Enforcement strategy did not just involve the police department but required a high level of commitment from the various organisations involved. These agencies included, the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office, Ohio Adult Parole Authority, Hamilton County Probation Department, Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office, the US Attorney’s Office and the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau (ATF) and was
supported by the Ohio State Attorney General’s Office and the Ohio Office of Criminal Justice Services. The organisations also gave the commitment to share information across agencies and consistently respond to group-related gun violence (CIRV Best Practices, 2008; Engel et al., 2008).

According to the US CIRV manager, the level of partnership-working between the law enforcement agencies was unprecedented in the city. It brought together the various agencies that had not previously worked together effectively and assisted the agencies in understanding the differing roles undertaken by them and how they could work together. The Cincinnati Probation Officer interviewed corroborated this view and commented on the increased and improved partnership-working between the law enforcement bodies:

I think the thing that came out of it for me that was the most beneficial was it got different agencies working together. It got different agencies and introduced agencies to each other that maybe hadn't worked together before. They learned a little about how we do things. We learned a little about how they do things and we figured out how to work together, to identify a problem and maybe attack that problem differently than we had in the past, rather than drive up, jump out, grab as many as you can, which was what it used to be, we learned ok let's identify who the leaders are and do controlled targeted enforcement and then bam, bam, bam, knock those guys off and see if we can't decrease the violence on that corner and that's what came of this. We learned a better way to do police work. We learned a better way to combat crime in my opinion. (Cincinnati Probation Officer Interview)
The increased and effective partnership-working was also commented on by a Cincinnati ATF Agent who stated that the relationship was unique:

The minute I got there, and the minute I saw what was going on, I was really intrigued by it. I thought it was a phenomenal programme and I thought it had tremendous potential. It was pretty unique. (Cincinnati ATF Agent Interview)

**The Community Team**

The Glasgow CIRV Community Team was also formed on a similar basis to that developed in Cincinnati for US CIRV. Its role was to form partnerships to work in and with the affected communities in the east end of Glasgow to express what the community believed to be normal behaviour. It was the intention of the Glasgow CIRV Community Team that its members would be chosen to represent various interests and groups within the community. Those identified included; community activists, religious leaders, elected officials, parents of affected children, voluntary groups and ex-offenders (WG Personal Recollection). However, the Community Team structure in Glasgow CIRV did not actually reach this level of staffing and was based in the central office. Hence, the US CIRV Community Team was stronger than that operated in Glasgow CIRV, in that it genuinely consisted of members of the community and was based in the local areas where it operated (WG Personal Recollection).

The US CIRV team also took a more active role in representing the ‘moral voice of the community’ and they used their collective influence and leadership talents to deliver the message to the community that the violence had to stop and also to ‘reject the norms and narratives of the street which promote violence’ (Engel et al., 2008).
Both Glasgow CIRV and US CIRV used the same key messages to deliver to the community though subtle differences in the wording between both existed as depicted in the table below:

**Table 2: Comparisons between Glasgow and Cincinnati messages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glasgow</th>
<th>Cincinnati</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>The violence must stop.</em></td>
<td><em>We need the violence to stop.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The community has had enough.</em></td>
<td><em>You are our sons, grandsons and nephews, we love you; we don’t want you to die; we don’t want you in prison.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>There are ways out of the violent lifestyle.</em></td>
<td><em>It causes unimaginable pain.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>There are no excuses for it.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>You are better than this.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: WG Personal Recollection and US CIRV Best Practice (2008)*

The above messages reflect the differing approaches adopted by both Glasgow and Cincinnati. The messages delivered by Glasgow CIRV were more direct in their tone while those delivered by US CIRV were more emotive.

Glasgow CIRV mainly used the ‘Call-In’ (or the ‘Self-Referral Session’ as it came to be known) to disseminate the key messages in addition to other key agencies and youth groups, which will be discussed later. However, US CIRV, while also using the key medium of the ‘Call-In’ sessions, used community service announcements on radio (see *Appendix*)
for example of the radio bulletin), Street Advocates verbally delivering the messages to those concerned, and finally pamphlets containing relevant information (see Appendix 13 for example of US CIRV pamphlet given to members of the community) (CIRV Best Practice, 2008).

US CIRV also used other mediums to communicate the message, for example, a simple phone call, which proved to be more effective than knocking on someone’s door:

Our message ...... was just [the] community picking up the phone and calling. They felt that knocking on doors was not the best approach. That people didn't necessarily like them knocking on their door. So the ones we reached were by phone or if they really knew the individual they didn't really have a problem, they would notice people on the street because they knew who individuals were talking to on the street. That has been our greatest challenge is figuring out how we get good information on a portion of the population. (Cincinnati Community Engagement Manager Interview)

Glasgow CIRV was much more cautious about the use of the media in disseminating the key messages, as demonstrated in instructions to Glasgow CIRV staff by senior VRU management that only they would be allowed to speak to the media. This facet of media management was strictly controlled by a Media Manager in the VRU and did not allow for any key messages to be broadcast in the same manner as in US CIRV, as will be discussed in the following chapter (WG Personal Recollection).

The Services Team

A Services Team formed the final strand of the Glasgow CIRV structure. Its main purpose was to form and provide a ‘life-change’ programme of services that attempted to engage
members of gangs involved in violence and tries to encourage them to move to an employment/education-based positive lifestyle. This constructive approach was designed to help provide an alternative lifestyle to those who had been caught up in gang life by providing a possible ‘way out’.

The team was comprised of members of education, social work services, and diversion and programme managers, working in conjunction with employment services to provide immediate and tailored services to individuals choosing to leave the life of violence. Glasgow CIRV also established a 24-hour support helpline number for gang members to seek help, which was supplied and managed by Glasgow Housing Association (Glasgow Housing Officer Interview).

In contrast, US CIRV had a different structure to that operated in Glasgow CIRV. The lead agency in Cincinnati was a non-profit making organisation, ‘Cincinnati Works’, who were tasked with conducting initial interviews and maintaining a case management system. They worked in conjunction with the Street Advocates who were also part of the Services Team. The Street Advocates had been established as a different initiative prior to US CIRV and had started out in Cincinnati after funding had been secured by the City Council. Their role was to deliver the non-violence message on the streets to gang members and those engaged with US CIRV and to ensure that they could access and utilise the required resources on offer. A Cincinnati Councilman explained their creation and role:

We called them street workers and the role of the street worker was to go into a neighbourhood, which is one of our most difficult areas, Over-The-Rhine in particular, meet those young men right on the corners, get in their heads, talk to them, find out what’s going on, gain trust and then see what we need to do to transition that young man from the streets to become a
productive member of society, so that was their role. (Cincinnati Councilman Interview)

The Councilman also recalled the role of the Street Advocates in US CIRV in relation to ‘Cincinnati Works’ in the early days of the initiative. He explained that the Street Advocates would escort the young men to ‘Cincinnati Works’ and remain with them while they were interviewed and their employment needs assessed. They would also accompany them to further interviews and ensured that they did not deviate from the path laid out for them:

They (Street Advocates) would come with the individual to ‘Cincinnati Works’, sit down with the individual along with the (Cincinnati Works) councillor. Have a blueprint basically, of that person’s life. Certain questions would tell the exact blueprint of what needed to occur and then it is up to the Street Advocate to take this individual by the hand and say we need to go over here to the Health Services. The Street Advocates would make sure that they stay on track and some really worked out with just getting a job, it worked out fine for some, but that was very rare and it continued to evolve. Each year we learned a little more and we were still evolving. (Cincinnati Councilman Interview)

‘Cincinnati Works’ provided a ‘one-stop-shop’ approach for the young men engaged with CIRV and the Street Advocates and was designed to provide services in an effort to place that person in employment:

What we would say to them is, before we can do anything we need to at least sit you down with an individual who can ask you the correct questions and find out just exactly where you are in your life. Because what we found out
was that just getting an individual a job did not work, because most of these guys had their street culture mentality, so when the boss says, “you have got to start being on time man”, they say “man, screw you. I don’t have to put up with this” and then they are out the door and they are back to the streets. So we had to work through all of the mess and we also found out that of those individuals that we had identified that fit the CIRV initiative, they had all kinds of other baggage. Mental issues, court issues, child support issues, just lack of skills, most of them had not been to school since ninth or tenth grade all these kinds of things. So we had to work through all of that with them.

(Cincinnati Councilman Interview)

This approach was different from that operated in Glasgow CIRV from the start of the project in 2008. However, following a site visit by Glasgow CIRV staff in April 2009 to Cincinnati, a change in focus for both projects took place. I have termed this phenomenon as a ‘back-flow of policy transfer’ from Glasgow to Cincinnati. This is a key finding of this research and will be fully analysed later in this thesis.

**Early Plans**

Early discussions around a launch date in Glasgow led to a decision being made to hold a ‘Call-In’ (later to be renamed a ‘Self-Referral Session’) session on the 24\textsuperscript{th} October 2008, which would be the official launch of Glasgow CIRV. This allowed the teams to focus on a projected date and work towards preparing for the outcomes of the session (WG Personal Recollection). As mentioned previously, I was responsible for the planning and
implementation of the ‘Call-In’ sessions in Glasgow and so held a series of meetings with various partners and agencies.

The Glasgow CIRV Manager and the Education and Social Work officials had observed the US CIRV ‘Call-In’ and their accounts of the session were important to what was being planned for Glasgow. It was the intention of the Glasgow CIRV team to copy the Cincinnati ‘Call-In’ model from the outset; however, it quickly became apparent that this would be problematic (WG Personal Recollection).

Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) pose the question regarding, ‘what restricts policy transfer?'; and in relation to the current research, it became apparent that the engagement model used in Cincinnati was one of compelling people to attend the session as a condition of their probation or parole. The persons identified did not have the option of refusing to attend the session, as failure to do so would result in their arrest for a parole or probation violation. This proved to be somewhat different from what was possible in Glasgow, as is explained below, and therefore, this part of the US CIRV model was not suitable for copying to Glasgow. This factor in the criminal justice system in Scotland was a key constraint that led to Glasgow CIRV having to change focus and move towards a process of emulation of US CIRV in order to accommodate the differences in the legal system in Scotland from that in America (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996 and 2000).

Scots Law allows for a person who is charged with an offence to be granted bail under the terms of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, Section 24, by the courts, which will allow them to remain in the community. In doing so, the court will take into account the nature and seriousness of the case and the individual’s history and circumstances. There are four standard conditions that a person released on bail must comply with:
I. To appear before the court on the due date as directed.

II. Not to commit a further offence.

III. Not to interfere with victims or witnesses, or in any other way, obstruct the course of justice.

IV. To make oneself available for interview as required for the completion of any reports requested by the court.

The court may also impose further conditions as considered appropriate and can include, for example, a requirement to stay at a designated address, restriction on the movements of the accused, prohibiting them from entering certain areas or places of residence or any other condition that the court may deem suitable (Bail Conditions, 1995).

Meetings with the Law Society of Scotland, a senior Glasgow Sheriff and the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service in Glasgow revealed resistance to the idea of compelling people to attend a ‘Call-In’ (‘Self-Referral Session’) in Glasgow. The reasons given, related to the fact that bail may only be imposed when a person is charged with an offence and is awaiting trial. If that person was then compelled, by using a bail condition imposed by the court to attend a ‘Call-In’ (‘Self-Referral Session’), where the message is about stopping violence, then it may be inferred that the person was admitting to being involved in illegal activities and may prejudice a fair trial at a later date (Glasgow CIRV Project Manager Interview).

This opposition by the judiciary effectively negated the idea that a person could be compelled to attend a ‘Call-In’ (‘Self-Referral Session’) in Glasgow. The Glasgow CIRV Manager commented that he still believed that people could be compelled to attend sessions, however, this point was met with stiff resistance from members of the judiciary:
We had many meetings with the Crown, with the PF (Procurator Fiscal), with Criminal Justice Social Work and I still believe that we could compel them to come in without any issues, but it wasn’t ever seen as an intervention that the Crown was happy to issue as a Bail condition. I pushed that door until I was blue in the face, and I still think there’s scope for it to be a Bail condition or as a disposal of the court or whatever it may be, but it’s just not something that I could ever find somebody within the justice environment that actually had that same belief that we could go down that road. (Glasgow CIRV Manager Interview)

The opposition to compel people to attend the ‘Call-In’ (‘Self-Referral Session’) in Glasgow led to a search for different ideas for engaging with young people and gaining their agreement to attend sessions. The first decision related to the term ‘Call-In’, as this term implied that people were ‘called’ to attend, and, as in Cincinnati, they did not have a choice. Indeed, in America, US CIRV did compel people to attend the ‘Call-In’ sessions as their parole conditions clearly stated that they must attend such sessions as and when dictated to them (Glasgow CIRV Project Manager Interview).

Clearly that was not possible in Glasgow. If anyone was going to attend such sessions in Glasgow, then they would be doing so because they agreed to attend voluntarily:

We couldn’t force people in and we had to engage far more in that front end and convince people in hearts and minds. We had to do it on a much broader range of people. (Glasgow VRU Director Interview)

A decision was made by the team to change the name of the ‘Call-In’ to ‘Self-Referral Session’, to reflect the voluntary nature of attendance at the Glasgow sessions (WG Personal Recollection).
This change in name reflects not only the differences in what was legally acceptable. The approach adopted by US CIRV appears to be tackling recidivism, by targeting those who had already committed violent crimes and thereafter trying to discourage them from doing so again. The approach in Glasgow CIRV was more of prevention, as well as recidivism, where those who may become involved in violence through their gang allegiance were targeted, as well as those who had committed violent crimes.

At this stage in the implementation of the Glasgow CIRV project, there was a realisation that it would not be possible to merely copy the US CIRV. Too many aspects of the model would have to change to become ‘fit for purpose’ for Glasgow and the local needs. When questioned on this matter, the VRU Director, commented that Glasgow CIRV had to take some key principles of US CIRV and apply them in the local context:

......we took some key principles and said okay you know the ‘Call-In’, the all levers, the co-ordination, the access, the target group, the evidence and diagnosis, we took all of that stuff and said, okay we need to do it in the context of not only Scotland but of Glasgow and the east end of Glasgow and be specific to there, and break it right down to the local needs. (Glasgow VRU Director Interview)

It is clear that at this point in the policy transfer process, Glasgow CIRV moved from a process of copying to one of emulation of US CIRV (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996 and 2000). The VRU Director is quite clear in the comments made above that they were aware that in order to make the process ‘fit’ the local needs of Glasgow, then they would have to adapt and thus emulate the US CIRV model rather than merely copy it as was first thought possible. This was due to the different and distinct legal framework in Scotland, amongst
other things, for example, the different gang membership and socio-economic situation in Glasgow.

The Glasgow CIRV project manager explains the process of *emulation* that was adopted after the realisation that *copying* would not suffice. The Project Manager used the phrase ‘tartanisation’, that reflected the manager’s understanding of the process. It was about making it ‘fit’ the local Scottish needs, especially in the east end of the city. The manager stated that it was looking at the US CIRV model in detail and making judgements about its suitability for Glasgow and that it was a process of adaptation and ensuring that it worked in the context of Glasgow, but with the same underlying principles of US CIRV:

> It wasn’t a lift and lay. It was a ‘tartanisation’ that was what it was. It was about…. unpacking it line by line from A to Z and then saying …. “Would A transfer to here? No. What do we need to do to A to make it transfer? If we tweak this tweak that, what’s our hybrid version of that? That’s us sorted A, now let’s move on to B”. It was very much unpicking it like a jigsaw and then rebuild it…. An adaptation, but very much in principle guided by their experience, their footprint, their understanding, and their knowledge. (Glasgow CIRV Manager Interview)

It is clear, therefore, that the Glasgow CIRV model was based on a process of *emulation* of US CIRV, which is defined as a ‘policy, programme or institution is not copied in detail but provides best practice to adopting actors’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 2000; Evans, 2009a). The US CIRV model was utilised as best practice and Glasgow CIRV management used US CIRV’s experiences, understanding and knowledge to shape the Glasgow model. This issue of *copying* then *emulation* will be discussed in detail later in this thesis when the question of different degrees of transfer is analysed.
Engagement

It became apparent early in the project that the police officers attached to the Enforcement Team would also have a dual role to play in the identification of people involved in violence and gangs. As discussed earlier in this thesis, the VRU had embarked on an intelligence gathering operation to identify those involved in gangs in the east end of the city (WG Personal Recollection). It was the policy of the Glasgow CIRV team that a potential ‘client’ (as the gang members engaging with Glasgow CIRV became known, as they would become a client or customer of the services on offer in the project) may be of any age and be either:

- A self-identified member of a ‘named’ territorial street gang ‘known’ to engage in violence and/or weapon carrying; or
- Identified by other members of that ‘named’ gang, or trusted members of the CIRV network (partners), as being such a member; or
- Self-identified as NOT being a member of a ‘known’ named territorial street but ‘known’ by the CIRV network to have engaged in occasional public space violence or weapon carrying with that gang; or
- Part of a loosely knit social network of individuals who, while not identifying themselves as a ‘known’ street gang, group themselves together in public places and are ‘known’ to engage in public space violence or weapon carrying (Glasgow CIRV Engagement Practice Note, 2009).

As such, Glasgow CIRV used the terms ‘violent groups’ and ‘gangs’ interchangeably. The use of the terms ‘named’ and ‘known’ in the above arises from the intelligence or
information that was gathered by the police and partners with regards to that particular person and/or gang. This intelligence or information was stored on a dedicated database (Excel Spreadsheet) that was maintained by the Glasgow CIRV intelligence analyst for use by the team and partners (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview).

As mentioned previously, the intelligence analysts, in co-operation with local police, had identified approximately 650 young people involved with 55 known gangs (see Appendix 2), aged between 12 and 26, with the peak ages identified as 14 - 18 years. The Glasgow CIRV Intelligence Practice Note (2010) explains that Glasgow CIRV concentrated its efforts on those gang members who, it was believed, posed the biggest risk to the community and themselves, due to them being ‘known’ to have engaged in violence as part of a gang as noted above. It was also decided to attempt to use the input of other gang members who possibly had the ability to influence their peers in a positive way. Intelligence suggested that the period of time that an individual engages in street gang activity, involving violence ranged from only sporadic involvement to such activity being an integral part of their life for a number of years. It was recognised that information relating to this form of activity could come from a variety of sources. Therefore, potential ‘clients’ were identified from various sources, including:

- The Scottish Intelligence Database (SID), Criminal History System (CHS) and the Strathclyde Police Crime Management System (CMS)
- Those identified by police officers working in the relevant target area as being members of a street gang
- Those identified by the CIRV network of partner contacts as being actively involved in street gang violence, subject to the professional judgement of CIRV staff as to their actual level of involvement
Those identified by other CIRV clients as being actively involved in street gang violence, subject to the professional judgement of CIRV staff as to their actual level of involvement (Glasgow CIRV Intelligence Practice Note, 2010).

The database of ‘known’ gang members was then used in the engagement process and was maintained by a full-time police Intelligence Analyst appointed to Glasgow CIRV. Its use and importance were acknowledged by one of the police officers that worked with Glasgow CIRV:

There was a lot of intelligence already in existence. The intelligence came from police officers out in the community who were recording the membership of gangs and the activities and the rivalries, the areas that they operated in. There was additional intelligence or additional information that looked at the mapping of the gangs and where they were in the sub-division. There was some work by the VRU visiting the local police offices and speaking to Community Police Officers like myself at the time and identifying these gangs and their territories and, what relationship they had with neighbouring gangs. Also, there was my own knowledge and my own experience of these guys and what I could bring to it. (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview)

The type of information and how it was gathered reflects a similar pattern of intelligence gathering in Cincinnati by the US CIRV team. They also relied on the information provided by local police officers to ‘pull together’ relevant intelligence. The information contained on the Glasgow CIRV database, was used by the officers who began to identify appropriate
people to approach to ascertain if they would be willing to attend the ‘Self-Referral Session’ (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview).

The development of a database in Glasgow CIRV, to collate relevant information and intelligence on gang members who were involved in violence, is similar to that operated as part of US CIRV, which was developed by the University of Cincinnati students and staff, as discussed previously. The police captain responsible for the operational aspects of US CIRV commented:

    We talked to probation and parole regularly, not only do we have our beat cops. After we compile the list, we meet with our specialised units, homicide take a look at it, we have narcotics take a look at it and they can add and subtract if they see fit. So we are quite comfortable when we make the final list that it is very representative of our gang problem. (Cincinnati Police Captain Interview)

This information was used by the US CIRV agencies to compel those on the list to attend the ‘Call-In’ sessions as part of their parole or probation conditions as mentioned above. Such sharing of information was also important to Glasgow CIRV and its effectiveness. The intelligence database was open to the partners working within Glasgow CIRV and the information contained therein was added to by the agencies involved, including Education and Social Work. Strict guidelines were put in place within the Glasgow CIRV team to ensure the intelligence held in the database was managed and its integrity maintained. Also, in order for this information sharing between partners, who in the past were not open to such collaboration, to work effectively, an information sharing protocol was drafted and agreed. This ensured that all up to date information on the relevant people was stored and was available to the Glasgow CIRV team in their efforts to engage
with them (WG Personal Recollection).

Safeguards were also put in place to ensure that the information contained in the database was not available to police to use in their normal police duties. This was to prevent misuse of information, provided by partners, by police officers. On one occasion, the Glasgow CIRV office was contacted by a police officer from the local division who had heard that a person was attending a Glasgow CIRV ‘Self-Referral Session’. This police officer wanted to interview the person in relation to an incident that the officer was investigating. The decision was made not to allow the police officer to approach the person at the session as this would compromise the information held on him and could jeopardise future engagement (WG Personal Recollection).

This sharing of intelligence and information between partner agencies was unique to Glasgow CIRV, as this information could also benefit other agencies in their efforts to work with their ‘clients’. For example, data gathered could be shared with Education or Social Work that they did not have and so aided their efforts to provide a better service for that person. The situation in US CIRV was different from Glasgow CIRV as the database developed there, by the university staff, was for the use of the police only and not shared with other agencies outside the law enforcement circle.

In light of the decision to change the name of the session, and the fact that any person who attended did so voluntarily, the engagement process had to become more about encouragement rather than coercion. People had to agree to attend the sessions and not be pressured to attend. They had to be ‘sold’ on the idea and what services were on offer for them if they attended as explained by the VRU Director, who commented that it also involved using the services of youth and street workers:
Well, we couldn’t compel people to go, so that was a big, big difference. So we had to convince people and that brought in good community cops doing their job and going beyond it. It brought in good youth workers and good street workers like, Jimmy Wilson up at FARE\(^4\),... good guys who saw that and were out there doing it and saying “oh aye right we could do that” and connect to that. (Glasgow VRU Director Interview)

This facet of the engagement process, and the voluntary nature of the attendance at the session was noted by the police officer responsible for the engagement process:

It was all voluntary and going back to something I alluded to. We planned the initial ‘Call-In’ (Self-Referral Session) along the same lines as the American version where offenders were compelled to attend as part of their probation and they were forced to attend. We looked into various legislative ways that we could do that and we found that it was just not practical. We weren’t able to do it that way. So at no time were we able to compel anybody to attend, it was voluntary and that was made clear to them right from the beginning.

(Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview)

As already mentioned, this is a significant difference from that operated in US CIRV, as the people attending the ‘Call-In’ Sessions did so because they were compelled to attend as part of their parole or probation conditions and did not have a choice, as opposed to the voluntary nature of the Glasgow CIRV ‘Self-Referral Sessions’.

The Parole Officer attached to US CIRV explained the process that was adopted to ensure

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\(^4\) FARE – Families Around Rogerfield and Easterhouse is a charitable organisation that works with young people and gang members in the Rogerfield area of Easterhouse, in the east end of Glasgow. They helped to provide services for young people that had been identified by Glasgow CIRV and work with them to move them away from gangs and violence.
that the person attended the ‘Call-In’ session. After the initial meetings with the team, a written order would be served on the person and they were warned that failure to attend would result in an arrest and they would spend time in the local prison (Cincinnati Parole Officer Interview).

US CIRV also worked with the Probation Service to identify and engage with those they required to attend the ‘Call-In sessions. They also utilised their powers to enforce and compel attendance:

I think that (US) CIRV needs the probation department, because we are the only ones that have the power to make people show up, because they are on probation and basically our job was to help come up with the initial CIRV list of people, put them into groups.... So we would help put the people where they belong and then when they wanted to have a call in session, run the names, if they are on probation, we would make them go. That was it, that’s what we did, which is a huge part, because that’s kind of the whole thing. (Cincinnati Probation Officer Interview)

These comments by the Cincinnati Probation officer seem to indicate that they believed that they were the key agency in the engagement process. The Probation Department believed that they were the only agency that had the power to compel people to attend the US CIRV ‘Call-In’, which is not reflected in the comments by the Police and Parole departments, who also state they were key to the engagement process. Later comments by the probation officer indicated that his department pulled out of US CIRV as they could not sustain the efforts and staffing levels that were required for the continued involvement without financial recompense:
We are out of it right now. I will do a couple of favours for people here and there, but we are not active.... There is a CIRV grant and a CIRV budget. When this first started we kind of did it as an in-kind service. We felt like it was part of our duty as the law enforcement community to participate, so we participated when it was 300 names. It was manageable, then it got bigger...., so it was taking up to 10, 15, 20% of our time of which we are not being compensated for. Cincinnati Police Department are getting overtime to do this. They actually detail officers to do this. I can’t do that. My officers have a job. They can’t get their job done in the 40 hours I give them. I certainly can’t give them an additional job to do and then on top of it, ask them to do it for nothing, so it no longer fits our budget. (Cincinnati Probation Officer Interview)

The decision by the Cincinnati Probation Service to pull back from US CIRV seems to indicate a ‘fracturing’ of the partnership-working approach that was at the heart of the US CIRV model. However, this was not apparent to me during my field research and did not seem to have a negative impact on the project at the time as it was still operating.

**Use of Partner Agencies in Glasgow**

It was acknowledged early in the establishment of Glasgow CIRV that in order to address the core aim to reduce violent gang offending in the east end of the city, the police could not be the only engagement agency. Those identified, through the intelligence and analysis process as outlined above, were the subject of ‘targeted’ engagement. As noted by the VRU Director, this task did not just involve the police officers, it also involved using
the contacts in the community, for example, youth workers and social workers, indeed any person who had a relationship with a person who could attend the ‘Self-Referral Session’. Those gang members who agreed to engage had to sign a pledge to stop the violence, which indicated that they would agree to stop the violence and that they gave their permission for members of the team to share certain information with partner agencies (see Appendix 14).

The task of engaging and ‘signing up’ young people to attend the (forthcoming) ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ did not fall primarily to the police officers attached to the Glasgow CIRV enforcement team. Any source was considered as a tool for engagement, including youth groups and workers, for example, FARE as previously mentioned, education officers, social workers and ‘Careers Scotland’ key workers. The task of identifying and gaining the assistance of these sources was allocated to the police officers in Glasgow CIRV. A starting point for the engagement was the local areas that the officers attached to Glasgow CIRV had worked in the community. They also relied on their personal knowledge of people involved, including their friends and families to try to identify any mechanism, reason or lever to aid their efforts to engage them in the project:

Looking at the gangs I knew were mostly active. I started off with the gangs that I knew, which were round about Parkhead and Tollcross, having some personal knowledge of the members of that gang, what they were like. I had a fair idea who I would be able to engage and who I wouldn’t be able to engage, to build up a bit of intelligence on them. To find out about them and their families and anyone else they were involved with, try to identify as many levers as we could to aid our engagement and then ultimately we had to go out and knock on their door and speak to them and explain the project
to them and try and convince them it was worthwhile. (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview)

However, as explained by one of the officers, this did not prove to be easy, especially when trying to talk to people in the streets; as they were in their ‘own environment’ and with their peers, they had to maintain the persona that they did not like or co-operate with the police. It was only when they could be spoken to privately in their own homes, that the officers could develop a rapport with them, and encourage them to take part in Glasgow CIRV:

These guys, as you can imagine, have a lot of issues. Their lives are chaotic at best. Part of the difficulty is getting a hold of them and actually getting them in their house and getting them in an environment where you could actually speak to them. That was difficult, but when I did have a face to face with the targets, the young people in their homes, mostly then I was able to develop a good rapport with them and convince that it was worthwhile in them taking part. There were issues with different places and different areas. For instance, if I tried to speak to a group of gang members together in their own environment, where they were comfortable I found it more difficult to engage them because there was always this attitude about not wanting to speak to the police or not wanting to be seen to be working with the police. (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview)

Furthermore, the officer stated that they did have some limited success with some gangs, where they could encourage or engage with an influential member of the gang and persuade him that it was worthwhile to attend the ‘Self-Referral Session’ then other gang members would ‘follow’ that person to the sessions (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview)
According to the police constable this approach, along with using other partners and people who worked with the young people, appeared to be the most successful way of engagement, to attend the ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ or indeed, sign-up with the project. He explained that using people from other agencies increased the chances of encouraging the young people to engage as they usually had a different, and better, relationship with them than they did with the police:

Being able to use other people, partly to increase the resources we had available to us and to increase the options. What I mean by that is that two Housing Officers may have a different approach to speak to a young guy who’s involved in a gang than a police officer would. Their reactions to the Housing Officers would be different as well. In many cases, using different people from different partners could become more effective than using cops by themselves. We used them quite a lot. (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview)

The engagement processes adopted by Glasgow CIRV, and its partners, had some success with the ‘face to face’ approach. This approach allowed staff to explain what Glasgow CIRV was all about and allay any fears that people may have, especially in relation to the involvement of the police, as the very people they were trying to engage with had always viewed them with some suspicion in the past:

The initial engagement and all of it was a learning curve. Initially we managed to engage, as in speak to a good number of people and I think we were looking at a 120 odds young people for that first ‘Call-In’ and this was adult sixteen and above …. agreed to attend that ‘Call-In’ and agreed to engage. So in terms
of getting that initial agreement and getting them to agree to being engaged
I think it was successful. That face-to-face meeting enabled us to describe
exactly what was involved in it and to sell the project to them and make them
see that it was worthwhile to them. That was successful. (Glasgow CIRV
Police Constable Interview)

The numbers that agreed to attend the first two ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ in Glasgow, on
24th October 2008 did not reflect the actual number of those who did attend. A total of 95
attended the morning session out of 120 who were invited. However, it should be noted
that they represented young people under 16 who were in school and were brought to
the session by school staff, so there was an element of being a ‘captured audience’. The
second session in the afternoon on the same day was for adults over the age of 16 and 40
attended out of 100 who had been invited. A full evaluation of the ‘Self-Referral Sessions’
is detailed in the next chapter.

Conclusions

This chapter has discussed the mechanisms and implementation of the policy transfer
that brought Glasgow CIRV from America by a process of copying then emulation as
defined by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000). It looked at the fact finding missions,
albeit somewhat limited, that took place by members of the VRU and city agencies that
would play a key role in the formation of Glasgow CIRV. This research has indicated that
some members of the team were of the opinion that US CIRV should be copied from the
outset, while others, were looking to see how it would ‘fit’ in with the local context in
Glasgow.
This chapter has also discussed in detail the process of team building in Glasgow CIRV and the services that were put in place, modelled on US CIRV. The US CIRV structure was particularly appealing to the Glasgow CIRV manager, as the structures in Cincinnati, developed by Proctor and Gamble executives, and had provided focus and sustainability for US CIRV to move forward. The Glasgow CIRV manager copied this business model, as he saw it as an efficient and sensible structure for Glasgow.

The role of academics in the US CIRV project was also noted to be an important point and it was apparent from my research that the role of university staff and students in US CIRV caused some initial controversy in the Cincinnati Police Department. On their introduction, some officers displayed some elements of ‘cop culture’ as discussed by Reiner (2000), with aspects of ‘isolationism’ and ‘suspicion’ apparent in the officers’ behaviour who did not like to work with ‘outsiders’. However, the police captain quickly overcame these barriers when the university staff and students demonstrated their ability to help the police.

Other aspects of the importance of academic influence at the outset of US CIRV can be seen in the development of robust evaluation techniques being built into the project. This allowed oversight officials and managers to have incontrovertible data at their disposal to react if necessary and to provide full evaluation reports to interested parties. It is apparent that this was not the case in Glasgow CIRV, which may have had an impact on sustainability, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Enforcement is another area of comparison that seems to have been underplayed in Glasgow as opposed to Cincinnati. US CIRV had a strong law enforcement ethos with multiple partners and was led by a senior police captain. Glasgow CIRV, on the other hand, did look to build partnerships with other criminal justice agencies, for example, the
Procurator Fiscal, police (both local and at force level) and Glasgow City Council enforcement agencies. However, it was led by a police constable who had to negotiate responses with local police commanders should the need arise, which led to a ‘watered down’ response to violent incidents. This is an aspect of Glasgow CIRV that was not fully developed and was not pursued with any vigour by the team and the police in particular. This aspect of Glasgow CIRV seemed to pay ‘lip service’ to the law enforcement message and relied upon those attending the ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ to believe what they were being told by the police about what would happen should they engage in violence crime, rather than actually delivering the ‘strong’ response in reality.

The Community Team structures in both Cincinnati and Glasgow may have looked the same on paper, but the structures and development of US CIRV out-weigh and out-strip built in Glasgow CIRV. The main differences are the definite links to the local community in US CIRV with the teams actually based in the communities and comprised of people who were vocal in their own community. Glasgow CIRV, on the other hand, was based in the central office and had very few links with, and staff from, the local communities.

The Services Team structure in Glasgow CIRV was based on a case management system that was developed differently from US CIRV. It was designed to take into account the personal and social needs of each individual and allocate resources and services as required. This was in contrast to US CIRV that operated a one-stop-shop approach through a separate non-profit making organisation, ‘Cincinnati Works’, which concentrated on employability issues only. However, following a site visit by Glasgow CIRV staff, including me, in 2009, a change of focus for both projects took place, in what I have termed a ‘back-flow of policy transfer’ and which is fully analysed later in this thesis.
McAra (2008: 481) comments on the different and distinct legal framework that exists in Scotland as it has a ‘separate criminal justice and penal system from that of England/Wales, but it also has a distinctive history in terms of crime control, penal policy and criminological scholarship’. This difference in the Scottish legal system led to a name change for the ‘Call-In’ session on Glasgow CIRV to a ‘Self-Referral Session’, to reflect the voluntary nature of engagement in Glasgow, as opposed to the requirements of people to attend the US CIRV ‘Call-In’ sessions. It was at this point that there was a realisation that the Glasgow CIRV project could not be copied from US CIRV, but would have to be an emulation of its best practices (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996 and 2000).

The engagement processes in both projects were discussed and the similarities and differences highlighted. Both projects used police intelligence as a baseline for the identification of relevant people to ‘target’ or approach and gathered information from various sources, including police and other agencies, both statutory and voluntary and in the case of Glasgow, schools were also a useful source of information about gang membership.

The legal constraints placed on Glasgow CIRV, for engagement and to invite people to attend the ‘Self-Referral Sessions’, also led to a recognition that Glasgow CIRV project staff could not do it all alone. Other sources of contact were sought with varying degrees of success, with both statutory and voluntary agency staff assisting in approaching people to attend sessions. This is a major difference from US CIRV as they relied on police and probation information as their main source of ‘clients’ and compelled them to attend the ‘Call-In’.

The ‘Self-Referral Session’ in Glasgow CIRV and the ‘Call-In’ session in US CIRV will be fully discussed in the next chapter, which will also examine the case management
processes in both projects and the differences in the services that were on offer to those who positively engaged with the projects. The enforcement aspect of both projects will also be examined and any similarities and differences outlined along with the relevant policing principles and legal constraints.
Chapter 7 - Outcomes of Policy Transfer

Introduction

The previous chapter analysed how Glasgow CIRV designed and implemented the policy transfer from Cincinnati of the new approach to deal with gang-related violence. It analysed the early lessons and the fact-finding visit to Cincinnati by members of the Glasgow CIRV team and how this visit and their experiences influenced their initial thoughts on how the initiative should be transferred to Glasgow. At the outset, this involved copying the US CIRV model, more specifically, the structures and ethos behind it. However, it was also noted that from an early point in the process, it became apparent that copying the US CIRV approach in its entirety was not possible due to various constraints, including the different legal system in Scotland and societal factors in relation to the engagement of those people approached. Therefore, Glasgow CIRV adopted a process of emulation as defined by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) as something that is not copied in detail, but provides best practice to adopting actors.

As in the previous chapters, a subset of the questions posed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) in their discussion of policy transfer will be utilised to provide a framework for this discussion, specifically:

- What was transferred?
- Were there different degrees of transfer?
- Did anything restrict the policy transfer?

This chapter provides a ‘rich’ description of and critically analyses the outcomes in that emerged in relation to the programme of violence reduction that was transferred from
Cincinnati to Glasgow. It also examines the similarities and differences of the outcomes of both cities and discusses any constraints or restrictions that affected the eventual shape of Glasgow CIRV, for example, legal and social-economic factors, that emerged from the transfer of the policy from Cincinnati to Glasgow. It should be noted at this point that the outcomes, discussed here, do not relate to the evaluation of Glasgow CIRV, but to the resultant policy transfer features.

The chapter examines how Glasgow CIRV communicated the key messages to the local community and those they wished to engage with. Specifically, it provides an in-depth analysis of the ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ in Glasgow and how they evolved from the process of emulation of the US CIRV ‘Call-In’ sessions, as outlined in the previous chapter. It also critically discusses the aftermath of the sessions from the official launch of Glasgow CIRV in October 2008 and analyses the structures put in place to deal with the young people engaging with Glasgow CIRV. In doing so, it examines the case management process and discusses the similarities and differences with US CIRV. The services and support programmes in Glasgow were quite distinct from that on offer in US CIRV and are analysed to ascertain their effectiveness and the differences from those on offer in US CIRV. As previously mentioned, the ethos in Glasgow CIRV was one of prevention, as well as deterrence, and it was felt that it would be beneficial to try to get the message out to young people of school age. This was in contrast to the approach in US CIRV, which only concentrated efforts on adults aged 16 and over who had been through the court system and had been found guilty of violent offences.

The enforcement principles proved to be significantly different in Glasgow from those in Cincinnati, where US CIRV used the police and other law enforcement agencies to deal
with gangs. Therefore, relevant laws and policing tactics in Glasgow will be discussed to highlight the differences and their impact.

The chapter also discusses the change of focus for Glasgow following a visit to Cincinnati in April 2009, which led to Glasgow CIRV altering its operations to mirror US CIRV, where a ‘one-stop-shop’ approach to service provision was in operation. This followed a project management exercise that was carried out as a result of the visit and recommendations that were made to expand operations and direction, including the mentoring provision in Glasgow.

Ironically, this visit to Cincinnati by Glasgow CIRV team members, including me, had a direct impact on the US CIRV approach, as they subsequently changed their direction and operations as a result of what was operating in Glasgow. This suggests a process of ‘back-flow of policy transfer’, a feature named by me, which does not appear to have been documented before in the field of international criminal justice policy transfer, and a key finding of this research. This feature will be analysed in detail in this chapter, along with the issues of funding and sustainability, as it is apparent that this change of focus and direction by both projects had an impact on sustainability, especially for Glasgow CIRV; Glasgow CIRV ceased operations in July 2011, while Cincinnati is still operating, albeit after resolving a funding issue that stopped the project for a period of time.

**Communicating the Messages Directly to Gang Members**

As previously mentioned, the Glasgow CIRV objective (Glasgow CIRV 6 Month Report, 2009: 2), was to ‘dramatically and quickly reduce the frequency of street violence in the east end of Glasgow’ and to attempt to continually reduce this frequency over time. In
order to achieve this objective, Glasgow CIRV acted as a central coordination unit for law enforcement, statutory agencies, service providers and community representatives to ensure that those who did participate in violence were dealt with appropriately by the law enforcement agencies, while those who made the decision to engage with Glasgow CIRV and its partners were given assistance, depending on their circumstances.

The main method that Glasgow CIRV used to communicate the key messages to the gangs in the target area of the city was the ‘Self-Referral Session’ while in US CIRV this was named a ‘Call-In’ session, as discussed previously. The ‘Call-In’ approach was seen as a major departure from routine policing and law enforcement in Cincinnati, with the Cincinnati ex-Police Chief stating that he used a specific message (see Appendix 15) when speaking to the people at the ‘Call-In’, concentrating on offering the people in the room a chance to change the way they conduct themselves and outlining that the police would help but would pursue the whole gang should they continue to engage in violence (Cincinnati Retired Police Chief Interview).

Glasgow CIRV adopted the same approach as US CIRV with similar messages being delivered at the ‘Self-Referral Session’. The session was designed to suit the local context in Glasgow and its main focus was to demonstrate the availability of services for those choosing to get out of ‘gang life,’ the expectations of the community and the consequences for them should the violent acts continue. This again was similar to the US CIRV ‘Call-In’ sessions.

The session speakers asked to take part in Glasgow followed a similar pattern as set out in US CIRV guidelines, to ensure that the Glasgow CIRV key messages were communicated to those attending the session. It was the stated expectation in the session that those in
attendance would pass on those messages to their peers. The key messages delivered in the session were:

- There is a new law enforcement strategy. For any subsequent act of violence, every member of the group will be pursued to the fullest extent of the law.
- The community has had enough. Stop the violence. Stop the killing, there is no excuse.
- There is help available. There are ways out. (Glasgow CIRV Self-Referral Session Practice Note, 2010)

It is worth noting that the first point, regarding a new enforcement strategy in Glasgow, appeared to be more of a threat rather than carrying any legal weight. However, in later enforcement operations, which will be discussed later in this research, attempts were made to indeed target ‘whole gangs’, rather than individuals, though it will be argued that this approach was never fully implemented and was more of a threat than actuality (WG Personal Recollection).

**Glasgow CIRV Official Launch**

The date chosen for the first session in Glasgow was the 24th October 2008 and in a similar fashion to US CIRV, where the ‘Call-In’ sessions were held in the County Court House in Cincinnati, Glasgow Sheriff Court was selected as the venue for the ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ for a variety of different reasons, not least of which was safety and security, to protect the
safety and anonymity of those young people attending and the guests alike (WG Personal Recollection).

Glasgow CIRV launched their programme by holding this inaugural ‘Self-Referral Session’ just 15 months after US CIRV launched their programme by holding their first ‘Call-In’ session on 31st July 2007. In Glasgow, it was planned to hold two sessions on the day, with the first of those for young people under 16 years of age. The second session in the afternoon would be for adults of 16 years and over. Planning commenced as soon as the decision was made to change the name of the ‘Call-In’ to the ‘Self-Referral Session’, as discussed in the previous chapter, and on how to effectively engage with the young people as previously discussed (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview and WG Personal Recollection).

The Glasgow CIRV 6 Month Report (2009) comments on the nature of the relationship that Glasgow CIRV had with the media in the run-up to the first ‘Self-Referral Session’. The report states that due to the sensitive nature of Glasgow CIRV, every effort was made to keep information about the project from the media in the early stages, as some young people who had been invited to attend the session stated that they would not do so if the media were present. Therefore, the VRU Media Manager handled all such requests, as it was important to limit this information to the media and public (Glasgow CIRV 6 Month Report, 2009).

However, later sessions did attract a lot of media interest, with journalists reporting on the sessions and the project in general in newspapers, magazines, television and radio. For example, Mrs Cherie Blair, the wife of the British Ex-Prime Minister, Tony Blair, filmed a documentary for a Channel 4 Television ‘Dispatches’ programme about Glasgow CIRV,
sitting in the courtroom observing the ‘Self-Referral Session’, (but not recording) and later interviewing Glasgow CIRV staff and participants of the session (Channel 4, 2009).

An operational guide was devised early in the project that would assist in the planning of the event. This was copied from the US CIRV model and thereafter adapted and reworked to suit the local needs of Glasgow (see Appendix 16). The plan was designed to lay down guidelines for the four weeks prior to and for the week after the session. However, actual planning for the first session began at least three months before it was scheduled to take place.

In originally copying the model developed by US CIRV, it was the intention of the Glasgow CIRV team to invite members of different gangs to the session to attempt to ‘widen the net’ and spread the messages to as many people as possible. However, bringing so many ‘opposing factions’ together in one room had its attendant issues and problems (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview). There was also a stated intention for the police to portray an ‘image of strength’ to all in attendance on the day, especially the gang member, involving co-ordinating police resources from a variety of departments, including the three policing divisions surrounding the court building; Strathclyde Police Support Services, in the form of the police helicopter, Territorial Policing Group, Mounted Branch, Dog Branch and the Marine section, with the police river launch nearby (the court building in Glasgow sits on the River Clyde), in addition to the police officers already on court duty. Other law enforcement agencies also provided resources, with Glasgow City Council Enforcement officers providing a uniform presence nearby and the use of the mobile CCTV unit from Glasgow Community and Safety Services (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview; WG Personal Recollection).
The use of the courtroom, as with the US CIRV, was intended to give a certain gravitas to the occasion, especially with the Sheriff, in full judicial regalia, sitting on the bench. The presence of the Sheriff, as an authority figure, reinforces the conduct expected of those in attendance in the courtroom and would assist in ensuring that the conduct of the gang members remained calm and no one would attempt to disrupt the proceedings (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview).

Facing the public seating area, where gang members would be seated, was the ‘well of the court’, where the legal teams usually sit and seating was arranged there for the invited guests. These guests were chosen from a variety of agencies, both statutory and voluntary, which represented those who could provide assistance to the gang members to ‘change their lives’ to a more positive lifestyle. Also in attendance were members of the community who could ‘testify to the damage caused to them and the places they lived in’ (Glasgow CIRV Self-Referral Session Practice Note, 2010: 4).

This set-up was designed as a copy of the US CIRV ‘Call-In’ session as described by the Glasgow CIRV Project Manager, who had observed the US CIRV ‘Call-In’ session in operation on his visit to Cincinnati earlier in 2008, discussed in the previous chapter. The unusual nature of the event was commented on by two academics, in attendance at the first sessions, who noted the heavy police presence outside the building with mounted, airborne and river police, and inside the courtroom, including the use of metal detectors before anyone could enter (Donnelly and Tombs, 2008: 1419).
The First ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ in Glasgow

As noted earlier, the first sessions were planned for the 24th October 2008, with the first in the morning for those young people less than 16 years of age and also included those young people who were 16 or 17 years’ old who were on supervision as a result of a Supervision Order imposed by the Children’s Hearing System. This supervision order had the effect of treating the relevant people as being children and under the care of the Children’s Hearing System (SCRA).

This decision, to keep young people away from adults, followed discussions with the Reporter to the Children’s Panel (SCRA) for the east and north of Glasgow, due to legal constraints regarding not allowing children under 16 to be in the same courtroom as adults. The Reporter made the point that the law in Scotland states that children less than 16 must be treated as children and not be dealt with alongside adults:

One of the things we were quite sensitive about…..is the application of the law. I think that although we did welcome the initiative, we still wished the law of Scotland to be maintained….. We obviously believe in the Children’s Hearing System and Reporters making decisions about children….. Please remember that we do have a different youth justice system in Scotland and we were trying to make that point by saying look we still see these people as children in the first instance and we have a system here that is well placed to deal with them. (Glasgow Children’s Panel Reporter Interview)

The second session, in the afternoon, was for adults of 16 years of age and over and included some prisoners from Polmont Young Offenders Institute (YOI), brought to the court, under guard, especially for the session. The prisoners came of their own accord
after being invited to attend by Glasgow CIRV and prison staff. It was anticipated on the
day that eight prisoners would attend, but one prisoner decided on the morning of the
session to stay at the prison (WG Personal Recollection).

Those identified to attend the first session primarily comprised young people from the
secondary schools in the east of the city and had been identified. The Glasgow CIRV staff
had compiled a list of known gang members from intelligence, as discussed in a previous
chapter. They thereafter attended each secondary school in the area and spoke to the
Head Teachers, who were asked if they would allow the young people on the list to attend
the ‘Self-Referral Session’ and also if they could identify any other person in their schools
who may benefit from attending, which they all agreed to do (Glasgow CIRV Police
Constable Interview).

It was the aim of Glasgow CIRV to address the issues of gang violence with younger people
in an effort to try to prevent them from becoming engaged in gangs and violence as they
got older. It has been discussed earlier in this thesis that gang membership in Glasgow is
generational and it was felt by Glasgow CIRV management that it may be beneficial to try
to ‘break the links’ with gangs that their older brothers, fathers and uncles may have been
actively involved with. Once the headteachers agreed to participate, the schools
undertook to approach the parents of the young people to inform them of the purposes
of the session and gain their approval, as it was necessary to have parental permission to
allow the school children to attend the session. Of the 120 young people invited to attend
the first session, 95 attended on the day (Glasgow CIRV Education Officer Interview;
Glasgow CIRV Self-Referral Practice Note, 2010).

The recognition that the message delivery to the young people under 16 years of age had
to be different, was acknowledged by the police constable responsible for their
engagement in Glasgow after discussions and concerns raised by the Reporter to the Children’s Panel for the area, in relation to having children in the same courtroom as adults. The Reporter also expressed concerns that the graphic images that would be shown during the presentations could cause some suffering or distress to the children. However, assurances were given that the message delivery would be appropriate for children and permission was given to proceed:

We split adults and juveniles and had them in separate sessions. We delivered the same messages. However, we delivered them slightly differently to make them more age appropriate. We watered down a bit the violence message to the young people. A lot of the young people that we had attending there, were from schools and were perhaps on the periphery of gangs rather than being involved in gangs directly and what we didn’t want to do was perhaps come down too hard on them and to make too much of an issue of the gang problem. Whereas the adults were actively involved and the message had to be strong and firm. (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview)

The inclusion of young people under the age of 16 was distinctly different from US CIRV, who did not engage or invite that age group to their ‘Call-In’ sessions and concentrated on adults. The Glasgow Education Officer attached to Glasgow CIRV on the site visit to Cincinnati in April 2009 noted this fact, who spoke to a local Cincinnati police officer and ascertained that US CIRV had no dealings with children, though each school had a Youth Engagement team who dealt with social, emotional and behavioural needs of the children. The Education Officer also commented on the provision of services for school children less than 16 years of age, which had a clear message about guns and gang violence, though
this had nothing to do with US CIRV and they (the police involved) had never heard of US CIRV (Glasgow Education Officer Interview).

The comments made to the Glasgow Education Officer by a Cincinnati Police Department officer attached to a local school, suggest that US CIRV was not well publicised in the Cincinnati education system, or its role known widely even in the police department.

The second session for adults, run by Glasgow CIRV in the afternoon of the launch day, was designed to deliver a stronger message with a large number of gang members from various gangs being invited to attend the session. The Glasgow CIRV police constable explained that they were invited from different gangs in the area because the gangs were not large enough to be invited on their own individually. This meant inviting potential rival gangs, with the resultant logistical problems in ensuring the event remained non-violent and orderly:

They were taken from different gangs. There was no one gang that was large enough to take up a whole ‘Call-In’ or ‘Self-Referral Session’5. We were forced to use different gangs and we were forced to use gangs who were perhaps rivals and there were logistical issues in keeping those gangs apart and policing them in order to ensure that everyone was safe on the day. (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview)

This view of the reasons for inviting members of different gangs, is in contrast to the official reasons as stated in the Glasgow CIRV 6 Month Report (2009), which maintained that it was the stated intention of Glasgow CIRV to engage with members of differing

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5 It has been noted that some interviewees in Glasgow sometimes referred to the ‘Self-Referral Session’ as a ‘Call-In’ and sometimes interchanged the terms. This stems from early days of the project in Glasgow when it was the intention of Glasgow CIRV to call the session a ‘Call-In’, copying the US CIRV model (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996 and 2000).
gangs in order to ‘widen the net’ and have those in attendance pass on the key messages to others not at the session.

The police officer went on to state that although a large number (120) had been invited to attend, only 40 actually did attend. The officers put forward various reasons for the non-attendance, for example, some transport and logistical problems and the poor weather on the day. However, the officer further commented that the initial contact with them had been some weeks before the planned session and that there had been a lack of further contact with them in the intervening period. The officer stated that this was a learning point, that it was important to maintain regular contact with them to encourage and support them. This role was meant to have been fulfilled by mentors or street advocates, similar to US CIRV, prior to the session, but Glasgow CIRV did not have a mentoring system in place, which appears to be a failing, as will be discussed later in this Chapter (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview).

The VRU Director also commented on the attendance issues for the session in the afternoon for the adults and his fear that no one would turn up and the difficulties faced due to the heavy rain. This was relevant because the Glasgow CIRV team had arranged with those who had agreed to attend to be at certain ‘pick-up’ points:

The first one we weren’t sure if anybody would turn up you know or would be overwhelmed and it was a miserable day, it was raining and we bused people in and it was a real “oh s**t, how many are here and how’s it going to work?” But it worked and it was really powerful. (Glasgow VRU Director Interview)
In a similar format to that carried out in the US CIRV ‘Call-In’, the Glasgow CIRV ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ on the first day were planned to follow a particular script and the speakers were chosen to reflect the key messages of Glasgow CIRV:

- The violence must stop
- The community has had enough
- There are ways out

Replicating the US CIRV ‘Call-In’, on entering the courtroom in Glasgow the Sheriff called the session to order. The court was not actually ‘in session’, in the normal legal sense, however, the impression generated was meant to affect the young people in attendance, and ensured that all in the court were made aware of the requirement to behave correctly while in the courtroom and encouraged all to listen to the messages to be delivered.

The Glasgow CIRV Project Manager explained the purpose of the event and the initiative was to provide the individuals and their groups with information. At this time, and throughout the session, the audience were told to take what they heard back to their groups, gangs, friends, family, and neighbours, with the clear message that what they were hearing applied to everyone. The Glasgow CIRV Project Manager then described the impact of violence on the community and gave an overview of the messages that the audience would hear at the session before introducing the first speaker (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview).

The law enforcement message was designed to be similar in nature to the US CIRV message and was delivered by the then Chief Constable, Sir Stephen House. He informed the audience of the new law enforcement strategy and emphasised the point that all crimes committed by members of a violent group would attract the coordinated efforts
of the police and other law enforcement agencies. Not only would the individual who committed the crime be pursued, the rest of the members of the gang would also be pursued for any illegal activities. It was made clear by the Chief Constable that it was in the individual’s best interest to make sure that his associates were not violent (WG Personal Recollection).

This was a departure from ‘normal’ policing in Glasgow, as in the past the focus would be on detecting and reporting the person responsible for the crime, not the whole gang, as was being intimated to the audience. This was a similar message to those delivered in US CIRV by the Police Chief that the whole gang would be targeted. However, this message did not prove to be the case and was more of a threat than was enforceable, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

During this presentation, various images and videos were played in the background, highlighting the amount of intelligence available to the police about the gangs. At one point, several police officers in full riot gear entered the courtroom to stand behind the gang members to portray an image of strength:

As the masked riot police entered the court even those of us on the comfortable side of the bar felt wary. (Donnelly and Tombs, 2008: 1419)

The next speaker, a maxillofacial surgeon, reinforced the law enforcement message by speaking about his field of expertise and outlining the effects of violence. He displayed graphic images of violence in order to reiterate the points made and spoke about his frustration and the efforts required by doctors to deal with the violence, rather than dealing with, for example, children with birth defects (WG Personal Recollection).
The second set of speakers, again copied from the US CIRV ‘Call-In’ model, included members of the community who expressed the pain, loss, and fear created by violence, again complementing the messages delivered before. In the first sessions, a mother whose son, while walking home from his girlfriend’s home, had been attacked by a gang and left seriously injured, told her story. In doing so, she described the injuries and the impact on her son and her family as a whole. Donnelly and Tombs (2008: 1419) noted that this proved to be a very powerful and moving input and that ‘when the mother of a victim stood, and talked, the young men listened’.

Ex-offenders followed and continued the same theme by describing the consequences of living a violent lifestyle and reiterating the point that serving long prison sentences is incredibly difficult and that their friends did not visit them in prison (WG Personal Recollection).

During this part of the session, a Church of Scotland minister also spoke about the impact that he saw on the local communities and the sense of loss that was felt when a young person was seriously injured, or killed. The use of a religious speaker was a direct copy of the US CIRV ‘Call-In’ session, where preachers and ministers were highly regarded by the participants. However, in the Glasgow CIRV ‘Self-Referral Session’ this did not have the desired effect, as there seemed to be a lack of respect and disregard for the church minister’s message. As a result, this aspect of the session was not repeated in later sessions (WG Personal Recollection).

Speakers who told the gang member attendees that their violent and chaotic life did not need to continue and that ways out existed, delivered the final part of the session, and explained that opportunities did exist for those who wished to change. The speakers outlined the initiatives, courses and employment opportunities that were available to
those who wished to engage with Glasgow CIRV and they explained that in order to access them, all they had to do was call the phone number for the Glasgow CIRV team (see Appendix 17).

In a departure from the US CIRV ‘Call-In’ model, where the final speaker was the US CIRV project manager, the final speaker on the first day in Glasgow was a motivational speaker, specially chosen to remind the gang members of the various messages delivered. He urged them to take the information back to their groups, reiterated that help was available and that all they had to do was call the number provided. He brought the session to a close by again stating that they should stop the violence, that there was no excuse for not doing so, and that they were better than that (Glasgow CIRV Self-Referral Practice Note, 2010).

Interviewees commented that the ‘Self-Referral Session’ was designed as a powerful piece of drama that would hopefully ‘move’ people emotionally in the courtroom. Guests who were in attendance at the first sessions commented on the drama and the feelings that were engendered as a result of the testimonies heard, especially from the mother of the gang violence victim and the ex-offenders. The VRU Director commented believed that the ‘Self-Referral Session’ was a risk in itself to run due to the possible repercussions if trouble should erupt. However, the Director stated that it was necessary to hold it because of the possible benefits that could be gained:

I think the theatre, the drama, I think the significance of it was saying, “God, we’re going to a lot of trouble and we’re going to a lot of trouble just for this one event that lasts an hour”. I’ll tell you why we’re going to a lot of trouble, because it’s important. You have been at a few, you know the number of people that come up to you after them and say, my goodness that was so
powerful and it is powerful, it absolutely is. Even the young guys. (Glasgow VRU Director Interview)

Other key personnel also commented on the benefits of the ‘Self-Referral Session’ and were impressed by what they saw and heard in the courtroom. One senior police commander commented on the fact that so many young people who had been involved in violence and would normally only have been in the court if they were facing trial were there voluntarily was ‘amazing’ in itself. The commander also noted that the fact that these young people would normally have been fighting each other and yet they were sitting quietly and respectfully and were able to listen to a mother and an ex-offender who had served prison time for murder, along with doctors explaining the consequences of violence, was ‘brilliant’. The commander also believed that it was easy for young people to become more involved in criminal acts along with their friends and to carry knives for their ‘protection’ and not think about the consequences of their actions (Glasgow Police Area Commander Interview).

**Criticisms of the Session**

However, not all of those in attendance were of the same opinion about the efficacy of the ‘Self-Referral Session’. The Glasgow Community Safety Director commented on how leaving the session on the first day ‘feeling ashamed’ of oneself and on behalf of the colleagues in attendance. The Community Safety Director believed that the ‘Self-Referral Session’ was an example of how the city had ‘failed’ the young people in the room on the day of the first sessions:
We all failed, and that never manifested itself more strongly than the day of the first Call In (‘Self-Referral Session’) when I absolutely left there feeling ashamed of myself and ashamed of all of my colleagues for the scale of the failure that we had in these young people that were called in. And we failed because I think we don’t work together to best advantage…. a human failing to try and build your own empire to the detriment of others but that is certainly what happens in the public sector. We failed because we’re all driven by our own targets and some of those targets are contradictory. And we fail because I have to say people are delusional and they kid themselves on that if they keep doing the same thing they will get different outcomes. Indeed, that’s an indication of insanity. You know my experience is that’s exactly how the public sector behaves. In, let’s say the commercial world, if you’re making wing nuts and nobody buys them your factory shuts down and your business closes. In the public sector, you can continually make wing nuts and if nobody buys them it’s okay because you’ll get funding next year to make more. There is no economic imperative that drives forward change. That’s changing a wee bit now I have to say, with the economic climate, but back in the old halcyon days of 2006 it was the same old, same old. So what that means is gigantic departments did what gigantic departments do. They spend their budget to the best of what they think and trying to reconfigure all that resource round single issues is difficult because a lot of the client groups suffer from multiple issues and violence is just the manifestation of a lot of these very complex social and family issues and individual issues. (Glasgow Community Safety Director Interview)
The interviewee was very scathing of the guests being ‘euphoric’ and applauding at the end of the session, noting that they did not actually understand their own failings and they had missed the point. The Director was also critical of the ideology of the session and the fact that Glasgow CIRV had brought a group of vulnerable young people into a place to be lectured to by reformed characters and that it was patronising and middle-class. The Director further believed that it was far removed from their lives and in fact, reaffirms their failure and that it was the guests that had failed even though they received large funds to make a difference. These comments appeared to suggest that the Glasgow CIRV model was yet another large funding opportunity for public agencies to focus on a single issue of gang-related violence, rather than the complex social and family issues (Glasgow Community Safety Director Interview).

Similar negative views of the ‘Self-Referral Session’ were also shared by a member of the Glasgow CIRV team, who believed that to have the substantial police resources on show at the first ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ were a waste of tax-payers’ money. The Glasgow CIRV Education officer stated that it was all a public relations exercise, a show of force for the young people’s attention and that it was a ‘bit of a pantomime’. The Education officer was also of the opinion that the young people in attendance at the first session were not actually involved in violence, but were there with their friends and by association only, and that by exposing them to the session, Glasgow CIRV ran the risk of demonising them (Glasgow CIRV Education Officer Interview).

The above comment about ‘demonising’ the young people has parallels with the process of labelling (Becker, 1963), which can lead to what Merton (1968) termed as ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’, which he defined as; ‘a false definition of the situation evoking a new behaviour which makes the originally false conception come true’ (Merton, 1968: 477).
In other words, by subjecting young people to this process, a potential result was that they would become involved in gangs and gang-related behaviour.

This situation could be attributed to the young people in court that day. As the Education Officer stated some of the attendees did not actually belong to a gang and were in the room by association of gang-member friends. By constantly reminding them of the dangers of violence and gang membership, the young people were being exposed to, and being accused of, behaviour that could lead to them acting out this label. The possibility might then exist that they could take on the violent persona of their peers and become violent. However, the intentions on the day were directed at having the opposite effect (WG Personal Recollection).

**Evolving ‘Self-Referral Sessions’**

After these first sessions, Glasgow CIRV carried out a process of evaluation and reflection to discuss the effectiveness of the sessions and to take note of any comments made by those in attendance. Each session thereafter was slightly different in terms of speakers used and how the session was run. For example, as mentioned earlier, it became apparent early on from comments made by young people in the audience and who engaged with Glasgow CIRV, that the use of a church minister was not effective at all, as they felt that the minister did not have any credibility in their eyes as the young people were not religious in any way. This was different from the US CIRV ‘Call-In’ session, where church ministers and pastors were regular speakers. On the site visit to Cincinnati in April 2009, I witnessed a local church Pastor speak passionately about the impact of violence in the community and the gang members in the court listened to him with respect and dignity. When the US CIRV team were asked about this, it was explained that church and religion
play a big part in the communities, even for the gang members (WG Personal Recollection).

In light of the comments made, the decision was taken not to include religious leaders in future ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ in Glasgow and replace them with other ‘community’ speakers to pass on the relevant messages (WG Personal Recollection).

Other changes made included amending the running of the session. The first sessions were stage-managed by the Glasgow CIRV Project Manager, who gave a running commentary between the different speakers. For example, he introduced each speaker and made comments about violence and the impact on communities, which meant that the first sessions lasted for almost two hours. On the site visit to Cincinnati, it was noted that the US Project Manager merely spoke at the beginning and end of the ‘Call-In’ and let each individual speaker introduce themselves. When this facet of the session was introduced in Glasgow, the effect was to reduce the running time of the session to one hour (WG Personal Recollection).

A further change made to the Glasgow CIRV sessions was the realisation that the senior police officer (the Chief Constable), who delivered the first law enforcement message, had to be able to communicate with the gang members on a level that they understood and respected. This message was meant to be hard-hitting and the people in the courtroom left in no doubt that future violence would be dealt with robustly, but at the first sessions, this message delivery did not appear to be strong enough and those in the room did not seem to respond to the officer as he was too quietly spoken. To achieve this aim, the police commander in charge of the Gangs Task Force fulfilled the senior police officer role at subsequent ‘Self-Referral Sessions’. The commander explained this role in the ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ was about telling the gang members exactly what the role of the police
was, the intelligence held on them as individuals and gangs, and how the police would go about their business if the violence continued:

I gave the senior police officer message to the gang members and told them exactly what they faced in terms of enforcement, what the intelligence product was. How we would go about our business on that enforcement side, and my role in that was to be the kind of big stick as the alternative, or one of the alternatives if you don’t cut out your offending behaviour and you don’t toe the line. (Glasgow Police Task Force Commander Interview)

This change in the delivery of the law enforcement message thereafter became similar to that delivered in Cincinnati as part of the US CIRV ‘Call-In’ and ensured that there was no misunderstanding of the role of the police in the project. This was an important issue, as the management of Glasgow CIRV was heavily weighted towards police officers. Therefore, there could be a ‘blurring’ of the message for the gang members if they saw police officers offering help and yet other police were threatening a strong law enforcement response (WG Personal Recollection).

Over the course of the three-year period that Glasgow CIRV was operating, a total of ten ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ were held. The eventual format and speakers used changed significantly from the first sessions held on 24th October 2008; though the concept of copying the US CIRV ‘Call-In’ remained, Glasgow CIRV had undergone a process of emulation, as discussed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) adapting the US CIRV model to suit the local context in Glasgow (WG Personal Recollection).
**What Happened After the Sessions?**

The intention of Glasgow CIRV was for those in attendance at the sessions to take the messages back to their communities, pass on what they had heard about the difference in the law enforcement strategy and what services were on offer to those who wanted to engage. This intent was a direct *copy* of the US CIRV message delivery and reflected the use of positive peer pressure as discussed in the previous chapter (Braga *et al.*, 1999 and 2001; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996 and 2000; WG Personal Recollection).

A process of self-referral was the main method of engagement, as mentioned previously; those that attended the ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ were given a card with a free-phone number to call, provided and administered by Glasgow Housing Association, if and when they wanted to engage with Glasgow CIRV. Other methods of engagement included young people self-referring, even if they had not attended a ‘Self-Referral Session’, being referred by local police officers, the Strathclyde Police Gangs Task Force, schools and youth groups (Glasgow Housing Officer Interview; Glasgow CIRV 1st Year Report, 2009).

This was a significant difference from the methods employed by US CIRV, who relied on the ‘Call-In’ session, which was attended by those who had no choice but to be there as part of their probation and parole conditions, as discussed previously.

The Glasgow CIRV Gang Engagement Practice Note (2009) describes other methods of engagement employed by Glasgow CIRV, which included home visits by staff from the partner agencies. Offenders in Polmont YOI were also encouraged to engage on their release and were spoken to while they were in prison by Glasgow CIRV staff and also by Scottish Prison Service staff. Also approached was any individual who was identified by divisional police officers as being identified by police intelligence as a ‘Problem Person’.
in relation to gang activity and subject to specific police attention. Glasgow Community and Safety Services (GCSS) also provided a route into Glasgow CIRV by referring those who came to their attention as a result of anti-social behaviour. Glasgow Life, a Glasgow City Council department responsible for social welfare, had a network of youth street workers and outreach staff who worked on a regular basis with Glasgow CIRV target groups and these workers also made direct referrals to take part in dedicated engagement programmes. Finally, School Campus Police Officers, school staff and Glasgow CIRV’s own Education Officer also developed engagement programmes for young people at school. A ‘suite of options’ of services was created (see Appendix 19) and there were many routes available to access the services made available by Glasgow CIRV (Glasgow CIRV Gang Engagement Practice Note, 2009).

**Case Management**

In order to access the services on offer, which will be discussed later, a case management process was developed by Glasgow CIRV to allow staff to monitor the progress of each individual. This was considered crucial; as the number of individuals increased, so did the possibility of losing track of their progress. The CIRV case management process began as soon as a gang member had either asked to engage after the ‘Self-Referral Session’ itself or via another route, whereupon that person was required to sign a pledge (see Appendix 14 and previous chapter) that they will cease their violent offending behaviour as part of the process of accessing services (Glasgow CIRV Case Management Practice Note, 2010).

A case conference was held on a weekly basis including all of the relevant staff and partners to discuss the needs and progress of each individual. It was also designed to
assess new applicants to Glasgow CIRV who had been referred for engagement. It looked at the individual’s needs and expectations and directed them to the most appropriate service for support in further education, self-development opportunities or particular needs.

The Glasgow CIRV Case Management Practice Note (2010) discusses the process in detail (see Appendix 18) and states that a key worker was identified and tasked with making contact with the person as soon as possible after the referral. The case was then reviewed on a regular basis to maintain a record of progress, or not, as the case may be. When it was recognised that a person was facing difficulty in keeping appointments to engage with the team, programmes, or had committed further violent offences, whilst engaging with Glasgow CIRV, a letter reflecting this was sent out and contact made in an attempt to rectify the behaviour or problems. In the case of continued offending the person was informed that they had been removed from the programme. However, the opportunity to change and stop offending would be later offered and after a period of time they could come back to CIRV and they would be engaged with once again (Glasgow CIRV Case Management Practice Note, 2010).

The case management process developed by Glasgow CIRV was distinctly different from that operated by US CIRV, as discussed in the previous chapter, where the case management was provided by ‘Cincinnati Works’ as part of their ‘one-stop-shop’ approach.
**Services and Support**

One of the significant differences between Glasgow CIRV and US CIRV was the services and support that was offered as part of Glasgow CIRV. As mentioned above, ‘Cincinnati Works’ delivered all services and support as part of US CIRV. In Glasgow, relevant services and support opportunities were identified at an early stage in the Glasgow CIRV development as part of the case management process.

A ‘suite of options’ created outlined what services were available to those who engaged with Glasgow CIRV, which included education, employment opportunities, diversionary programmes and other support services. It was the intention that existing services in the city would be utilised and various service providers agreed to participate (see Appendix 19).

The police officer attached to Glasgow CIRV commented on the availability of services on offer and stated that a lot of the options that were listed could not actually be used:

There was a lot on the menu that we didn't use or couldn't use. We very quickly tended to use what we knew could work. Our diversionary activities were focused on the east end football league. Personal Development became the KanDo programme. We made a decent effort at the employment, but from the early days there were a lot more employment opportunities discussed than actually materialized. So we probably didn’t have as much in the way of employment as we had hoped to have.... We were very good at parts of it you know we were very good at engaging, very good at the ‘Call-In’ (‘Self-Referral Session’), very good at delivering the message. We were very good at or we had the ability to deliver the enforcement message. We were absolutely not
ready in terms of the community and services that were available. We didn’t have mentors; we didn’t have programmes. We had commitments from lots of partners. However, in practice you know a lot of these commitments weren’t able to be met. (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview)

It is apparent from the comments above that commitments were made by agencies and partners but not delivered or services were not provided as promised. Therefore, Glasgow CIRV tended to concentrate their efforts on a few select programmes, for example, the football provision (see below) and the personal development programme delivered by a private enterprise, KanDo Sports, which the officer stated could be relied upon to deliver. However, these services had to be 'bought in' at a significant cost, which went against the ethos of Glasgow CIRV, as outlined in the funding process with the government and the city agencies. It was the intention of Glasgow CIRV, as discussed previously, that it would use the existing services on offer in the city at no cost, but it became apparent at an early stage that suitable services were not available (WG Personal Recollection).

The officer further commented that not all of the services and programmes listed in the ‘suite of options’ was in place at the outset, though there was a willingness to help and support young people. However, it became apparent that the agencies did not really understand the behavioural patterns and potentially violent nature of the young people. Therefore, when it became known to some partner agencies, that they may be dealing with ‘high-tariff’ violent offenders that Glasgow CIRV were aiming to deal with, some of the partners stated that they could not cope or did not wish to change their practices, which led to Glasgow CIRV developing different programmes with those who could and would work with the ‘high-tariff’ offenders. It was important for Glasgow CIRV to engage
with the ‘high-tariff’ violent offenders as it was deemed necessary to try to change their ways and reintegrate them into ‘normal’ society. Some agencies could not or would not engage with them for a variety of reasons, not least that the young people themselves did not want to engage with the services. For example, in my capacity as the Deputy Manager, I was present during a meeting with a prominent service provider in the city when they decided that they could not actively engage with the type of person that Glasgow CIRV was targeting as they thought that they were too dangerous, therefore they pulled out of the partnership (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview, WG Personal Recollection).

In addition to the self-development services, Glasgow CIRV also employed the services of a private company, Sidekix, to run a football league for Glasgow CIRV at a local secondary school in the east end of the city every Friday night with training sessions organised for mid-week nights. During the training sessions the company also ran workshops on violence reduction and counselling for those who engaged:

On paper what we supplied to the project was football coaching. What we supplied in reality was football, workshops, counselling. Counselling is too broad a word right, advice and advocacy was probably a better expression. Football, workshops, advice and advocacy and any practical assistance that people needed to succeed. So, for example, I would regularly get a phone call here from somebody to say “look have been offered an interview at such and such a place and in the town or Cardonald or something and ah don’t get ma giro⁶ tae Monday”, and I would say “I’ll come down and get you and take you, wait on you and bring you back”. (Glasgow CIRV Service Provider Interview)

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⁶ A ‘giro’ is a common Glasgow term denoting an unemployment benefit payment.
The football proved to be very popular with young people and provided them with an outlet for their energy without engaging in illegal activities and violence. In my role as the deputy manager of Glasgow CIRV, I attended an awards ceremony for the football tournament in September 2009 and was struck by the sense of occasion and pride felt by all in the room. The room contained almost 100 gang members, who, in the past, had fought with each other, though that night they sat together and applauded each other when the awards were handed out (WG Personal Recollection):

I think we completely and utterly underestimate the power of the football...I think fundamentally what we have is we have groups of young people trying to find their way in the world and trying to find their position which involves confrontation. I think what we managed to achieve is people being able to confront, compete and contest with each other in a well-structured, well-rulled way and they got as much satisfaction out with that as they did out of any fighting they were involved in.... It’s not an opinion because you know they turned up every week ...... they wanted to get involved and they amended their behaviour towards each other because they knew if they get involved in violence here then they wouldn't be allowed to come back.

(Glasgow CIRV Service Provider Interview)

The comments above indicate how the young people did not engage in violence at the football, as it would jeopardise their continuing involvement in Glasgow CIRV. They had committed to not engaging in violence by signing the pledge as discussed previously.

In August 2009, Glasgow CIRV also engaged with the Army who provided an outward-bound course in Aviemore for gang members from two opposing gangs who had been engaged in some violent confrontations. The aims of the programme, known as Operation
Youth Advantage, were to provide outdoor activities to CIRV clients as part of a comprehensive programme of diversion and confidence building activities, provide a safe learning environment for the delivery of conflict resolution workshops, and to establish the basis for rival groups to work together, in order to address issues of gang violence (Glasgow CIRV 1st Year Report, 2009).

The programme of outdoor activities included rock climbing, abseiling, kayaking, orienteering and mountain biking. The gang members were split up to form four separate teams and the activities were organised to encourage team working. During each evening, they were encouraged to participate in workshops based on conflict resolution activities, which resulted in some powerful personal realisations from many of the young people about their violent and offending lifestyles. The operation led to a visit from the Scottish Government’s Community Safety Minister, and the Brigadier of the British Army’s Scottish regiment, pictured below.

Source: (Glasgow CIRV 1st Year Report, 2009).

The police constable attached to Glasgow CIRV explained the background to the programme and commented on the rivalry between the gangs from Haghill and Carntyne and the levels of violence involved. The officer stated that during the course they
eventually came to realise that they shared similarities and began to identify with each other and this led to the violence between them stopping:

There were two gangs in the Haghill and Carntyne areas, which were particularly active ..... and.... a few incidents of gang fighting involving those two.... leading to quite serious injuries and .... there were two attempted murders that had occurred in one incident involving those gangs. So we decided to focus on those two in particular because they were at that time our most active, they were the highest risk in terms of serious injury. We .... took them to Aviemore using the Army training team to run some outdoor activities, abseiling, rock-climbing, canoeing, mountain biking, that sort of thing. We also ran some personal development workshops and anti-violence workshops ..... for four days and at the end of that time, while they weren’t the best of pals, I think both groups could see similarities in each other and were able to identify with each other a bit more and it was able to stop the violence. Yes, those two groups stopped fighting. There were no more violent incidents from those two groups, you know and that’s still been the case.

(Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview)

Glasgow CIRV also used the services on offer from the various youth centres in the east end of Glasgow, which offered diversionary activities, ‘drop-in’ centres, and personal development and life skills. For example, the Parkhead Youth Project, Families around Rogerfield and Easterhouse (FARE), ‘Urban Fox’ based in the Parkhead area, the Bridgeton Community Learning Campus and ‘Innerzone’ in the Wellhouse area (WG Personal Recollection).
The social worker attached to Glasgow CIRV was tasked with ensuring that support services were accessible to those who required them. These services included the access to alcohol support and treatment, drug use support and treatment, including: family support services, young people’s services, services to offenders with addiction problems, needle exchange, harm reduction advice, community support, rehabilitation services, hospital services, 24/7 drug crisis centre, carers services, family support, training and employment (WG Personal Recollection).

Craig (2010) discusses how big a part alcohol and drug misuse plays in the lives of the young people in Glasgow, and it was discovered by the team that many of those young people that engaged with Glasgow CIRV did suffer from these issues. These could lead to behavioural problems, anger management issues and violence on the part of the young people. It was believed that it would be beneficial to try to address their personal problems in relation to alcohol and drugs. To this end, the Greater Easterhouse Alcohol Awareness (GEAAP) also provided trained counsellors in relation to alcohol or drugs misuse (WG Personal Recollection).

Often as a result of the alcohol, drug misuse and anger management issues experienced by the young males, in particular, often led to instances of domestic violence abuse occurring against girlfriends and partners. In an effort to counter this problem, GCSS also provided assistance in the form of ASSIST (Advocacy, Support, Safety, Information and Services Together). These support services were offered by the Violence against Women team in GCSS to young people aged under the age of 16 who had been referred from Glasgow CIRV (Glasgow CIRV 6 Month Report, 2009).

It is clear that Glasgow CIRV offered a wide range of services to those who engaged with the project, as outlined above and in the regular evaluation reports produced by Glasgow
CIRV (Glasgow CIRV 1st Year Report, 2009). The ‘whole systems’ or holistic approach of offering a wide range of services, including life-skills, well-being and health courses, personal development, employability and skills courses and anti-violence and knife awareness courses, was more extensive than those offered by US CIRV, who, at the outset tended to concentrate on employability courses provided by ‘Cincinnati Works’, as discussed in a previous chapter. However, following the site visit to Cincinnati by Glasgow CIRV staff in April 2009, US CIRV changed their focus to reflect the more holistic approach that was offered by Glasgow CIRV. This will be discussed later in this chapter in relation to the ‘back-flow of policy transfer’ concept (WG Personal Recollection).

It was suggested by interviewees that the services on offer by Glasgow CIRV were not all available. A variety of reasons, for example, a reluctance to work with ‘high tariff’ violent offenders, led to some agencies who had promised services, fail to deliver and reneging on promises. Other services were not provided by some statutory agencies and this led to Glasgow CIRV having to ‘buy in’ services and courses from external, private companies at substantial costs. This, I believe, had an impact on the longer-term sustainability of Glasgow CIRV. As discussed earlier in Chapter 5, the Scottish Government placed an undertaking on Glasgow CIRV and the Glasgow CPP, as a condition of funding, that the project would be ‘rolled out’ across the city with services being provided by existing resources, should the project prove to be successful. The lack of service provision from within existing services impacted negatively on Glasgow CIRV and its sustainability and will be returned to later in this thesis.
**Enforcement**

It is clear from the evidence gathered, that Glasgow CIRV attempted to *copy* US CIRV by adopting a strong enforcement ethos that was to be followed in the event of continuing violence on the part of the gangs (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996 and 2000). This message was relayed to all concerned at the ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ for those in attendance to share with their peers and also by police officers and other law enforcement agencies. In order to be able to deal with violent acts, a protocol was formulated by Glasgow CIRV to be followed for various levels of such acts, ranging from minor or common assault through to serious assaults and murders (homicides). It was also made clear to them that continued violent behaviour would result in a strong enforcement response from the police, with individuals being removed from programmes and targeted enforcement action against groups as a whole (WG Personal Recollection).

In a departure from the US CIRV model, Glasgow CIRV established a Locality Team to work in the north and east of the city that comprised a Sergeant and two Constables who operated from two satellite offices at Maryhill and Shettleston Police Offices (Glasgow CIRV 3rd Quarter Report, 2010). The team was designed to have greater contact with the police division tasking and co-ordinating group meetings and ensured that intelligence was shared efficiently and in line with information sharing protocols. This allowed officers to be in a position to consider enforcement actions should the need arise. They were also tasked with engaging with young people and youth groups in the areas where they operated.

An engagement/enforcement tracker matrix was also devised, which recorded individuals involved in recent violent incidents, either as a victim or offender. This was used to determine, after discussion in the Case Management meeting, whether an
individual or gang as a whole should be targeted by the team for engagement or enforcement.

It was also recognised that it was important to have a wide range of partners that could be called upon to carry out enforcement operations. These included the local police division, Strathclyde Police’s Gangs Task Force, Glasgow Housing Association (Neighbour Relations Teams or Antisocial Behaviour Teams), Community Safety Services, the Procurator Fiscal and any other partner deemed necessary to carry out an effective intervention (WG Personal Recollection).

Glasgow CIRV used various enforcement ‘triggers’ that were considered when deciding to implement an enforcement operation:

- Serious Assault and above involving a person already engaged with Glasgow CIRV.
- Weapons offences involving those engaged with Glasgow CIRV.
- Raised levels of gang activity involving specific gang members/gangs.
- Requests from Division for Glasgow CIRV enforcement support.

In order to address these ‘trigger’ points, the Glasgow CIRV team developed a menu of response parameters that could be considered for each enforcement operation (see Figure 2 below).
Figure 2: Glasgow CIRV Enforcement Parameters

Source: Glasgow CIRV Enforcement Practice Note (WG Personal Recollection)

Figure 2 highlights the different levels of actions and options that were available to Glasgow CIRV and its law enforcement partners in response to each level of violence. The highest level on the ‘enforcement pyramid’ included the worst acts of violence, for example, serious assault and above, including murder. The responses that could be utilised included a media release, an enforcement operation in the relevant area with
concentrated activity by the police and partner agencies, and a post-operation community reassurance phase.

The second level of the ‘enforcement pyramid’ included lesser acts of violence and the use of weapons, which did not lead to serious assault or murder. Options available to the law enforcement agencies included; the co-operation of the police Gangs Task Force engaged in a high visibility policing operation, which was limited to gang members and their associates, extensive use of stop and search powers to search for weapons, temporary or permanent removal from the Glasgow CIRV programmes and services if they were engaged, and possible application of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) or Anti-Social Behaviour Contracts (ASBCs) (Anti-Social Behaviour (Scotland) Act, 2004).

At the lowest level on the ‘pyramid’, offending behaviour would lead to Glasgow CIRV instigating home visits or custody visits in the police cells, the issue of a Warning Letter to the individual and/or parents, consideration of suspension and removal from programmes or services, and suspension of programme provision to others from the gang (Glasgow CIRV 3rd Quarter Report, 2010).

The Glasgow CIRV police constable explained how the team would react to a low-level act of violence or in response to a gang that was not fulfilling its commitment to the Glasgow CIRV ethos, by targeting a gang territory by carrying out a ‘day of action’. However, this would also put pressure on the local community of the area the gang was from. This tactic seems to be somewhat ‘draconian’ in its style and was in opposition with the Glasgow CIRV message that ‘the community has had enough’. When questioned further on the effectiveness of this tactic, the officer did admit that it did not have the desired results and that by punishing the community at large, it tended to turn the public against the police and partners (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview).
Enforcement Operations

The Glasgow CIRV message, ‘the violence must stop’, was meant to be a clear and unequivocal message to the gangs in the east of the city that any act of violence on their part would mean that the law enforcement agencies would act.

As mentioned previously, the recognised enforcement arm of Glasgow CIRV was the Gangs Task Force of Strathclyde Police, which had been established in 2008 to provide a force-wide resource that could target specific areas, gangs and individuals. The commander of the Task Force explained the background and the staffing of the unit (Glasgow Police Task Force Commander Interview). The Commander commented on research that ascertained that there were approximately 170-180 gangs in the force area with around 3,500 members though these numbers were fluid. One of the early tasks that was implemented was the use of an indicator, a ‘gang marker’, being placed on the police intelligence computer system, the Scottish Intelligence Database (SID), to indicate to officers that a particular person was associated with a gang and that this information had come from police intelligence. The Commander also commented on the territoriality issues that surrounded the gangs and their engagement in what he termed as ‘recreational violence’. This term indicated that those involved engaged in violence as a past-time and saw it as a bit of ‘fun’. My experience of working in the same areas confirms this view; young people regularly engaged in gang fights as a past-time, especially fighting with other rival gangs from neighbouring territories.

Although there were a few occasions when acts of violence that did merit attention from Glasgow CIRV though, as explained by the Glasgow CIRV police constable, no police operation was carried out in relation to serious acts of violence, (Level 1, on the Enforcement Matrix):
There were a few days of action. None of them were using the full coordinated response that we envisaged that we would use in the early days. And part of that is because I think there was very few occasions or very few opportunities where we felt we needed that full response. Other parts of it were I think that we had ideas or intentions of being able to have more of a severe response on the gangs than we were actually able to do. We were restricted in terms of legislation for a few things. For instance, we were looking at special Bail conditions to be applied that we hoped that we would be able to use and we weren’t able to do that. We were looking at partners to enforce the community at large rather than just focusing on the gangs in that area. That wasn’t able to be driven home. So we probably had more of a diluted response than what we envisaged we would have in the early days.

(Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview)

The difference in the Scottish legal system, as opposed to the American legal system, is highlighted in the above statement. The officer commented on the inability of the police in Glasgow to be able to use bail conditions on offenders to prevent them from engaging in violent acts, as it may jeopardise a fair trial at a later date.

This level of enforcement operation or response to a violent act is distinctly different from that operated by US CIRV in Cincinnati, where the enforcement operations did look at the ‘whole’ gang, rather than individuals. For example, Engel et al. (2008) reported that following the ‘Call-In’ session on 31 July 2007, Cincinnati experienced eleven homicides in the month of August and it fell to the Law Enforcement Team to follow through on the promises made at the ‘Call-In’. Intelligence revealed that five out of the eleven homicides involved gangs, therefore, the police department carried out enforcement actions and
thereafter shared the intelligence with other law enforcement agencies, for example, the Sheriff’s Department, Parole and Probation departments and the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau (ATF). This information and the resultant law enforcement actions and arrests were conveyed to the attendees at the next ‘Call-In’ session to highlight that US CIRV would take action as promised.

It appears that the Cincinnati police had been gathering intelligence on illegal acts carried out by the gang members over a period of time and ‘held back’ on acting on this information until they had an opportunity to arrest multiple gang members in one operation. This type of action would not have been allowed in Scots law as the police in Glasgow would be duty bound to act on information if they had evidence to arrest and report an offender.

Glasgow CIRV did carry out a small-scale enforcement operation against one gang in particular, the ‘Parkhead Rebels’. This gang, which frequented the area around Parkhead Cross in the east end of the city, was very active in criminality, including serious acts of violence against members of the public. For example, in one instance, a young male was attacked, without apparent motive, by gang members on his way home from work and had his leg broken. They were also engaged in fighting with other rival gangs in the area and on one occasion, a firearm was discharged (WG Personal Recollection).

Four multi-agency teams were established, each comprising a local police officer, a Glasgow Housing Association (GHA) official, a Glasgow Community and Safety Services officer and a Glasgow CIRV member of staff. It was the intention of the teams to visit a co-ordinated list of gang members from the Parkhead Rebels and, depending on their behaviours, warn them regarding their future conduct and the conditions of their engagement with Glasgow CIRV. If they or their parents were tenants of GHA, they were
warned regarding the possibility of losing their tenancy and also the possibility of an Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) being taken out against them. This was a particularly punitive approach by warning the parents of the gang members of the possibility of being evicted from their houses; however, this threat was not actually carried out. This type of enforcement operation was only carried out on one occasion and appeared to have the desired effect with the re-engagement of the gang members as a whole (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview; WG Personal Recollection).

**Cincinnati Site Visit**

April 2009 saw a change of Project Manager for Glasgow CIRV and this led to a visit being arranged to Cincinnati for the new manager and other members of the team to allow them to experience the US CIRV operation. I was also included in this visit in my capacity as the Deputy Project Manager.

The Glasgow CIRV team visited Cincinnati for three days, and while there, attended Hamilton District Court House to view a ‘Call-In’. The team also spent time with the US CIRV Project Manager and staff involved in the project; they visited the service provider organisation, ‘Cincinnati Works’, and learned of the services that they provided. Meetings were held, where members of both US CIRV and Glasgow CIRV teams, including Professor Engel from the University of Cincinnati, shared experiences and Glasgow members gave an overview of the Glasgow CIRV (WG Personal Recollection).

During this research, it became apparent that the experiences of Glasgow CIRV and their organisational structures, shared during the visit had subsequently led to a change of focus for Cincinnati and a change in service provision as indicated previously. The focus
in Cincinnati, at that time, was based on gaining employment and creating employment opportunities for the people engaged with US CIRV. ‘Cincinnati Works’ was the hub for all ‘clients’ of US CIRV, and anyone who engaged with US CIRV was referred to them and they carried out all work with them thereafter to enhance their employability chances (WG Personal Recollection).

During this research, in conversation with Professor Engel of the University of Cincinnati, that the members of US CIRV noted from the Glasgow CIRV team that their focus was on a ‘whole systems’ approach, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Over the course of the next few months, the US CIRV team discussed the Glasgow CIRV ‘whole systems’ approach that had been developed to look at the individual needs of the person and addressing those needs by providing access to the necessary courses and assistance required. It was felt in Cincinnati that the current service provider, ‘Cincinnati Works’, was not providing the required services, as it was only focused on employment provision. Professor Engel argued that focusing only on employment was not the way forward and she recommended that the service provision that she had gleaned from the Glasgow CIRV team visit was a better direction for US CIRV to take. A decision was made then by US CIRV to restructure their service provision to mirror that operated by Glasgow CIRV, and as such a new service provider was sought, ‘Taberham House’. The changes took 6 months to implement and US CIRV changed their focus to deliver a service that provided a ‘whole system’ approach similar to that operated by Glasgow CIRV (Engel, 2012; WG Personal Communication).

It is apparent that this change in focus and direction was determined as a direct result of the visit of the Glasgow CIRV team members, through a process of learning from their experiences. This development indicates that US CIRV, the site of the original initiative
and the policy transferred to Glasgow, learned from the recipient of the policy transfer, Glasgow CIRV. The policy of dealing with gang violence, the focused deterrence strategy employed by US CIRV, first flowed from Cincinnati (US CIRV) to Glasgow (Glasgow CIRV) in 2008. Following on from the information gleaned from the Glasgow CIRV staff the following year, US CIRV changed their practices and services to adopt the ‘whole systems’ approach employed by Glasgow CIRV. I have termed this phenomenon of policies flowing back to the originating site as a ‘back-flow of policy transfer’, and it would appear that this is undocumented in the field of international criminal justice policy transfer in the studies that have been analysed, for example, private prisons, electronic tagging, Zero Tolerance Policing, ‘Three Strikes and You’re Out’ and the ‘broken windows’ approach (Newburn and Sparks, 2004; Jones and Newburn, 2007). As such, this is a key finding of this research and will be further discussed in the next chapter.

**Change of Focus for Glasgow CIRV**

Following on from the visit to Cincinnati by the members of the Glasgow CIRV team in April 2009, Glasgow CIRV also changed focus in their operations. This was brought about by the new Glasgow CIRV manager who instigated a project management review process and looked at all of the areas of operational responsibility of Glasgow CIRV. The reasons for the review were two-fold; to assess the capacity of Glasgow CIRV to extend their operations to the north of the city, as there had been pressure from partners to do so, and also to critically assess the delivery of the project to that point to ensure an effective plan for the future of the project (Glasgow CIRV 1st Year Report, 2009).
This process identified a number of key service delivery areas that it was deemed necessary to change and develop:

- A need to make CIRV’s enforcement response to gang activity more regular and robust
- Recruitment of dedicated CIRV mentors in order to provide support to the most violent and difficult to engage gang members
- Development of closer working relationships with community groups
- Further work to develop the central CIRV model component of using the moral voice of the community
- A lack of diversionary and educational programmes and services for under-16 gang members
- A need for closer day-to-day working relationship with the local police division (Glasgow CIRV 1st Year Report, 2009).

The above measures were meant to increase the efficiency of Glasgow CIRV and map the future direction of the project. I would argue that these measures did not develop as anticipated, though some measures did lead to improvement. For example, in relation to the first point, the need to improve gang enforcement response, this was not achieved. As mentioned previously, Glasgow CIRV did not have a particularly strong enforcement strategy, as noted by the Glasgow CIRV Police Constable who stated:

We probably had more of a diluted response than what we envisaged we would have in the early days (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview)

The closer contact with local community groups was a facet of Glasgow CIRV that did appear to operate well. Contacts were made with numerous groups as mentioned previously and they did assist in identifying and engaging young people. However, the
work on developing the ‘moral voice of the community’ was non-existent. This area of Glasgow CIRV lacked focus and attempts to motivate and encourage more members of the local communities to engage and make their voices heard were insufficient. This is in direct contrast to US CIRV, where they did achieve engagement with the local communities and worked extensively in areas suffering from violent acts (WG Personal Recollection).

It was perceived that there as a lack of diversionary schemes for young people under 16 years of age who had been identified as important, as commented on by the Education Officer:

We needed to identify the age scale at which most gang violence occurs, which is between fourteen and sixteen. We were targeting sixteen plus because it looked good on paper. We took the easy option because big grants were there for employability. (Glasgow CIRV Education Officer Interview)

This situation did not improve over the course of Glasgow CIRV, although funding did become available at a later stage to try to identify courses and schemes for young gang members under 16 years of age (Glasgow CIRV Education Officer Interview).

The one area that did appear to improve, as a result of the review, was the forging of closer links with the local police divisional management. Regular meetings were established with police divisional senior management and the Gangs Task Force that I attended in my role as the Glasgow CIRV deputy manager, while the police constable attached to Glasgow CIRV attended local meetings. This liaison ensured that information was being shared and that any actions that need to be carried out were done so with the co-operation of the local police (WG Personal Recollection).
**Move to the North of the City**

As detailed here Glasgow CIRD was established in the east end of the city in 2008, and following lobbying by some partner agencies, for example, the Social Work Department, Education, and Glasgow Housing Association (GHA), and in line with the recommendations made during the project management review, a decision was made to expand into the north of the city later in 2009. Extra police officers were drafted into Glasgow CIRD and a locality team was established, comprising a Sergeant and two police constables. These officers were given a remit of working in both the east and north of the city and were sited in two police offices, Shettleston in the east and Maryhill in the north.

The intelligence gathered by the police and partners indicated that the north of the city contained 21 different gangs comprising approximately 400 members with a peak age range of 15-19 years (see Appendix 20) (Glasgow CIRD 1st Year Report, 2009). The move to the north increased the number of people who engaged with Glasgow CIRD and efforts were made to engage with them to attend future Self-Referral Sessions. Those who did engage were put into the case management process and allocated services as required according to their needs.

**Mentoring**

The Glasgow CIRD 1st Year Report (2009) states that mentoring was an important tool in the Glasgow CIRD case management process, as identified by the project management review, and in line with the model established by US CIRD with the street advocate network established there. A network of mentors was established with the assistance of Glasgow Housing Association, who assigned a member of their staff to Glasgow CIRD to act as a Mentoring Manager. It was this staff member's responsibility to recruit mentors,
befrienders, project workers and peer mentors from across the public and voluntary sectors in the city, with the Case Manager ensuring resources, were utilised in the appropriate manner (Glasgow CIRV 1st Year Report, 2009).

The information contained in the Glasgow CIRV Third Quarter Report (2010) states that the mentoring service that Glasgow CIRV established had 34 volunteers from various backgrounds and figures were published of their location and how many young people had been allocated to them (see Table 3 below), and included those that refused a mentor or had been deemed unsuitable to be allocated a mentor.

**Table 3: Total Number of Glasgow CIRV Mentors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Number of current CIRV mentors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Includeem (non-statutory service provider)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRV PEER Mentors via Bambury Centre</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and Sport</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHA</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills Development Scotland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCSS</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of CIRV Young Persons with allocated Mentor</th>
<th>33 East 18 North</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of current CIRV Clients who have refused a mentor or deemed not suitable</th>
<th>8 North 12 East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of CIRV mentoring courses completed</td>
<td>1 Pilot course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of CIRV attended CIRV mentoring course</td>
<td>3 PEER Mentors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Glasgow CIRV 3rd Quarter Report (2010)*
It was originally envisaged that this aspect of Glasgow CIRV would reflect the Street Advocate network established in Cincinnati. However, it can be argued that the mentoring and street advocacy aspect of Glasgow CIRV did not function the way it was designed to. When the Glasgow CIRV Police Constable was asked if Glasgow CIRV ever had any street advocates or mentors, he replied that it did not. He also claimed that those people Glasgow CIRV had listed as mentors were not effective and that it was a weakness of Glasgow CIRV. The role of the mentor was crucial in assisting those engaged with Glasgow CIRV in coping with their ‘chaotic lifestyle’:

The short answer is no. There were some efforts into having the street level advocates or mentors, but I feel that probably that was one of the weaknesses in the project that we never ever had that up and running properly....I think they were crucial. I think that for every person that we had engaged someone who could come along after that and have a regular contact with that person, then we will keep them. If we didn’t have that contact, then we were going to lose them. The lifestyles that these guys have you know, it’s so chaotic that you know they barely remember that they’ve got an appointment at court or an appointment at the doctors or an appointment for an interview. So they really need a bit of help. They really need that mentorship or that person on the street who can go and speak to them on a daily basis or a weekly basis just to remind them that they had this thing coming up and to support them, but we never had that. (Glasgow CIRV Police Constable Interview)

It appears to be the case that although some form of a mentoring network existed ‘on paper’, it did not work in practice. This facet of Glasgow CIRV is a distinct difference from the provision of street advocates in US CIRV, as discussed in the previous chapter, and
was a serious failing in Glasgow CIRV. US CIRV demonstrated the importance of a street advocacy network and mentoring system, whereas Glasgow CIRV tried to implement the mentoring system used in US CIRV, they failed to achieve this aspect of *copying* the best practice from US CIRV. It would appear that it failed due to a lack of sufficient resources and support from other agencies, who, although they stated that they would provide mentors, as indicated in the table above, in reality they were not active in their role.

**Funding and Sustainability**

The issues of funding and sustainability are key themes in the Glasgow CIRV discussion and were important points of the Strategic Plan set out at the beginning of the project. It was a condition before the funding was approved by the Scottish Government that the Glasgow Community Planning Partnership would agree to roll out the Glasgow CIRV concept across the city, should it prove successful. This was also clearly stated in the Glasgow CIRV 2nd Year Report (2011), which highlighted the fact that the project had completed its ‘proof of concept’ phase and was operating in the north and east of the city with partnership co-operation.

However, it was also noted that the concept of a Glasgow CIRV Academy was being proposed as a vehicle to continue with the Glasgow CIRV model citywide in 2011. This was similar to the ‘one-stop-shop’ model that had been initially developed in Cincinnati in co-operation with ‘Cincinnati Works’, which the team members had seen during the site visit in 2009, and was an idea that the new Glasgow CIRV Manager had been keen to explore. It should be noted that at this stage, the Glasgow CIRV management did not know
that US CIRV had changed focus to mirror the Glasgow CIRV approach of a self contained case management process.

The Glasgow CIRV Academy was proposed to include a number of commercial, charitable and voluntary partners and be an ‘informal and innovative collective provider of core programmes and services, which any future partner is encouraged to join where they have the means and capacity to do so’ (see Appendix 23) (Glasgow CIRV 2nd Year Report: 23).

It was proposed that the new structure would relocate the Glasgow CIRV team from the Violence Reduction Unit to Strathclyde Police from April 2011 and a new strategic plan developed along with a new Information Sharing Protocol for partners. This concept of a Glasgow CIRV Academy is central to the discussion of sustainability of Glasgow CIRV and a change of direction from that proposed and agreed upon by the key partners in the city and the Glasgow Community Planning Partnership (CPP) at the outset. The failure of the city agencies and the Glasgow CPP to support and continue funding of the project and roll it out across the city has never been addressed, as commented on by a Scottish Government Civil Servant:

I would reflect that we did get a commitment for the Community Planning Partnership to roll out CIRV if it proved to be successful. ..... What I am not clear about particularly is what happened to the commitment from Community Planning Partnership to take CIRV forward after the Scottish Government’s funding ran out. I haven’t seen a formal statement from the Community Planning Partnership stating their position on that. (Scottish Government Civil Servant Interview)
The importance of funding cannot be overstated and the failure of officials to continue to support Glasgow CIRV eventually led to its demise. It was the stated intention of Glasgow CIRV in the initial Strategy document, and a condition of the funding allocation from the Scottish Government, that the Glasgow CIRV concept would become part of normal business for the city agencies, at no additional cost, at the conclusion of the initial funding and trial period. Furthermore, the change of focus that the new Glasgow CIRV Project Manager proposed, in relation to moving to the ‘one-stop-shop’ approach that he had seen during the site visit to Cincinnati in 2009, also had a negative impact on the sustainability of Glasgow CIRV.

In fact, even in February 2012, the Scottish Government produced a report (see Scottish Government (2012) on alcohol and its relation to violence and what actions the Government had planned to tackle the problem. In this report, it was outlined that Glasgow CIRV had received government funding, and that its aim after this initial funding period ran out (2009-2011), was for Glasgow CIRV to be a sustainable venture and to be rolled out city-wide, with leadership provided by Strathclyde Police, in conjunction with partners in justice, government, community safety services, housing, education, social work, health and the community, if the project was found to be successful. The report also includes figures from the evaluation carried out by members of St. Andrews University and Glasgow Caledonian University (see Williams et al, 2014). This statement in the report is ironic, given that Glasgow CIRV ceased to operate in July 2011.

Official reasons for the lack of continued funding and the continuation of Glasgow CIRV have not been established during the course of my research. The concept of the Glasgow CIRV Academy led to the formation of a charitable body and an application was made to the Big Lottery Fund to provide funding for the concept moving forward. However, this
application failed, for which the official reasons are unknown. Therefore, the concept of the Glasgow CIRV Academy failed to materialise and hence Glasgow CIRV ceased operating in the summer of 2011 when the funding from the government ran out and the city agencies ceased to support its continuation.

This is in direct contrast to US CIRV, which is still in operation (July 2016). One of the key issues the US CIRV team focused on, from its inception in 2007, was sustainability. As noted earlier, the business model developed for US CIRV by the Proctor and Gamble executives was designed to deliver sustainability even if key people left the project and were replaced.

In December 2010, one of the Cincinnati street advocates was arrested on a charge of aggravated burglary and sexual assault on a 9-year-old child. At the same time, a new funding cycle came before the council. The result was that the Street Advocate programme was shut down in January 2011 and funding completely cut. Coincidentally, the CIRV Manager and the Police Chief both retired at this time (which was unrelated to the two events).

As a result, US CIRV stopped in January 2011, but following intervention from the Mayor, it was re-established in January 2012. Funding was secured and the Street Advocates were re-employed and retrained with better supervision and monitoring, directly reporting to the Service Team leader (Engel, 2012).

Funding again became an issue in 2013 when the police chief left the police department to take up a new post in another city. The result was that US CIRV again stopped and the city saw an increase in shootings, especially in the realm of gang/group-related shooting with a 21% increase from 2012-2013. One of the neighbourhoods, Over-The-Rhine, had
56 shootings in 2013, with 48 of them being group/gang related (Cincinnati Police Department, January 2014).

More recently, US CIRV has been re-launched in Cincinnati with the Mayor and new Police Chief reiterating their desire that the US CIRV is the way forward for Cincinnati (Cincinnati Local 12 News, 1st January 2014).

This reaffirmation of the US CIRV model, the renewed funding by the city council, and the approach taken to reduce violence and homicides is an example of the efficacy of the sustainability model that was put in place at the beginning in 2007. Since then there have been many changes in personnel in the US CIRV team and associated agencies but the model has allowed the new personnel to progress the concept with little disruption. It is clear that the main agencies involved in the US CIRV and the city council fulfilled their commitments to continue funding over the years and this has led to the long-term sustainability of the US CIRV being maintained.

The difference in the funding and sustainability of Glasgow CIRV and US CIRV can be summarised and discussed in terms of the individuals and city agencies. In Glasgow the failing of sustainability appears to be about lack of agency support, even down to the individual level with certain officials not being willing to continue supporting and/or resourcing the project, for different reasons, for example, one respondent was critical of the management of Glasgow CIRV, stating that it was ‘hard to work with’ and did not embrace partnership-working:

I have never come across a project that was so hard to work with. It was in the same building and you would never have known and we even had staff seconded to it that ended up in a bubble. They gave up their connections back to the real world. We both had the same aims. Both had the same objectives.
I was struggling to achieve mine with five hundred staff and thirty million quid [pounds] and these eight people must have been super-human because they had sorted it. It was really difficult to work with. The leadership of it was literally deaf to partnership-working that didn't suit them. (Glasgow Community Safety Director Interview)

These comments made by the Community Safety Director indicate a level of mistrust of the Glasgow CIRV management team and criticism that it worked in isolation from other partners. The Community Safety Director was also critical of the results that Glasgow CIRV were claiming that had been achieved, and commented on the large budget that the Director’s own organisation had and struggled to achieve positive outcomes, yet Glasgow CIRV, with eight staff, were claiming to have sorted gang violence:

You know, my experience was with the leadership and the leadership of the project and I found that very, very difficult. And I found it very, very difficult to stop saying things that I knew were not true, and I could substantiate that they were not true. (Glasgow Community Safety Director Interview)

These comments suggest that the Director thought that the Glasgow CIRV management were exaggerating the results achieved in the quarterly reports. It should be noted that at this point in the project life, the results were only available in the Glasgow CIRV Quarterly reports that were produced by the Glasgow CIRV team themselves without any independent input or scrutiny, although some independent academic evaluation has since been produced (see Williams et al., 2014). This lack of robust evaluation information is a key failing of Glasgow CIRV and is discussed in the next chapter.
The Director was also critical of a perceived duplication of services and poor communication between Glasgow CIRV and GCSS:

We had duplication going on. We had an analyst. They had an analyst. Same target population. Very poor communication.... you know. (Glasgow Community Safety Director Interview)

Furthermore, the Deputy Director of GCSS raised concerns about the way the Strategic Oversight Group of Glasgow CIRV operated, in particular regarding a lack of oversight of the project by the group:

I also think that there wasn’t enough of a strategic overview. I mean I could count on less than one hand the amount of times the group met. (Glasgow Community Safety Deputy Director Interview)

The Deputy Director was also critical of the composition of the Oversight Group, in that it began to contain service providers from private organisations, as well as the key partners from the city agencies. The results and effectiveness of Glasgow CIRV were somewhat tainted by the views of the service providers who it was suggested had a vested interest in the project being successful as they benefited financially from its continued presence:

The group became, I was going to say, tainted. I don’t mean that to sound too dramatic, but I think a Strategic Overview Board should be the key partners involved and they should be able to have full and frank discussions about where you go. What it became was, there was service providers in there who were benefiting from the money that had gone through CIRV, who, when you
worked your way round the table, “how's it working?” “It fabulous, it’s the best thing that ever happened.” Well of course, you would say that because you have benefited to the tune of tens of thousands of pounds. (Glasgow Community Safety Deputy Director Interview)

It is clear that within the city agencies, there were doubts about the results that the management of Glasgow CIRV were claiming had been achieved, that they were possibly exaggerated and there was a lack of discussion about the way forward at the end of the funding period. The Community Safety Deputy Director further comments on the Big Lottery fund application that was being proposed by the VRU Director and that there was a lack of consultation about its applicability and likely success and that there was no contingency plan should it fail:

“Well, we'll obviously do the Big Lottery funding and we'll get other people to come in and we'll continue to do that” *(quoting the Glasgow VRU Director)*, and I think for me that was real concern and I did voice it at the time. “Well, what about the mainstreaming? What happens if you don’t get funding?” I think there was a very strong feeling of, “oh no we’ll be getting it. The funding will be coming in. There’s no option of that not to happen”. And obviously that didn’t happen, you know, really in the end. (Glasgow Community Safety Deputy Director Interview)

In contrast to Glasgow CIRV, in US CIRV the sustainability model and structure allowed it to carry on even when a change in police chief and mayor, coupled with the incident with the street advocate, led to a halt in funding. The new mayor and police chief later provided funding and US CIRV was re-established. This highlights the importance of lead
individuals and also the city structure in Cincinnati, which gives the mayor the power to authorise city agencies to re-engage. The lack of such an authoritative figure/structure in Glasgow may have had a negative impact and did not help the argument for continued funding for Glasgow CIRV, leading to the search for funding outside the city public sector agencies and its eventual demise.

Conclusions

This chapter has discussed the outcomes of the policy transfer process that brought Glasgow CIRV from America by a process of copying, then emulation. It is clear that Glasgow CIRV set out to copy US CIRV in its entirety, as discussed earlier, but quickly realised that this would not be possible due to various legal and societal constraints, including; the renaming of the US CIRV ‘Call-In’ to a ‘Self-Referral Session’ and the evolving makeup of the sessions to communicate the key messages of Glasgow CIRV to the participants; the engagement and case management of young people under 16 years of age; the case management process, service provision and mentoring system, and the enforcement messages. The issues of funding and sustainability were also discussed; and finally, the key finding of this research, the ‘backflow of policy transfer’, that resulted from the site visit to Cincinnati in April 2009.

The legal constraints placed on Glasgow CIRV, regarding the attendance of gang members at the ‘Self-Referral Sessions’, related to the proposed use of bail conditions at the pre-trial stage, which proved to be impossible to implement, due to objections by members of the judiciary, including a Sheriff, prosecutors and defence lawyers, who felt that it may prejudice a fair trial at a later date, leading to a change in the engagement processes.
The attendance of young people under 16 years of age at the ‘Self-Referral Sessions’, and their subsequent engagement by Glasgow CIRV, were also significant differences from US CIRV. The legal constraints placed on Glasgow CIRV by the Reporter to the Children’s Panel in Glasgow, prevented young people under 16 years of age from attending the same sessions as adults, leading to the delivery of more age-appropriate messages to the young people. This developed as it was felt that a prevention message would be appropriate in Glasgow to attempt to deal with young people who may be on the periphery of gangs and become involved with violence.

The case management process in Glasgow CIRV was distinctly different from US CIRV. The services and support in Glasgow CIRV were designed to offer individual assistance to those in need of help and who had engaged with Glasgow CIRV, a major difference between Glasgow CIRV and US CIRV, who focused on employability issues only.

Enforcement in Glasgow CIRV is an area of some discussion in relation to the level of commitment and ability of the police, and other law enforcement agencies, to follow through on their stated intentions as outlined at the ‘Self-Referral Session’. Glasgow CIRV attempted again to copy the US CIRV model of strong enforcement but did not have the legal powers to do so. The police in Cincinnati were able to ‘hold back’ on evidence to allow them to target a whole gang at the same time, should the need arise, but this was not the case in Scotland as Scots Law does not allow the police such latitude; if evidence of a crime is available to the police then they are duty bound to report the case to the Procurator Fiscal for consideration of prosecution.

The issues of funding and sustainability were also discussed in this chapter and the failings were highlighted of the Glasgow city agencies and Community Planning
Partnership, to fulfil their commitment to fund Glasgow CIRV at the end of the funding period, in accordance with the conditions of funding set out by the Scottish Government.

It can be argued that the concept proposed by the Glasgow CIRV management of a Glasgow CIRV Academy did not ‘sit well’ with other key city agency officials. It is clear that there were issues regarding the management of Glasgow CIRV, as commented on by the Glasgow Community Safety Director and Deputy Director (Interviews), and also doubts and suspicions regarding the level of success that Glasgow CIRV was claiming in their quarterly reports. However, the official reasons for the lack of continued funding and support were not ascertained in this research.

Members of the Glasgow CIRV team visited Cincinnati in April 2009 to meet with members of US CIRV, and it was during this visit that experiences and information was exchanged between both teams, which led to a change of focus for both Glasgow CIRV and US CIRV. US CIRV team members took note of the Glasgow CIRV ‘whole systems’ approach with the case management model and determined that it was more effective than that operated by ‘Cincinnati Works’. On the other hand, the new Glasgow CIRV manager, who was on the trip, was impressed by the one-stop-shop approach offered by ‘Cincinnati Works’. Over the course of the following months, US CIRV changed their focus and working practices to reflect the Glasgow CIRV ‘whole systems’ approach, while Glasgow CIRV also looked to change their focus for the future to provide the ‘one-stop-shop’ model, Glasgow CIRV Academy, based on the initial US CIRV model offered by ‘Cincinnati Works’.

It is clear that US CIRV, learned from the recipient of the policy transfer, Glasgow CIRV. It is evident that a transfer of working practices has occurred in this instance, as the policy/project first flowed from Cincinnati (US CIRV) to Glasgow (Glasgow CIRV) and thereafter, a facet of this (case management ‘whole systems’ approach) flowed back to
Cincinnati the following year, which led to US CIRV changing their practices and services to mirror those of Glasgow CIRV.

I have termed this development as a ‘back-flow of policy transfer’, and it would appear that it has not been documented before in the field of international criminal justice policy transfer in the studies that have been analysed in the past, as discussed by Newburn and Sparks (2004) and Jones and Newburn (2007). As such this is a key finding of this research that will be further discussed in the next and concluding chapter.
Chapter 8 - Discussion and Conclusions

Introduction

In order to carry out a critical analysis of the policy transfer, this research used the Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) model, to provide the theoretical and empirical framework to analyse the various processes, mechanisms and outcomes of the policy transfer, as described in rich detail and discussed in Chapters 5-7. This research involved an in-depth examination of the reasons why Glasgow engaged in the policy transfer, what was transferred, and what level of transfer took place. In doing so, the questions posed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) provided a framework for the collection and analysis of empirical data (see Chapter 4), illuminating the key issues; such as the reasons why Glasgow embarked on the policy transfer process, who was involved, and the eventual shape of the initiative in Glasgow, given the various legal constraints, taking into account the different socio-economic factors, the structure of the gangs in the city, and the funding and long-term sustainability of Glasgow CIRV.

This final chapter critically analyses the key factors identified that had a bearing on the development and operation of Glasgow CIRV, and its eventual demise, within the policy transfer framework. It also discusses the ‘back-flow of policy transfer’ that took place as a result of a site visit in April 2009, by members of the Glasgow CIRV team, to Cincinnati. This ‘back-flow’ in the policy transfer process, identified in this research, does not appear to have been documented before in the literature on criminal justice policy transfer and is, therefore, a key finding of this research, which I believe makes a novel contribution to academic knowledge in this field.
The Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) model of policy transfer proved to be a useful analytical tool for interpreting and classifying the empirical findings, though it proved more limited for understanding the final outcome of the transfer, in terms of the lack of longer-term sustainability of Glasgow CIRV. The limitations that have been identified include its descriptive nature, linear scope and finite framework, which fail to allow for the conceptualisation of the cyclical process evident in what I call the 'back-flow of policy transfer'. In order to conceptualise what happens after the policy has been transferred, where the model stops, but the process may continue, a more cyclical, processual framework is suggested. Therefore, this research also extends the existing knowledge base in the field of criminal justice policy transfer by (1) identifying what the Dolowitz and Marsh model does not encapsulate and proposing an extension of the model beyond its linear and finite scope, and (2) allowing for a ‘back-flow’ process to be included. It also reinforces the significance of local contexts that shape the transfer process as contingent on various local issues and different legal, policing and socio-economic contexts in Glasgow. This finding concurs with the work of Peck and Theodore (2010) in this respect, who also claim that orthodox policy transfer models are too linear and do not allow for the complex mobilities and mutations of the transfer process. Furthermore, McCann and Ward (2013) also reiterate the importance of social and environmental issues in the sphere of policy transfers or mobilities.

This final chapter summaries the key findings of the substantive chapters of this thesis, relating them to the key concepts identified in the literature chapter. It discusses the aims and objectives of the research set out in Chapter 1, where I analysed the legal, socio-economic and cultural issues in Glasgow, including the reasons that led the key agents to decide that the city needed a new approach to deal with the historic problem of violence in gangs, especially in the east end. It also discusses the process of this policy transfer;
the mechanism put in place to enable the transfer of the gang programme from Cincinnati (US CIRV) to Glasgow (Glasgow CIRV) to take place, and the outcomes of the transfer process and discusses the various measures of success or failure, including the issues of funding and long-term sustainability. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of the key finding of this research, the concept of a ‘back-flow of policy transfer’, in doing so, examines the efficacy and limitations of the Dolowitz and Marsh model, and recommends a revised, more process-oriented model of policy transfer.

**Reflections on Aims and Objectives**

This research sought to conduct a comparative study of the history of problems associated with both Cincinnati and Glasgow and discuss the outcomes of the policy transfer. In order to do so, a number of key objectives were set:

- To examine the legal, socio-economic and cultural environments in which the initiative was developed in Glasgow and how it was implemented in Cincinnati.
- To develop an understanding of the factors, both endogenous (internal factors existing within the initiative) and exogenous (external factors existing in the wider environment), which affected the implementation of the initiative and its outcomes.
- To establish whether the policy transfer had the intended outcomes and whether it was a complete transfer of the initiative policy or otherwise?
- To reflect on the general transferability of this type of criminal justice policy.

Each of these areas will now be considered in turn, although it should be noted that there are areas of overlap in places.
**Reflections on My Role as a Researcher**

As discussed in detail on Chapter 4, I am a former police officer, who had a role to play in the policy transfer as the Deputy Manager of Glasgow CIRV from its commencement date in June 2008 until my retirement from the police in September 2010. This unique position, situated within the transfer process, offers an insider account of the difficulties and complexities faced by the actors in a similar fashion to the research offered by others, notably Durnescu and Haines (2012), McFarlane and Canton (2014) and Blaustein (2015a).

While it is important not to impose my feelings and thoughts on the research, especially in the interview process by prompting and imposing my own perceptions on the interviewees, it would be remiss of me not to take into account my experiences and knowledge of the project to add value to the rich description of this research. Strauss and Corbin (1998) also state that maintaining objectivity can be problematic, in reality we all rely on our own knowledge and experiences to shape our experiences of the real world, in this case the transfer process of the model from Cincinnati to Glasgow.

This point is also discussed by Charmaz and Mitchell (1996) who argue that there is merit in the voice and views of the author should not be silent in the research. I have recognised this point of view and offered my thoughts throughout the research to provide a deeper meaning and context of the process of transfer of Glasgow CIRV, using my unique position in the project and not taking a purely objective stance.
**Socio-Economic Factors Affecting the Policy Transfer**

Throughout this research, it has become apparent that there are various nuanced areas of similarities and differences between Glasgow CIRV and US CIRV (Cincinnati). Table 4 below compares the central issues in both cases, in this instance, socio-economic factors. *(Similar tables will be used throughout this chapter highlighting the various areas of comparison as appropriate.)*

In light of the first aim, this thesis explored the different legal, socio-economic and cultural environments in both Glasgow and Cincinnati and how the approach was implemented in these cities. It examined the differences and similarities in the structures and constraints that were placed on the policy transfer from the US to Glasgow as a result of different social contexts.
Table 4: Areas of Comparison between Glasgow CIRV and US CIRV: Socio-Economic Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glasgow CIRV</th>
<th>US CIRV (Cincinnati)</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A post-industrial city, established in the 6th Century and first came to prominence as the 'second city of the (British) Empire' in late 18th and early 19th Centuries</td>
<td>A post-industrial city, established in 1788 and became an important industrial centre in mid-19th Century</td>
<td>Similarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population of Glasgow city - 600,000</td>
<td>Population of Cincinnati city - 300,000</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population of Greater Glasgow conurbation – 2,500,000</td>
<td>Population of Greater Cincinnati conurbation – 2,000,000</td>
<td>Similarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffered from post-industrialisation and economic decline</td>
<td>Suffered from post-industrialisation and economic decline</td>
<td>Similarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High levels of unemployment, social and economic deprivation and rising crime</td>
<td>High levels of unemployment, social and economic deprivation and rising crime</td>
<td>Similarity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Graham (2015)

As discussed in detail in Chapter 1, it is clear that both cities had similar backgrounds in relation to their economic growth and subsequent decline due to various factors. Both were major industrial centres, with large inner-city populations affected by economic downturns over the years, leading to areas of social deprivation, as the population moved out to more affluent urban areas. Chapter 2 discusses this aspect of social change and movement of populations that led to large parts of both cities suffering from high unemployment and rising crime rates, as discussed by Park and Burgess (1925) and Shaw and McKay (1942). Accordingly, both cities suffered from poor economic and poverty conditions that allowed gangs to flourish in these inner-city areas (see Table 4 above).
Chapter 2 discussed the gang situation in Glasgow and the research that has been carried out over the years by various researchers (see Table 5 below). This concluded that Glasgow has had a similar problem with gang violence as did Cincinnati, albeit on a different scale and with different types of gangs and their members. For example, Cincinnati gangs comprised adult, black African/American males, while Glasgow gangs comprised young, white males, generally of a younger age group, typically aged between 12 and 26, reflecting the different ethnic makeup of the cities. However, these cultural differences do not detract from the scale and impact the violence has on communities in each city.

Table 5: Areas of Comparison between Glasgow CIRV and US CIRV - Gangs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glasgow CIRV</th>
<th>US CIRV (Cincinnati)</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gangs - predominantly young white males aged 12-26</td>
<td>Gangs – predominantly black African-American older than Glasgow</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in casual street violence over territoriality issues, not engaged in acquisitive crime, e.g. drug dealing</td>
<td>Territorialism issues. Engaged in ‘turf’ wars, lack of respect issues related to illegal drugs and guns market</td>
<td>Similarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol misuse prevalent</td>
<td>Alcohol misuse not prevalent</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons used – knives, bottles and sticks etc., but not guns</td>
<td>Weapons used – primarily guns</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Graham (2015)

Other issues were found to be similar in relation to territoriality (Kintrea, et al., 2010), or ‘defended neighbourhood’ (Suttles, 1972) and the use of violence between rival gangs in protecting their own areas. One significant difference in the violence was the use of different type weapons in each city, with Cincinnati gangs using firearms, while this
research has also determined that gang members in Glasgow typically used any weapon, other than firearms, with knives being predominantly used.

Alcohol misuse is also a factor in Glasgow with young people regularly being under the influence of alcohol during instances of violence, while drug abuse in Glasgow is not generally associated with violence. In contrast, the gangs in Cincinnati are heavily involved in drug misuse and acquisitive crime associated with the illegal drugs and firearms market, leading to violence to protect their ‘turf’ or gang territory, whereas the territorialism issue in Glasgow is more about protecting their own area and is generally not linked to acquisitive crime.

The issue of taking into account socio-economic factors in policy transfers, or in the case of policy mobilities and mutations as discussed by human geographers, (see Peck and Theodore, 2010; Peck, 2011; and McCann and Ward 2012), is of paramount importance to decision makers and actors involved in the transfer process. However, this research has determined that these social factors of difference and similarity did not have a major effect on the decision to transfer the initiative to Glasgow. The existence of the gangs and their negative impact on society in Glasgow led to the decision by the police and VRU officials in Glasgow that something had to be done to combat the problems.

Chapter 5 fully discussed the reasons why the police and VRU officials decided to look elsewhere for an answer to the gang problem in Glasgow. The issues identified were the gang violence associated with territorialism, the fear of crime experienced by members of the public, the impact on resources of the city agencies and a growing realisation that the police, or any other single agency could meliorate the problem effectively and finally, a recognition that what had been tried in the past had/was not working. This is in contrast to Cincinnati where a ‘trigger point’ had been reached, leading to the establishment of US
CIRV (see Table 6 below). I would also argue that the actors responsible for the transfer decision, actually carried out limited research into ideas and initiatives elsewhere in the country and on a wider global scale, to tackle the problem. The actors in Glasgow seemed to be only to ready to replicate the model in Cincinnati as a ready made ‘off the shelf’ solution and subsequently, it could be argued that they carried out little research into its efficacy by only interviewing those actors in US CIRV who were positive architects of the approach there and had no real engagement with critical voices. This is a criticism that is levelled at actors of orthodox policy transfers by Peck (2011) whom he argues, only engage with ‘cheerleaders’ and are not wholly objective in their assessments of the approach adopted.

Table 6: Areas of Comparison between Glasgow CIRV and US CIRV – Trigger Point?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glasgow CIRV</th>
<th>US CIRV (Cincinnati)</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Initiative to Reduce Violence (Glasgow CIRV) established - June 2008</td>
<td>Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (US CIRV) established – July 2007</td>
<td>Similarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding supplied by the Scottish Government for period of 2 years initially and then extended to 3 years (National)</td>
<td>Funded by Cincinnati City Council (Local)</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of operations in the east end of city only later moved to incorporate north of city</td>
<td>Area of operations covered the whole city</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Graham (2015)

This research has identified key actors in Glasgow who played a major part in the policy transfer process; senior officials in their respective fields of professionalism, including police officers and education, social services, housing and community safety officials. The scale of their involvement, influence, roles and actions was uncovered during this
research, to provide insight into the policy transfer process. Each had an important role to play, dependant on their position and influence in their own agency, which would ultimately have an impact on the long-term sustainability of Glasgow CIRV, as discussed later. It was also noted that, in contrast to US CIRV, there was a lack of academic input to assist in the development of suitable robust evaluation tools at the early stages of the Glasgow CIRV implementation, which had a detrimental effect on later evaluation studies, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

A key finding of this research relates to the role that epistemic networks (see Haas, 1989 and 1992; and Dunlop, 2009) played in the sharing of best practice, which is of importance in this process of policy transfer, as discussed in Chapter 3. My research has determined that, in the case of Glasgow CIRV, the police and VRU staff were part of an epistemic network (Haas, 1992) that shared ideas, approaches and experiences from police and academics in America. It was common for police and VRU staff to attend conferences and conventions of police officers and other professionals in America, where they learned of the US CIRV project and the focused deterrence strategy adopted there. Without this network, such best practice sharing may not have happened and the initiative may not have been transferred to Glasgow. It was also clear that they did not look locally or nationally within the UK for solutions. This lack of a local or national solution and the apparent willingness of the Glasgow officials to look to America is symptomatic of the patterns of transfer of policies and ideas from America to the UK that became usual in the late 20th and early 21st Centuries (Newburn, 2002; Newburn and Sparks, 2004; Newburn and Jones, 2007).

The part the police played in this case of policy transfer proved to be multi-faceted. The key responsibility of the police has been, and is primarily, a law enforcement agency. The
knowledge search and the role of the epistemic network of senior police officers in the US and the UK provided the police in Glasgow with a new strategy, namely the focused deterrence strategy developed in Boston and latterly, Cincinnati. This type of strategy did involve the police in its main function as a law enforcer; however, senior officers also had a role to play in the implementation of the multi-agency approach and the formulation of partnerships with other agencies.

This dual role of the police was a matter of some concern to the Scottish Government in the funding process, as discussed in Chapter 5, whereby the government was not prepared to enter into a bilateral arrangement with Strathclyde Police to deliver Glasgow CIRV. In order to receive approval and funding, the police had to enter into an agreement with the Glasgow Community Planning Partnership (CPP) to provide a partnership approach. This condition of funding allocation indicates that the government was concerned that the project would be viewed as a police initiative only. Therefore, it was imperative that the CPP provided oversight of the project and ensured that other agencies were equally involved. This is a different funding structure from US CIRV, where the funding was allocated by the city council to the newly created body, US CIRV, with a manager employed by the City Council and the police were viewed as a partner and not allocated funds directly. The structure in US CIRV was found to be more robust, designed to encourage and enhance long-term sustainability. This was not the case in Glasgow CIRV, which will be returned to later in this chapter.

An example of an exogenous factor affecting the eventual shape of the initiative in Glasgow was the different legal systems between the US and UK (see Table 7 below), more specifically, Scots Law as a distinct legal system (McAra, 2008). Glasgow CIRV had set out to copy the structures and ethos of US CIRV in its entirety from the outset, as
discussed in detail in Chapter 6, however, it became apparent early in the transfer process that this would not be possible due to legal constraints placed on Glasgow CIRV by Scots Law and the judiciary.

Table 7: Areas of Comparison between Glasgow CIRV and US CIRV – Legal Constraints

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glasgow CIRV</th>
<th>US CIRV (Cincinnati)</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal constraints led to prevention of use of bail powers to compel people to attend court sessions</td>
<td>No legal constraints to use of parole and probation powers to compel attendance at court sessions</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal constraints led to renaming ‘Call-In’ to ‘Self-Referral Session’</td>
<td>‘Call-In’ session</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Graham (2015)

This research has determined that the legal constraint emerged early in the process of the copying of the US CIRV ‘Call-In’ session, which was designed to allow Glasgow CIRV to communicate the key messages to gang members and have them pass on what they heard to their peers. Research discovered that, at an early stage in the transfer process, that merely copying US CIRV would not be possible or appropriate. Discussions by members of Glasgow CIRV with representatives of the judiciary, discovered that to engage with young people and bring them to the court for the planned ‘Call-In’ sessions, would require powers to compel them to attend, as was the case in US CIRV, where they used probation and parole powers to compel attendance. Glasgow CIRV initially also planned to use bail powers to enforce attendance, however, the judiciary effectively opposed this plan, as Scots Law allows a person to be granted bail in certain circumstances when they have been charged with an offence, but only prior to trial. Therefore, it was argued by the
judiciary that to use bail to compel attendance at such a session might prejudice a fair trial at a later date (Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, S.24).

It was at this stage that Glasgow CIRV realised that any mechanical *copying* of US CIRV was not feasible and the policy transfer become more a process of *emulation*, as discussed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000), i.e. looking to US CIRV for best practice, while taking into account specific socio-economic, legal, policing and cultural factors, resulting in an adaptation being made to suit the local needs of Glasgow.

This need for Glasgow to make the project ‘fit’ the local needs and requirements of Scottish society was referred to as a process of ‘tartanisation’ by the Glasgow CIRV Project Manager, again highlighting a shift from earlier perceptions that the US CIRV model could be *copied* in its entirety. For example, as discussed in detail in Chapter 6, the court sessions planned by Glasgow CIRV to engage with gang members became known as ‘Self-Referral Sessions’, as opposed to ‘Call-In’ sessions as they were known in US CIRV (see Table 7 above). The aforementioned legal constraint on engagement led Glasgow CIRV to move to a process of voluntary engagement, rather than compelling people to attend the court sessions and engage with US CIRV, using US parole and probation powers. This is a significant *difference* in the two approaches, another indication of *emulation* of the US CIRV initiative by Glasgow CIRV, rather than a mechanical *copy*. Further differences and similarities in terms of engagement are summarised in Table 8 below.
Table 8: Areas of Comparison between Glasgow CIRV and US CIRV - Engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glasgow CIRV</th>
<th>US CIRV (Cincinnati)</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central coordinating hub</td>
<td>Project Manager to act as hub for Strategic Managers</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures put in place to mirror US CIRV</td>
<td>Structures replicated in Glasgow CIRV</td>
<td>Similarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public health approach adopted to attempt to minimise harm to the victim/society/assailant</td>
<td>No public health approach</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement process – voluntary</td>
<td>Engagement process – mandatory, compelled to attend as part of probation conditions</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active engagement with young people under 16 years of age (school children) to prevent them becoming involved with gangs</td>
<td>No engagement with young people under 16 years of age. Adults only</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Graham (2015)

The engagement process in Glasgow CIRV, discussed in detail in Chapter 6, **differed** significantly from that operated in US CIRV as a result of the identified legal constraint and who was to be approached. Whereas US CIRV could use legal powers to compel people to attend their ‘Call-In’ sessions, this was not possible for Glasgow CIRV, therefore, new non-legal and non-compulsory methods of engagement had to be sought.

This research has determined that Glasgow CIRV also differed significantly from US CIRV in the engagement of young people under the age of 16. Glasgow CIRV staff targeted young people in an attempt to deter them from becoming involved in violence in the first
place and joining the gangs. This significant departure from the US CIRV model also
directly led to the ‘backflow of policy transfer’ issue that will be discussed later. It will be
argued that US CIRV officials became aware of this practice in Glasgow and the case
management approach used there and decided to change direction and amend their
working practices.

The Glasgow CIRV engagement process initially fell to some local community police
constables attached to Glasgow CIRV for their local knowledge and contacts, who were
assisted by other youth workers and Careers Scotland staff. Glasgow CIRV first used the
same intelligence gathering exercise as carried out by US CIRV, using information from a
variety of sources, including police and local community groups. This exercise identified
approximately 650 young people involved with 55 known gangs in the east end of
Glasgow (see Appendix 2), aged between 12 and 26, with the peak ages identified as 14-
18 years. Glasgow CIRV concentrated its efforts on those gang members who were
‘known’ to have engaged in violence as part of a gang; since it was perceived that they
posed the biggest risk to the community and themselves (Glasgow CIRV Intelligence
Practice Note, 2010).

The information gathered by Glasgow CIRV was for use by the team and, crucially, its
partners. To facilitate this, an Information Sharing Protocol was agreed by partners,
which was a significant departure from US CIRV, where the police did not share
information with other partners, but kept it for their own use (see Table 9 below).
Table 9: Areas of Comparison between Glasgow CIRV and US CIRV – Information Sharing and Academic Input

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glasgow CIRV</th>
<th>US CIRV (Cincinnati)</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information sharing with key partners</strong></td>
<td><strong>Lack of information sharing with key partners</strong></td>
<td><strong>Difference</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lack of academic evaluation tools at the outset of the project. Academics not embedded into the project at the outset had a negative impact on providing robust evaluation tools to be implemented</strong></td>
<td><strong>Academic experts involved from the outset of project and able to provide expert advice and evaluation of results</strong></td>
<td><strong>Difference</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Graham (2015)*

This research also discovered that the sharing of information also allowed Glasgow CIRV to use other partners in the engagement process, and this helped to widen the network to approach as many people as possible to attend the ‘Self-Referral Sessions’. As previously discussed, this was a distinctly different approach from US CIRV who used the services of the Probation and Parole Departments to compel people to attend ‘Call-In’ sessions. I would suggest that in contrast to US CIRV, this endogenous factor allowed Glasgow CIRV to become more inclusive in its approach to other agencies and allowed them to engage more widely, involving younger people than US CIRV, and employ a stronger crime prevention focus than US CIRV, who only engaged with adults already in the criminal justice system.

Interestingly, the Cincinnati Police Department did not at first have the expertise to build a database to analyse relevant intelligence. Therefore, they turned to the University of Cincinnati to assist, who supplied some doctoral students and experts in data analysis. This proved controversial at first, as the police officers displayed some elements of ‘cop
culture’ as discussed by Reiner (2000) in the form of ‘isolationism’ and ‘suspicion’ of the outsiders and initially closed ranks. However, officers quickly realised the value of their expertise being offered, which served to break down barriers.

In contrast to the central role they had in US CIRV (see Table 9 above), the absence of academic expertise in Glasgow CIRV can be examined in light of the lack of a robust evaluation framework for Glasgow CIRV. US CIRV had an academic placed in a central position in the management structure, in charge of the Systems Team, and this ensured that a proper and accountable system of evaluation was ‘built in’ to the structure to provide an on-going analysis of results, levels of engagement and crimes committed. This was not the case in Glasgow CIRV, as it was only at a later date did Glasgow CIRV engage academics to contribute to the evaluation of the project.

I would argue that the lack of a robust external evaluation methodology, as provided by professional academic input at an early stage in the transfer process, had a detrimental effect on Glasgow CIRV’s ability to produce results for independent evaluation. Glasgow CIRV did publish some evaluation results in their quarterly reports, however, it would have been beneficial to have a more structured evaluation model in place at the outset of the project to provide valid and reliable data for independent analysis and scrutiny. This failing appeared to hinder Glasgow CIRV in producing relevant data as reliable evidence of progress at a later stage, especially when attempting to secure funding in order to ensure longer-term sustainability.

Enforcement in Glasgow

This research has identified a further exogenous factor, a legal constraint that directly affected the policy transfer to Glasgow (see Table 10 below). It was established that
Glasgow CIRV at first attempted to copy US CIRV in adopting a strong enforcement ethic that was to be followed in the event of continuing violence on the part of the gangs. It was the intention of Glasgow CIRV that this message would be conveyed to all concerned at the ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ to share with their peers and also by police officers and other law enforcement agencies. As discussed in Chapter 7, Glasgow CIRV also developed a protocol for various levels of violent acts, ranging from minor or common assault through to serious assaults and murders (homicides) (see Figure 3).

**Table 10: Areas of Comparison between Glasgow CIRV and US CIRV – Enforcement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glasgow CIRV</th>
<th>US CIRV (Cincinnati)</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement Team lead was a police Constable</td>
<td>Enforcement Team lead was a police Captain</td>
<td>Similarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scots law led to constraints being placed on enforcement operations. Not able to target a ‘whole’ gang effectively</td>
<td>US law more lax on enforcement agencies allowing more robust enforcement operations. Able to target a ‘whole’ gang effectively</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Team was significantly smaller than US CIRV</td>
<td>Community Team was robust and included members of local communities</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Graham (2015)*

Although the message, that continued violent behaviour would result in a strong enforcement response from the police, with individuals being removed from programmes and targeted enforcement action against groups as a whole, was conveyed to all participants at the sessions, it gradually became apparent that this enforcement threat, that the whole gang would be targeted, was not possible. Though Glasgow CIRV,
along with partners, did engage in some small-scale operations, as discussed in Chapter 7, large-scale operations against the whole gang did not materialise. It was noted that the police in US CIRV had different legal powers from those of the Scottish police: For instance, it became apparent that the Cincinnati Police Department could ‘hold back’ on evidence of a crime and thereafter act on it later to target the whole gang and then convey that information back at the next ‘Call-In’ session as evidence of a strong enforcement provision (Engel et al., 2008).

In contrast, Glasgow CIRV and the police were unable to engage in such a practice of ‘holding back’ on evidence of a crime taking place. Scots Law determines that the police have a duty to act promptly and report offenders to the Procurator Fiscal as soon as possible if evidence of a crime becomes available. Therefore, I would argue that the message delivered at the ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ was more symbolic than real, since it was not possible for the police to target a whole gang. As it transpired, the police were not put in such a position during the period of operations for Glasgow CIRV and the symbolic powers and messages went unchallenged.

**Policy Transfer Outcomes for Glasgow CIRV**

As discussed, various differences in culture, society and the legal system in Scotland led to the Glasgow CIRV team making certain adaptations to ensure that the model transferred from US CIRV could ‘fit’ local needs and requirements. As discussed in Chapter 7, the ‘Self-Referral Session’ in Glasgow was designed to *copy* the US CIRV ‘Call-In’ session, and this continued to be the case, even after the name change.

The ‘Self-Referral Session’ aspect of this policy transfer was seen as the main method of communicating the key messages to the gang members that the violence had to stop (see
Table 11 below). Glasgow CIRV officially launched with two sessions on the 24th October 2008, one for young people, under the age of 16, in the morning and one for adults, over the age of 16, in the afternoon. The decision to attempt to engage with young people under 16 (school age) was a major difference from the engagement carried out by US CIRV, as they only engaged with adults who had been found guilty of being involved in violent crime. In this respect it could be argued that Glasgow CIRV looked to use a prevention message for young people and deter them from becoming involved in violence, in contrast to the anti-recidivist message used in US CIRV for known offenders. As discussed earlier, the different Scottish legal system placed a legal restriction on Glasgow CIRV in not allowing children less than 16 years of age to be at the same session as adults. Therefore, a decision was made to hold a separate session for young people excluding adults at the insistence of the Reporter to the Children’s Panel (SCRA).

I would argue that this was a significant change to the project in Glasgow to that of US CIRV. The decision to engage with young people and deliver prevention messages, directly led to the backflow of policy transfer later in the timeline of the projects, when US CIRV staff decided to copy the working practices in Glasgow CIRV to align them with adopting a more inclusive and holistic approach to addressing the needs of ‘clients’. This point will be discussed in full later in this chapter.
Table 11: Areas of Comparison between Glasgow CIRV and US CIRV – “Self-Referral Sessions”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glasgow CIRV</th>
<th>US CIRV (Cincinnati)</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use of Glasgow Sheriff Court for ‘Self-Referral Sessions’</td>
<td>Use of Hamilton District Court House for ‘Call-In’ sessions</td>
<td>Similarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speakers reflected key messages delivered at ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ – law enforcement (police/doctors), community members (mother of victim, ex-offenders), service providers</td>
<td>Speakers reflected key messages delivered at ‘Call-In’ sessions – law enforcement (police/doctors), community members (mother of victim, ex-offenders), service providers</td>
<td>Similarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of religious speakers not successful in ‘Self-Referral Sessions’</td>
<td>Use of religious speakers considered to be key in ‘Call-In’ sessions</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of motivational speaker at end of ‘Self-Referral Sessions’</td>
<td>‘Call-In’ sessions closed by Project Manager</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Graham (2015)

The ‘Self-Referral Sessions’ were first run along the same lines as the US CIRV ‘Call-In’, as discussed in detail in Chapter 7, with similar type speakers and messages being delivered. However, over time, subsequent sessions in Glasgow CIRV changed to reflect the distinctive needs of Glasgow society and those of the young people in the courtroom. Therefore, Glasgow CIRV was again seen to engage in a process of emulation of US CIRV in this facet of the model by using different types of speakers.

As discussed in Chapter 7, most interviewees commented positively on the Glasgow CIRV ‘Self-Referral Sessions’; however, the sessions also attracted negative comments,
including one key actor expressing feelings of ‘shame’ and a sense of ‘failure’ to make a difference to the young people’s lives. The negative comments appeared to reflect deeper concerns that Glasgow CIRV was just another short-term and narrowly focused project with large funds allocated to it, which could be better spent elsewhere. As a key actor in Glasgow CIRV, this person’s negative opinion may have ultimately influenced the demise of Glasgow CIRV. Furthermore, one member of the Glasgow CIRV team felt the session was a waste of taxpayers’ money and ‘a bit of a pantomime’, feelings they had not made known while working in Glasgow CIRV.

**Case Management Post ‘Self-Referral Sessions’**

A significant endogenous factor in the establishment of Glasgow CIRV was process of case management devised for the project, which proved to be very different from that operated by US CIRV (see Table 12 below). US CIRV had initially employed the services of a ‘stand-alone’, non-profit making organisation, ‘Cincinnati Works’, to provide a one-stop-shop for those engaged with US CIRV with a case management facility that looked at employability options only. Glasgow CIRV, on the other hand, employed a case manager whose responsibility was to assess the individual needs of those engaged and to assign them to appropriate services for support in further education, self-development opportunities or their particular needs.
Table 12: Areas of Comparison between Glasgow CIRV and US CIRV – Case Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glasgow CIRV</th>
<th>US CIRV (Cincinnati)</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Case management system carried out ‘in-house’ by Glasgow CIRV staff</em></td>
<td>Case management system carried out by external service provider</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>'Whole systems’ approach, needs of the individual taken into consideration</em></td>
<td>Employability issues only considered at the outset. This changed to incorporate a ‘whole systems’ approach after Glasgow CIRV site visit in April 2009 ('backflow of policy transfer')</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Lack of mentor provision</em></td>
<td>Strong street advocacy and mentoring in place</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Graham (2015)*

In contrast to US CIRV, who used employability schemes only, Glasgow CIRV created a ‘suite of options’ that outlined the services available to those who engaged and included education, employment opportunities, diversionary programmes and support services. It was the intention that existing services/resources in the city would be used and various service providers agreed to participate (see Appendix 19).

However, this research has determined that not all of the services were available to Glasgow CIRV, as some service providers pulled out of Glasgow CIRV at an early stage, as they were unable or unwilling to engage with the type of young person that Glasgow CIRV was looking to engage with, namely young violent gang members. In addition to existing services, Glasgow CIRV had to engage the services of two private companies to provide football and self-development courses. These services cost Glasgow CIRV a significant
amount of money, which went against the original concept of the initiative, as it was meant to access existing services/resources already available in the city, at no extra cost: this also had a bearing on the longer-term sustainability of Glasgow CIRV, as will be discussed later. However, other services were available and accessed, for example, youth clubs and ‘drop-in’ centres offered places, and the Army provided a one-off outward-bound programme for two rival gangs who had been engaged in serious violence, which proved to be somewhat of a success with the fighting stopping between the rival gangs, as discussed in Chapter 7.

This research has determined that Glasgow CIRV offered a wide range of support services as outlined in Chapter 7. The ‘whole systems’ or holistic approach of offering a wide range of services, including life-skills, well-being and health courses, personal development, employability and skills courses, anti-violence and knife awareness courses differed significantly from US CIRV, who, as previously discussed, used the employability services of ‘Cincinnati Works’. However, this changed for US CIRV as a result of a site visit to Cincinnati by members of the Glasgow CIRV team, as discussed later.

**Funding and Sustainability**

As highlighted in Chapter 7, the issues of funding and sustainability were important points of the Strategic Plan set out at the beginning of the project. The Scottish Government insisted before the funding application for Glasgow CIRV was approved that the Glasgow Community Planning Partnership (CPP) would agree to roll out the Glasgow CIRV model across Glasgow, should it prove to be successful and funding would thereafter be provided by the city agencies. This was commented on in the Glasgow CIRV 2nd Year
Report (2011), which stated that the project had completed its ‘proof of concept’ phase and was operating in the north and east of the city with partnership co-operation of city agencies.

However, as discussed previously, this report also stated that the concept of a Glasgow CIRV Academy was being proposed as a vehicle to continue with the Glasgow CIRV model citywide in 2011. This model was similar to the ‘one-stop-shop’ model initially utilised in US CIRV by ‘Cincinnati Works’ witnessed by team members during the site visit in 2009 and was an idea that the new Glasgow CIRV Manager had been keen to explore. Ironically, this research uncovered the fact that while Glasgow CIRV management were considering this move to the ‘Academy’ approach similar to what had been seen in Cincinnati in 2009, US CIRV were in fact in the process of changing their processes to reflect the Glasgow CIRV model, specially in relation to case management and the adoption of a more holistic approach to deal with the needs of their ‘clients’.

The Glasgow CIRV Academy model would include a number of commercial, charitable and voluntary partners and be an ‘informal and innovative collective provider of core programmes and services, which any future partner is encouraged to join where they have the means and capacity to do so’ (see Appendix 23). It was further proposed that the new structure would be relocated from the VRU to Strathclyde Police from April 2011 and a new strategic plan developed along with a new Information Sharing Protocol for partners.

This concept of a Glasgow CIRV Academy indicated a departure from the original concept that was proposed and agreed upon at the outset, by the key partners in the city structure and the CPP that was key to the funding grant at the outset and is therefore central to the discussion of the long-term sustainability of Glasgow CIRV.
This research has not been able to ascertain the official reasons why there was a departure from the original concept of ‘rolling-out’ the model across the city. The failure of the city agencies and the CPP to continue funding the project and extend it out across the city has never been addressed. Even the government was not clear on what happened to the commitment from the CPP to fully engage the concept for the rest of the city at the conclusion of the initial funding period, as planned at the outset of the project and as a condition of funding, which indicates a lack of oversight in terms of accountability.

I would argue that the importance of continued financial support cannot be overstated and the failure of city officials to continue to support Glasgow CIRV eventually led to its demise, in spite of its claimed success in crime reduction amongst the target group. I would also argue that the change of focus that the new Glasgow CIRV Project Manager proposed, in relation to moving to the ‘one-stop-shop’ approach that he had seen during the site visit to Cincinnati in 2009, had a negative impact on the sustainability of Glasgow CIRV. It is clear that all/some city officials did not support the initiative ‘going forward’ in the format of a ‘Glasgow CIRV Academy’ and I would argue that some key actors had merely ‘paid lip service’ to Glasgow CIRV from the start, as indicated by the comments made by the Community Safety Director who did not believe that Glasgow CIRV was an effective model of engagement. Furthermore, this key actor also commented negatively on the management of Glasgow CIRV, stating that it was the worst that they had worked with in the sector of working with young people. It is clear therefore, that tensions existed in the city between key actors in positions that would have an influence in the future direction of Glasgow CIRV, that had nothing to do with the success/failure of the initiative, but more to do with competition for funding and resources and a lack of belief that it was a worthwhile approach (see Table 13 below). It is clear that these key actors had different views on the success or otherwise of Glasgow CIRV and had different opinions.
on the way forward. While the management of Glasgow CIRV saw the Glasgow CIRV Academy model as an appropriate vehicle to move on across the city, this view was not shared by others, most notably the Glasgow Community Safety Director and Deputy Director.

Table 13: Areas of Comparison between Glasgow CIRV and US CIRV – Sustainability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Glasgow CIRV</th>
<th>US CIRV (Cincinnati)</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of political and key stakeholder support</td>
<td>Lack of key central figure of power and authority negatively impacted on long-term sustainability of project</td>
<td>Political and key stakeholder support</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mayor in position of power and authority who is able to authorise and instruct project to continue</td>
<td>Political and key stakeholder support</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure of city to implement long-term funding and lack of sustainability</td>
<td>City committed to long-term funding and ensure sustainability</td>
<td>Mayor in position of power and authority who is able to authorise and instruct project to continue</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceased operations in July 2011</td>
<td>Still in operation (July 2016)</td>
<td>Mayor in position of power and authority who is able to authorise and instruct project to continue</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Graham (2015)*

The official reasons for the ultimate demise of Glasgow CIRV have not been established during the course of my research. However, it is clear that there was a lack of political support and a willingness to sustain the project beyond the government-funding period.

Furthermore, the concept of developing a Glasgow CIRV Academy led to the formation of a charitable body and an application was made by some individuals connected to the original Glasgow CIRV project, along with the person forming the charitable body, to the Big Lottery Fund to provide future funding for the Academy idea. However, this application failed, as Glasgow CIRV ceased operating in the summer of 2011, when the
initial government funding of £1.5 million ran out. It is also clear that the management of Glasgow CIRV did not have contingency plans in place to counter such an eventuality, as commented on by the Deputy Glasgow Community Safety Director in Chapter 7, who asked the Glasgow CIRV management if they had alternative plans in place, should the Big Lottery Fund application be unsuccessful, to be told that it would not fail!

The demise of Glasgow CIRV is in direct contrast to US CIRV, which is still in operation, and raises the issue of sustainability, one of the key issues that the US CIRV team focused on from its inception in 2007. As noted earlier, the business model developed by the P & G executives was designed to deliver sustainability, even if key people left the project and were replaced. In fact, US CIRV did have a one-year period when it did not operate, as outlined earlier, but after intervention from the new Mayor, it was re-established in January 2012 (Engel, 2012).

Funding became an issue again in 2013 when the police chief left the police department to take up a new post in another city. The result was that US CIRV again stopped and the city saw an increase in shootings, especially in the realm of gang/group-related shooting. However, US CIRV was re-launched in Cincinnati in early 2014 with the Mayor and new Police Chief reiterating their commitment to and support for US CIRV as the way forward for Cincinnati (Cincinnati Local 12 News, 1st January 2014).

This reaffirmation of the US CIRV model, the renewed funding by the city council in order to reduce violence and homicides, is an example of the resilience of the sustainability structure implemented in 2007. Since then there have been many changes in personnel in the US CIRV team and associated agencies, but the business model has allowed US CIRV to proceed with little disruption. The longer-term sustainability of US CIRV has been maintained through continued funding from the City Council and it is clear that the main
partners have fulfilled their commitments to continue to resource and support operations.

I would argue that the difference in funding and sustainability of Glasgow CIRV, when compared to US CIRV, could be summarised and discussed in terms of key stakeholders and the city agencies. Glasgow CIRV suffered from a lack of sustainability, which appears to be about lack of stakeholder and agency support from officials not being willing to continue funding and resourcing the project. As mentioned earlier, some of the reasons given for this were; a lack of support from key stakeholders for the change of direction towards a ‘one-stop-shop’ approach as proposed for the Glasgow CIRV Academy model; the belief of some key actors that the Glasgow CIRV model was not an effective method of engagement; and the absence of an alternative funding plan for Glasgow CIRV in the eventuality of the Big Lottery Fund application failing.

In US CIRV, the sustainability model and structure allowed it to carry on even when a change in police chief and mayor, coupled with the incident with the street advocate, as previously discussed, led to a temporary halt in funding. This highlights the importance of the leadership personalities involved, coupled with the city structure in Cincinnati, which gives the mayor power to authorise city agencies to engage. I would argue that the lack of such a central authority/leadership figure in Glasgow had a negative impact and did not help the case for continued support for Glasgow CIRV, leading to the search for funding outside the city structure and its eventual demise. Glasgow CIRV did not have a leading central figure willing, or able, to instruct and authorise the continued funding/resourcing.

Glasgow CIRV has since been evaluated by academics (Williams et al., 2014), with results that mirror those published in the Glasgow CIRV 2nd Year Report. The figures would seem
to indicate that the project was a success in terms of reducing violence in the areas concerned. However, the project has not been formally evaluated in the same rigorous manner as US CIRV has been over the years.

This takes me back to the point made earlier, about the inclusion of academics at the outset of the project in Cincinnati, which ensured that there was a proper and robust evaluation model in place from the beginning. This allowed a full and critical analysis of the appropriate data and key indicators, which were designed for production on a regular basis. Although Glasgow CIRV did produce their own evaluation figures in the Quarterly Reports, no evaluation model and performance management data analysis were in place at the outset, hindering later efforts to provide a coherent and strong argument for continued funding at the end of the government funding period.

Research into Glasgow CIRV state that gang members were ‘eager to reintegrate into society and the majority of them joined the initiative hoping to find a job and some stability in their lives, and that this demonstrated the effectiveness of the approach’ (Glasgow CIRV 2nd Year Report, 2011: 32 and Williams et al., 2014). Although some research was retrospectively carried out (see Williams et al., 2014), I would argue that this research was insufficient in order to provide a full and rigorous evaluation of the impact of the project, in a valid and reliable way, which would have been facilitated by a performance management framework established from the beginning of Glasgow CIRV, and greater independent academic support.

**Policy Transfer - Success or Failure?**

The third key objective of this research, relates to the question whether the policy transfer achieved its outcomes and the scale of the transfer. It is apparent from this
research that the key actors in Glasgow attempted to copy the US CIRV in its entirety at the outset, but very quickly realised that this would not be possible and that they had to engage in a process of emulation, in order to transfer the approach to Glasgow.

The transfer of the US CIRV model to Glasgow is an example of how the borrowing organisation or body, in this case Glasgow CIRV, must take into account local socio-economic conditions and needs, along with organisational and legal constraints, in order to make the model useful and beneficial to the specific environment. Failure to do so, may have a negative impact on the success or otherwise of the approach transferred, a position also posited by Peck and Theodore (2010) and Ward and McCann (2013) in their discussions on policy mobilities and mutations.

Dolowitz et al. (2000) state that not all policy transfers are successful, however, it is difficult to ascertain if a transfer was a success or not. A measure of success could be that the stated aims at the outset of the transfer process were met or the project was seen to be a success by the key actors involved.

It is clear from the evidence (Glasgow CIRV Reports and interviews), that the key actors and the management team of Glasgow CIRV were of the opinion that the key aims of the project had been met, in that the stated results achieved the desired outcome of reducing violence, with an overall reduction of 46% in violence amongst the target group. Secondly, they were also of the opinion that it was a success, in terms of fostering good partnership working, which they claimed, had not been evident to that extent in the city before.

Dolowitz et al. (2000) comment on three factors that may result in policy transfer failure, uninformed, incomplete or inappropriate transfer. In the case of uninformed transfer, the borrowing country/institution does not have sufficient information regarding the
programme/policy, from which it was being transferred. This was not the case with Glasgow CIRV as the key actors conducted several in-depth site visits and liaised with US CIRV staff on a regular basis to inform the transfer process from US CIRV to Glasgow CIRV. This policy transfer was therefore an informed transfer, given the level of research and information gathering that took place prior to the transfer by VRU and Glasgow CIRV staff.

In the case of an incomplete transfer, Dolowitz et al. (2000) comment on the borrowing country/institution not transferring some key elements of the relevant programme/policy. My research has shown that Glasgow CIRV did in fact attempt to transfer all of the key elements of US CIRV at the outset in an effort to copy US CIRV, but at a point early in this process, it was realised by Glasgow CIRV team members that direct copying was not possible due to the various legal and societal constraints covered previously. Thereafter, a process of emulation was carried out, taking the best practice from US CIRV and applying them to ‘fit’ the local needs of Glasgow. Therefore, I would argue that this policy transfer was a complete transfer, albeit with adaptations to fit the local context.

The final point to be examined is in the case of an inappropriate transfer, which occurs when insufficient attention to detail of different economic, social, political and ideological contexts in the transferring and borrowing countries is not taken into consideration (see Dolowitz et al., 2000; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Jones and Newburn, 2007). This was clearly not the case in Glasgow CIRV, as the different social factors were taken into account, and Glasgow CIRV was established to address the specific needs of the local society, indicating that this was an appropriate transfer.

This research has determined that this instance of criminal justice policy transfer does not fall into any of the three categories of failure as outlined above by Dolowitz et al.
(2000), i.e. uninformed, incomplete or inappropriate transfer. However, the lack of sustainability and funding and the fact that Glasgow CIRV ceased operations in 2011, suggests that it failed in its longer-term goal of sustained reductions in violence for the city as a whole, as at the end of the initial funding phase of three years set by the government, it was not ‘rolled out’ across the city, as was originally intended. As has been reported by Williams et al. (2014), Glasgow CIRV did demonstrate a reduction in violence in the group that engaged with the project; however, as discussed above, questions still exist regarding the generalisability of the results/findings.

I would argue that the reasons why Glasgow CIRV ceased operations in 2011 might lie in the perceptions and actions/inactions of key stakeholders and the strategic position of city agencies. It is clear that some of these key actors were not fully supportive of the idea of Glasgow CIRV from the outset and felt that the substantial money allocated could have been better spent elsewhere. Support was provided initially, but when the funding period was coming to an end, there was no authoritative figure, as there was in US CIRV, to ‘champion’ the approach. There was also a failure on the part of the Glasgow CPP to fulfil their earlier pledge to ‘roll-out’ the concept across the city, but the reasons for this are not clear and there has been no subsequent follow-up regarding this breach of the original conditions of funding allocation, from the Scottish Government.

In conclusion, the question has to be asked if the transfer of the model to Glasgow CIRV was ultimately a success? In light of the above evidence, I would argue that it was, in part, a successful transfer, as Glasgow CIRV was established and ran for a period of three years, but ultimately ceased operations in 2011 as discussed above. As the, albeit limited, evaluation by Williams et al. (2014) illustrated, Glasgow CIRV did show a reduction of
violence in the target group, but it did not achieve long-term sustainability, as was its stated outcome at the commencement of the project.

**Efficacy of the Dolowitz and Marsh Model of Policy Transfer**

The Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) model of policy transfer was chosen as a framework for this research due to its flexibility in terms of the range of factors that could be used to critically analyse this case study of international criminal justice policy transfer, and in most respects it was found to be a useful analytical tool. However, the model was found to have some limitations (a key finding of this research) in terms of fully understanding the final outcome of the policy transfer process.

The limitations identified in this research relating to the model include its unavoidably descriptive approach, but more significantly, its linear and finite framework, which does not allow for the conceptualisation of one of the main findings of this research; (1) the ‘back-flow of policy transfer’; which, I would argue, requires a more cyclical approach in the transfer process; and (2) the model does not allow for the conceptualisation of what happens after a policy has been transferred, where the model of transfer ends, but the process may continue. This criticism of being too linear in its outlook, is also suggested of orthodox policy transfers, such as the Dolowitz and Marsh model of policy transfer, by human geographers, such as Peck and Theodore (2010: 170), who argue that ‘policymaking process is not one of simple emulation and linear replication across policymaking sites, but a more complex process of nonlinear reproduction. Policies will therefore mutate and morph during their journeys’.
Furthermore, the Dolowitz and Marsh model cannot take into account, the importance and significance of local contexts in the eventual outcome of the policy transfer. These contexts are fundamentally important, especially in this case of international transfer, due to the differences in local societies, especially the political, legal, policing and cultural environment, which may impact on the transfer process. Although this is not featured in the model, it is the subject of much empirical study. It is the rich description and discussion of such differences and their importance on how policy transfer is conceived and implemented that adds qualitative rigour to theoretical discourse.

The fourth objective of this research focused on the transferability of this type of policy/programme. It is clear, using the Dolowitz and Marsh framework that in this case of criminal justice policy transfer; a violence reduction programme was successfully transferred from Cincinnati to Glasgow. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, Glasgow CIRV failed to achieve longer-term sustainability and ceased operations in 2011 due to various reasons, for example, a lack of funding and of political support by key stakeholders and the city agencies for its continuation.

I would suggest that the Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) model does not extend far enough to allow for the analysis of a policy or programme that is successfully transferred and operates for a number of years, as in this case, yet ultimately fails. One could ask; at what point does the transfer process stop as a process and the programme or policy that has been transferred become recognised as normal, everyday working practice?

In order for this limitation to be adequately explained, the model would have to facilitate further analysis beyond the three categories of failure outlined earlier and take into account longer-term goals and sustainability. It would seem that a policy or programme can be successfully transferred initially, and therefore be viewed as a success, but can
then fail in the long-term as in the case of Glasgow CIRV. Although the Dolowitz and Marsh model does not recognise this possibility, which could be viewed as a limitation of the model, it could also be argued that this was not their aim when developing the model.

Glasgow CIRV set out to become an everyday, ‘normal’ working practice in the city structure and to be seen as a routine way of working for the city agencies in dealing with violence in gangs. In light of Glasgow CIRV failing to achieve this goal, the policy transfer could be regarded as having failed in the longer term. This is more pertinent given the continued existence of US CIRV, partly explained by another aspect of the process not captured by the Dolowitz and Marsh transfer model.

**Back-flow of Policy Transfer**

A key finding of this research is, what I have termed, the ‘back-flow of policy transfer’, and I have determined that the Dolowitz and Marsh model does not allow for an analysis of this phenomenon, as this requires a more cyclical framework to discuss the features of the occurrence. The model is descriptive and somewhat linear in its approach describing policy transfer as a logical, step-by-step process. As mentioned above, the linear nature of the Dolowitz and Marsh model is also a matter of some criticism by critical geographers, (see Peck and Theodore, 2010; Peck, 2011; and McCann and Ward, 2012). As such, policies will mutate and morph during their journeys and as such are not linear in their development. In this case, I would argue that in a similar fashion, the US CIRV model has undergone a process of emulation, or ‘mutation’, on its transfer from Cincinnati to Glasgow CIRV during the initial transfer stage.
In the case of the policy transfer between Cincinnati (US CIRV) and Glasgow (Glasgow CIRV), the model adequately described the process and mechanisms of transfer. However, it fails to take into account the process of the flow-back of working practices and ideas to the originating site. This can be conceptualised using a more cyclical framework to describe the process of transfer back to US CIRV (see Figure 3 below). By looking at the model and adding this step, one can examine the feedback loop and analyse what transpired. In this case, US CIRV analysed the experiences and working practices of Glasgow CIRV and changed their working practices to copy or emulate the Glasgow CIRV model of case management and engagement.
Figure 3: Process of Internal and International Policy Transfer (Boston to Cincinnati to Glasgow)

- **Internal Criminal justice policy transfer within USA**
  - Boston Gun Project (1996)
  - Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (2007-Ongoing)
- **International Criminal justice policy transfer**
  - Cincinnati to Glasgow (2008-2011)
  - International 'Back-flow' of criminal justice policy transfer - Glasgow to Cincinnati

Source: Graham (2016)
As discussed in detail in Chapter 7, a change in the management of Glasgow CIRV, early
in 2009, with a new project manager being recruited from the police, prompted a site visit
to Cincinnati by members of the Glasgow CIRV project team. After this site visit, some
recommendations emerged as part of a review process in Glasgow CIRV that I would
argue had limited impact and success. For example, the intention of a robust enforcement
capability was not possible, due to the differences between US Law and Scots Law. Other
measures included developing the ‘moral voice of the community’, which was
successfully engaged in US CIRV, but not in Glasgow. As a result of the different
context/environment in Glasgow, it proved to be difficult to engage with community
members to allow their voices to be heard, as opposed to the success of this approach in
US CIRV, which was particularly strong in engaging local communities. US CIRV had
dedicated local members of the communities who were fully engaged, and assisted by the
US CIRV Community Team lead, and regularly took part in local activities, spreading the
US CIRV messages. This was not the case in Glasgow CIRV, where difficulties in identifying
and engaging key community members resulted in a distinct lack of community support.
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 7, diversionary schemes were identified for young
people under 16 for improvement and the establishment of a mentoring scheme for
Glasgow CIRV, but these failed to develop significantly. However, the new Glasgow CIRV
manager was impressed by the one-stop-shop approach offered by ‘Cincinnati Works’
and began developing a similar model for Glasgow CIRV, a ‘Glasgow CIRV Academy’
model, discussed earlier in this chapter in relation to the sustainability issue.

Paradoxically, my research has determined that following the Glasgow CIRV site visit to
Cincinnati, the US CIRV team discussed the ‘whole systems’ approach that Glasgow CIRV
had developed, of looking at the individual needs of the person and addressing those
needs by offering courses and assistance as required: It was felt in Cincinnati that the then current service provider, ‘Cincinnati Works’, could not sustain a ‘whole systems’ approach to services as it was more focused on employment provision for adults. Thereafter, US CIRV restructured their service provision to mirror that operated by Glasgow CIRV at that time and offer a more services to take into account the social and health needs of individuals and not just employability issues, by employing a new service provider, ‘Taberham House’.

This change in focus and direction was developed as a direct result of the visit of the Glasgow CIRV team members and by learning from their experiences, an example of information and practices being shared by epistemic networks (Haas, 1992). This development and change of operation indicates that US CIRV, the originator of the project in Cincinnati and the policy transfer to Glasgow CIRV, learned from the recipient of the original policy transfer, Glasgow CIRV. Figure 3 above (see also Appendix 22) illustrates this flow of ideas and working practices, first internally within the US, from Boston to Cincinnati. This was followed by the instance of international criminal justice policy transfer, where the information and learning from best practice flowed from Cincinnati (US CIRV) to Glasgow (Glasgow CIRV) in 2008. Thereafter, there was a further exchange of working practices and ideas back to Cincinnati from Glasgow in 2009, which led to US CIRV changing their services to mirror those in Glasgow CIRV.

I have termed this transfer of policy as a ‘back-flow of policy transfer’, as it indicates that adapted policies and programmes, or parts thereof, can flow back to the originating source from the original ‘borrower’ of the policy or programme, in this case US CIRV to Glasgow CIRV and back to US CIRV, leading to developments in US CIRV to improve services. It does not appear that this phenomenon has been documented before in the
field of international criminal justice policy transfer in the studies that have been analysed, for example, private prisons, electronic tagging, Zero Tolerance Policing, ‘Three Strikes and You’re Out’ and the ‘broken windows’ approach (Newburn and Sparks, 2004; Jones and Newburn, 2007).

The perceived growing trend of the UK importing policies from America, has been discussed by Newburn (2002), Newburn and Sparks (2004) and Jones and Newburn (2007), in relation to the convergence of UK and US crime control policy. It has been the ‘normal’ practice, in the past that ideas and best practice generally flow from the US to the UK, as in this instance; the CIRV approach initially flowed from the US (Cincinnati) to Scotland (Glasgow). However, the process has in fact been partly reversed and subsequent working practices, in terms of the model of how to deal with and manage clients, flowed back to the US from the UK. As such, this is a key finding of this research and I believe it adds to the existing academic knowledge base. This aspect indicates that policy transfer in the criminal justice field can, in fact flow both ways. This finding may have an impact on the study of criminal justice policies by proposing an extension to the Dolowitz and Marsh model of policy transfer beyond its linear and finite scope, by showing that transfer can be cyclical in nature and not be restricted to ‘one-way traffic’.
Appendix 1: Cincinnati Gangs Network Analysis

Source: University of Cincinnati and Cincinnati Police Department (2007)
Appendix 2: East End of Glasgow: Gang Territories (Source: Glasgow CIRV Six Month Report, 2009)
## Appendix 3: Research Questions Schedule - Glasgow

| Why and when do actors engage in policy transfer? | Could you tell me a bit about the problems that Glasgow had been experiencing in relation to gang violence?  
What impact did this problem have on your organisation and society in general?  
What other ideas to tackle it been tried before? |
| --- | --- |
| When do actors engage in policy transfer and how does this affect the policy-making and policy transfer process? | Was there recognition that what had been tried in the past was not working?  
Was there any pressure from the public/elected officials/other agencies to make a change?  
Was the government involved in the decision making process? |
| From where are lessons drawn? | What made you look elsewhere for ideas to tackle gang violence, e.g. in Glasgow/Scotland/UK/abroad?  
In looking to America, was there a perception that it was a key jurisdiction/country in crime control policies?  
Did you take into account the different environment (e.g. legal/social/cultural/policing) in America and if so did they make a difference to what was eventually transferred?  
Did you look at other programmes in addition to the CIRV model in Cincinnati?  
What was the attraction of the Cincinnati model?  
What were the key similarities with the problems being faced in Glasgow?  
What benefits could be gained from taking this project from America? |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who transfers policy?</td>
<td>When did partners from other agencies become involved and did they have any influence on the decisions making process to look at Cincinnati?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is transferred?</td>
<td>What parts of the Cincinnati project were deemed suitable to transfer to Glasgow? Why was this?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there different degrees of transfer?</td>
<td>Where there any parts of the Cincinnati model not deemed suitable to be transferred? Why was this?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What restricts policy transfer?</td>
<td>Were there any constraints placed on you, either legally, politically, socially or structurally? Did you face any difficulties or opposition in implementing the project in Glasgow? If so how did you overcome them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How can policy transfer help our understanding of policy failure?</td>
<td>In your opinion how successful was the project in Glasgow and what impact did it have on your organisation and society on general? Would you say that the transfer process of the project from Cincinnati to Glasgow was a success? What lessons can be drawn from this project/approach to gang violence?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How can researchers begin demonstrating the occurrence of policy transfer?</td>
<td>Not applicable.</td>
</tr>
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### Appendix 4: Research Questions Schedule—Cincinnati

<table>
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<tr>
<th>What were the reasons that led to the search for new ideas/policies/programmes?</th>
<th>What were the problems that led you to implementing the CIRV programme? Was there a particular problem in relation to gangs and how long had it gone on for? What impact did it have on your organisation and society?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was there any dissatisfaction with existing programmes etc.?</td>
<td>Was there recognition that what had been tried in the past was not working, and why do you think that was the case? Was there any consultation with the public and other interested parties?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From where were lessons drawn? (This would include consideration of why the US is a key source of exported policies in the field of crime control.)</td>
<td>What was the attraction of the focused deterrence strategy adopted?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who was involved in the transfer of the ideas, policies and practices? (What role, if any, did structural factors play?)</td>
<td>Who was involved in the decision making process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why was this policy transfer deemed suitable?</td>
<td>Were there any similarities in the problems in Cincinnati and Boston?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What exactly was transferred?</td>
<td>Did you transfer the whole model or did you have to adapt it to suit your needs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What was not transferred?</td>
<td>What parts were not deemed suitable to transfer to Cincinnati and why was this?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Answer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Were there any difficulties with the transfer process?</td>
<td>Was it difficult to implement the project in Cincinnati and if so, can you expand on the issues faced?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How complete was the transfer process? (E.g. was it a process of copying or emulation?)</td>
<td>Not applicable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What constraints were there on the transfer process? (A crucial aspect in my view.)</td>
<td>Were there any constraints placed on you, either legally, politically, socially or structurally?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were there any barriers to transfer from within the borrowing country/organisation/institution?</td>
<td>Did you face any opposition to the project and if so how did you overcome them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How was the process transfer related to policy success or failure? (i.e. did it have the intended effect? Were there any unexpected outcomes?)</td>
<td>How successful was the project in Cincinnati and how do you measure success?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What lessons can be drawn from this case of policy transfer?</td>
<td>Not applicable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 5: Glasgow CIRV Interview List

G1    Glasgow CIRV Manager
G2    Glasgow CIRV Police Constable
G3    Glasgow Education Officer
G4    Glasgow Acting Chief Constable
G5    Glasgow Police Divisional Commander
G6    Glasgow Police Task Force Commander
G7    Glasgow Police Area Commander
G8    Glasgow Housing Officer
G9    Glasgow Senior Social Work Manager
G10   Glasgow Education Director
G11   Glasgow Council Community Safety Director
G12   Glasgow Council Community Safety Deputy Director
G13   Glasgow CIRV Evaluation Academic
G14   Scottish Government Civil Servant
G15   Glasgow Youth Worker
G16   Glasgow CIRV Services Provider
G17   Glasgow VRU Director
G18   Glasgow Children’s Panel Reporter
## Appendix 6: Cincinnati Interview List

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<th>C1</th>
<th>Cincinnati Ex-Police Chief</th>
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<td>Cincinnati Probation Officer</td>
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<td>C3</td>
<td>Cincinnati Councilman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>Cincinnati Police Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5</td>
<td>Cincinnati Street Advocate Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>C6</td>
<td>Cincinnati Community Engagement Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C7</td>
<td>Cincinnati US CIRV Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C8</td>
<td>Cincinnati ATF Agent</td>
</tr>
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<td>C9</td>
<td>Cincinnati Police Commander</td>
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<td>C10</td>
<td>Cincinnati Parole Officer</td>
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Appendix 7: Images of civil unrest in Cincinnati, 2001
## Appendix 8: Nvivo Nodes List (Source: Graham, 2015)

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Appendix 9: Glasgow CIRV relationship to Glasgow Community Planning Partnership (CPP) (Source: Glasgow CIRV Strategy Document, 2009)
Appendix 10: US CIRV Organisational Structure

CIRV Organizational Structure

Role: Overall responsibility and key barrier busting

Governing Board

Role: Develop/Deploy strategy; Get resources; Monitor results; Enable key decisions

Strategy/Implementation Team

Role: Develop/Execute the action plan for the strategy

Enforcement Team (Strategy 1)
Robin Engel: Co-Owner
James Whalen: Co-Owner

Services Team (Strategy 2)
Ross Love: Co-owner
Gary Dowdell: Co-owner

Community Team (Strategy 3)
Victor Garcia: Co-Owner
Stan Ross: Co-Owner

System Team (Strategy 4)
S. Gregory Baker: Owner

Mayor Mark Mallory (Governing Board Chair)
Councilman Cecil Thomas (Chair-Law and Public Safety Committee)
City Manager Milton Doloney

Dr. Victor Garcia (S/I Team Co-Chair)
Chief Thomas Streicher (S/I Team Co-Chair)
S. Gregory Baker (Project Manager)
Lieutenant Colonel James Whalen
Dr. Robin Engel
Dr. John Eck
Mr. Ross Love
Professor David Kennedy
Mr. Stan Ross
Mr. Keith Lawrence (Resource)
Mr. Al Spector (Resource)

Source: CIRV Best Practice (2008: 98)
Appendix 11: Glasgow CIRV Oversight Group (*Roles are in brackets*)

- The Scottish Government (Funding)
- Scottish Violence Reduction Unit (Operational oversight)
- The University of St Andrews (Evaluation advice)
- Glasgow Caledonian University (Evaluation advice)
- Strathclyde Police (Enforcement and support)
- Glasgow Community & Safety Services (Seconded Staff)
- Glasgow Housing Association (Seconded Staff)
- Glasgow City Council Education Department (Seconded Staff)
- Glasgow Community Planning Ltd (Support)
- East Glasgow Community Health and Care Partnership (Support)
- NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde (Support)
- Culture and Sport Glasgow (Support)
- Careers Scotland (Support & Seconded Staff)
- Job Centre Plus (Support)
- The Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (Support)
- Scottish Children's Reporter Administration. (Support)

(Source: Glasgow CIRV 1st Year Report)
Appendix 12: US CIRV Radio Bulletin used in Cincinnati

“In breaking news...

A broad coalition of African-American community and neighbourhood representatives from throughout Cincinnati announced a partnership with city, county, state and federal officials to put in place plans designed to significantly reduce gun violence here.

This “Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence” has identified the street groups that are responsible for much of the violence.

Several dozen African-American neighbourhood leaders and activists spoke to a number of group members in meetings today at the County courthouse. They delivered the message that the violence in our neighbourhoods is out of control and that the community is demanding that it stop now.

"We value and care about our youth – and we have to protect our neighbourhoods – for that reason we have to draw the line here and now. We are prepared to help those who are caught up in 'the life', if they are willing to step forward and seek help – but the shooting must end no matter what”, said Reverend Calvin Harper. This message was echoed by many other community members during the meeting.

Group members were told about a new law enforcement strategy. Beginning immediately, the next time a member of a group kills anyone, not only will they be pursued for the murder but, in addition, any other members of their group involved in criminal behavior will be pursued. The coordinated resources of city, county, state, and federal law enforcement agencies will be brought to bear on the entire group.

A team of service providers communicated their commitment to help group members who want off the streets. Education, mentoring, treatment and employment services are being made available to those who want to change their lives for the better.

"The community has spoken. The violence is intolerable,” said Mayor Mark Mallory with council members at his side. “That message is being delivered to those who need
to hear it most. We have put together the resources that can help those who want to pursue employment, as an alternative to a life scarred by illegal and violent behaviour. Those who continue the shooting will be dealt with swiftly from this point forward. The community will accept nothing less than this.”

Source: (CIRV Best Practice, 2008: 40)
Appendix 13: US CIRV Information Pamphlet (given to members of the community) (Source: CIRV Best Practice, 2008: 59-60)

The Killing Must Stop!

To Stop the Killing Cincinnati Law Enforcement Has a New Game Plan

Cincinnati, Hamilton County and the Federal Government are organized in a new way to use all available laws to stop the killings.

Severe Consequences

If you are in a group involved in a killing not only will the shooter be arrested, your entire group will be aggressively pursued and prosecuted even those not involved in the shooting. Everyone in the crew will be arrested for any illegal action – no deal, no out, no exceptions and no shell time.

To Escape this World of Violence

Maybe you don’t have a work history. Maybe you’ve never had a real job. Maybe you’ve been in and out of prison for multiple felony convictions. And maybe now, you wish things were different.

We can get you where you want to be. We won’t promise it will be easy. You’ll have to want it more than you’ve wanted anything you’ve ever wanted before.

You can stay in the dead-end streets or you can begin making a better future for yourself. Be the difference. We can help you. We want to help you.

CIRV Service Sign-up Line

513.633.3800

CIRV

Initiative to Reduce Violence

If you are a member of a group and want to change your life for the better you need to...

Make the Call — 513.633.3800

Call the CIRV Service Sign-up Line to get connected with someone in your local area who will act as your coach through all phases of the CIRV process.

Get A Plan & Purpese

Your coach will help you make a life plan and purpose that you can be proud of.

Get Clean

You MUST get clean to achieve your dreams. There is a network designed to help those who may have substance abuse issues.

Get A Job & Stick With It

Get a job and stay on it for 12 months. This helps clean up your record and more importantly makes you eligible for higher paying jobs.

Get Smarter

More education gives you a better chance for real success. If you take full advantage of the educational opportunities you can increase your pay by 500% or more.

The difference is between Survival and Thriving.
Must Stop!

The Community is a Full Partner
Community members from across Cincinnati have joined with city, county, state and federal officials to stem group-related gun violence. The Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV) has identified the street groups who are responsible for much of the city’s violence. Several dozen neighborhood leaders and activists are delivering the message to these groups:

The level of violence in our city is unacceptable and it must stop!

Consequences for those who won’t stop will be severe.

Immediate help is available for those who choose a different way of life!

The Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV) is a partnership of law enforcement, social services, and the community people most affected by the violence.

The message is clear:

The Killing Must Stop!

Law Enforcement has new rules and punishment is severe.

But, there is help if you want it.

CIRV

In Cincinnati, 4 out of 10 young Black men "in the life" will be killed in 10 years.

The Killing Must Stop!

CIRV Leadership

Dr. Victor Garcia
Colonel Thomas H. Streicher, Jr.

Project Manager

Mr. S. Gregory Baker
Phone: 513-282-1223
Greg.Baker@CincinnatiOH.gov
Funded in part by the City of Cincinnati
Appendix 14: Glasgow CIRV Commitment Form

CIRV COMMITMENT FORM

I ……………………………………, wish to engage with the CIRV project Team and in so doing, I agree not to carry out any act of violence or to carry weapons.

I understand that any support offered to me may be removed immediately if I fail to keep this agreement.

I will attend all scheduled appointments and will remain respectful towards those who are assisting me.

I give my full consent to CIRV Project Team members to share my private and personal information with Education Department, Social Services, Community Health Care Partnership, Careers Scotland, Job Centre Plus and voluntary sector groups. I understand that this information will only be used for CIRV purposes.

SIGNATURE …………………………………………………

CIRV TEAM MEMBER SIGNATURE………………………………………………

DATE………………………..

Source: Glasgow CIRV Gang Engagement Practice
Appendix 15: Cincinnati Police Chief Message at Delivered at ‘Call-In’

“We are changing the way we do policing ..... All of you are here because you have been designated as being at risk, at risk of being the next victim of a very violent crime or at risk of being the next person or perpetrator of a very violent crime. Either way, your chances are way up here, highly increased probability that you are going to wind up in a box. The box could be a 6 x 9 cell that you are in for the next 25 to 50 to 100 years, or in a box that we put 6 feet underground and you are dead for ever and never get out either one of the boxes..... you might get out so you can go walk over to the electric chair.... You are not here because we are mad at you, we are here to offer you an alternative and let you know.... We are going to show you a piece of our play book here, here is how we are going to do this, Jim Whalen is going to stand up and tell you about enforcement and here is the prosecutor’s office.... these are social service agencies that will tell you about some alternatives that you can pursue. I only want you to do one thing for me, I want you to open your ears, open your eyes, open your mind and open your heart and think for the next hour and a half, just listen to what people have to say, if it is good for you let’s give it a shot, if it’s not good for you, and you decide to go back out on the street, ok we will see you tonight some place.... I am just being open and frank with you here, just like I would be on the street”.

Source: Interview Cincinnati Police Chief
### Appendix 16: Operational Plan for Glasgow CIRV ‘Self-Referral Sessions’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4 Weeks Prior to ‘Self-Referral Session’</th>
<th>Action Item</th>
<th>Comments/Action Completed</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| **Choose Approximate ‘Self-Referral Session’ Date** | • Date chosen based on Team’s ability to engage with client group to attend  
• Availability of courtroom (or suitable venue) | | |
| | • Date chosen should be a *minimum* of 4 weeks | | |
| **Coordinate ‘Self-Referral Session’ Date(s) and Time(s)** | • Date/time based on availability of courtroom, sheriff and key speakers | | |
| | • Determine sheriff to officiate | | |
| | • Request use of courtroom and review logistics - seating, break room, pre-staging rooms for guests and speakers | | |
| | • Determine list of key speakers | | |
| | • Send invitation to speak to each speaker | | |
| **Coordinate ‘Self-Referral Session’ Notification Procedure with Interested Parties** | • Identify clients to be invited | | |
• Maintain database of those invited and status of attendance etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Item</th>
<th>Comments/Action Completed</th>
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</table>

### 3 Weeks Prior to ‘Self-Referral Session’

#### Coordinate ‘Self-Referral Session’ Rehearsal Date

Schedule rehearsal for approx. 2 days before ‘Self-Referral Session’ (If possible)

#### Coordinate Executive Meetings

- Coordination Team Meeting – 2 weeks prior to ‘Self-Referral Session’

- Debrief Meeting – week after ‘Self-Referral Session’

- Send meeting confirmation notices

#### Finalise ‘Self-Referral Session’ Speakers and Audience Members

- Develop comprehensive lists of ‘Self-Referral Session’ speakers and audience members with contact information
## Coordinate Media Coverage

- Decide if media coverage desirable, if so, develop Media Plan
- Determine media outlets that should be approached
- Project Manager: advise which CIRV stakeholder(s) are appropriate for each interview based on recommendations of Coordination Team
- Arrange Post 'Self-Referral Session' press conference if deemed necessary

## Operational matters

- Develop operational policing order to endure courtroom, court building and surrounding area security
- Refreshment requirements

## 2 Weeks Prior to ‘Self-Referral Session’

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Item</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Send ‘Self-Referral Session’ Invitation to Dignitaries and Guests</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Council members, potential service providers etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Review Staffing Needs</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ensure there will be adequate CIRV staffing and security for courtroom audience check-in, staging courtroom check-in, court after-hours building entrance and courtroom rear entrance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Review ‘Self-Referral Session’ plans and media strategy</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Coordination Meeting</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Review speaker list, audience list and special guest list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Finalise agenda, order of speakers and speaker scripts</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Intake plan for customary post-‘Self-Referral Session’ influx of calls immediately after event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Plan for ensuring services ready to handle post-‘Self Referral Session’ demand immediately</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Review of any media events surrounding ‘Self-Referral Session’</td>
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<td>1 Week Prior to ‘Self-Referral Session’</td>
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<td>Refreshments</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Revise agenda as needed</td>
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<td>• Monitor speaker timing and advise if changes needed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Content suggestions/revisions to speakers as needed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Revise attendance list as needed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Determine speaker alternates / contingency plans for emotional speakers who may not be able to finish</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day of ‘Self-Referral Session’</th>
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<tr>
<td>Courtroom Setup</td>
<td>• Arrive 4 hours prior to ‘Self-Referral Session’</td>
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</table>
- Arrange seating in courtroom
- Place names for speakers

- Arrange break room for guests and speakers

- Bring speaker time cards to limit speaking time (5 min., 2 min., Done)

**Distribute Lists**
Distribute final participant list and guest list to door attendants

**Announcements to Audience**
- Announcements made to audience before target population enters
- No one enters or leaves courtroom during session
- Mobile phones to be silenced

**1 Week After ‘Self-Referral Session’**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Action Item</th>
<th>Comments/Action Completed</th>
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<tr>
<td>‘Self-Referral Session’ Debrief</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Project Manager Report: actual attendance list, overall impressions</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Evaluation leading to improvements for next ‘Self-Referral Session’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Draft and Disseminate ‘Self-Referral Session’ Audience Survey</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Manager to Send Thank You Email/Letter to Respective Audience, Speakers, Guests and Sheriff</td>
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</table>

*2 Weeks After ‘Self-Referral Session’*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Item</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comments/Action Completed</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordination Team Meeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Discuss survey results</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Decide on guidelines for choosing when to hold the next ‘Self-Referral Session’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Discuss any evidence/anecdotes from the streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Report on service request</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Source: Glasgow CIRV ‘Self-Referral Session’ Best Practice, 2010)*
Appendix 17: Glasgow CIRV Freephone Number Card (Source: Glasgow CIRV Six Month Report, 2009)
Appendix 18: Glasgow CIRV Case Management Process Map

Source: Glasgow CIRV Case Management Practice Note (2010)
Appendix 19: Glasgow CIRV ‘Suite of Options’

Source: Glasgow CIRV Strategic Plan, WG Personal Recollection
Appendix 20: Map of Gang Territories in the north of Glasgow (*Source: Glasgow CIRV 1st Year Report*)
Appendix 21: Continuum of Policy Transfer

Obligated Transfer (Transfer as a result of treaty obligations etc.)

Lesson-Drawing
(Perfect rationality)

Lesson-drawing
(Bounded rationality)

Voluntarily
but driven by perceived necessity (such as the desire for international acceptance.

Conditionality

Coercive Transfer
(Direct imposition)

Source: Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 13); Graham (2016)

**Boston Gun Project (1996)**

- *Internal Criminal justice policy transfer within USA*

**Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (2007- Ongoing)**

- *International 'Back-flow' of criminal justice policy transfer- Glasgow to Cincinnati*

**Community Initiative to Reduce Violence- Glasgow (2008-2011)**

- *International Criminal justice policy transfer- Cincinnati to Glasgow*

Source: Graham (2016)
Appendix 23: Relationship, Roles and Responsibilities - CIRV Co-Ordinating Team and the CIRV Academy Structure

Source: Glasgow CIRV 2nd Year Report
# Glossary and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASBC</td>
<td>Anti-Social Behaviour Contracts (Scotland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASBO</td>
<td>Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (Scotland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSIST</td>
<td>Advocacy, Support, Safety, Information and Services Together (Glasgow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHS</td>
<td>Criminal History System (Scotland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMS</td>
<td>Strathclyde Police Crime Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPFS</td>
<td>Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (Scotland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Community Planning Partnership (Glasgow)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Glasgow Community Safety Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARE</td>
<td>Families Around Easterhouse and Rogerfield</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCSS</td>
<td>Glasgow Community and Safety Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHA</td>
<td>Glasgow Housing Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>Glasgow CIRV</td>
<td>Glasgow Community Initiative to Reduce Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHS</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCG</td>
<td>Organised Crime Gang</td>
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<tr>
<td>P &amp; G</td>
<td>Proctor and Gamble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCRA</td>
<td>Scottish Children’s Reporters Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SID</td>
<td>Scottish Intelligence Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOA</td>
<td>Single Outcome Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCG</td>
<td>Tasking and Co-ordination Group (Police)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Trans-National Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>US CIRV</td>
<td>United States Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VRU</td>
<td>Violence Reduction Unit (Scotland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOI</td>
<td>Young Offender's Institute (Scotland)</td>
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</table>
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